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**CANADIAN JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH**
**REVUE CANADIENNE DE RECHERCHE SOCIALE**
3rd edition / 3e édition

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The first decade of the 21st century witnessed unprecedented changes in the politics of the Canada-U.S. border as well as dramatic increases in international migration worldwide. This special issue on boundaries and borders provides a geographical, historical, and political overview of the patterns, issues, and relationships linking Canada and the United States. As a set, the articles that appear on the following pages provide an analysis of some of the key processes shaping the fluid intersections of geography, migration, and identity north and south of the 49th parallel.

Despite a plethora of published work on international migration during the past decade or so, remarkably little has been said about American migration to Canada or the migration and settlement of Canadians in the United States. This is particularly surprising considering the many shared historical, economic, and cultural ties linking these two neighboring North American countries. Likewise, to date, scholars in a variety of fields have spent a great deal of time comparing and debating the national identities of Canadians and Americans (see, for example, Lipset 1989, Granatstein and Hillmer 1991, Konrad and Nicol 2008 among many others). However, despite ongoing attention to the impacts of migrant flows in other parts of the world, other than the historical analysis of Americans in Canada during the Vietnam War years by John Hagan (2000, 2001) and earlier work by geographer Randy Widdis (1997) and a few other scholars, very little has been accomplished on this topic. Even less has been said about Canadian migration into the United States with the notable exception of Jeffrey Simpson’s Star Spangled Canadians (2000). The goal of this special issue is to help fill this gap in the literature on migration, identity, and place in Canada and the United States.

Identity is a much used term but it is rarely clearly defined. On the one hand, according to geographers Rachel Silvey and Victoria Lawson (1999), identity is linked to particular geographies and is constructed by space, place, and process. Anthropologists Caroline Brettell and Carolyn Sargent (2006) referred to identity as a process of defining the differences between two groups—of distinguishing oneself or one’s country from others. These and other definitions of identity raise a series of intriguing and timely questions about the comparative processes of identity construction, especially the emerging identities of Canadian and American migrants.

We begin with a foundational look at basic knowledge of Canada as expressed by a group of American university students based on a pilot study conducted by James McCormick and Carol Chappelle. Data gathered and analyzed from this Iowa State University assessment of undergraduate students’ knowledge of Canadian geography, politics, culture, and languages serves as a cogent reminder of the persistent lack of basic knowledge about Canada among many if not most Americans. Based on student responses to questions posed to Political Science and French Language students in this assessment, a great deal remains to be done to educate American students about their largest trading partner and northern neighbor.

Next, we have Geographer Susan Hardwick’s article on American migration, settlement, and identity in Canada. Driven in part by an escape from the ultra-conservative policies of the former U.S. President George W. Bush era, as well as a desire for safety and security, multiculturalism, universal health care, gun control, and more open policies toward gays and lesbians, Hardwick’s article shows how there are now more Americans in Canada than at any time since the Vietnam War era. Following her spatial analysis of the migration flows and settlement patterns of U.S.-born migrants in Canada, Hardwick then turns her attention to uncovering some rather surprising findings related to the shifting national identities of these borderland migrants. Based on data gathered and analyzed from survey questionnaires and narrative interviews, it appears that the majority of U.S. migrants in Canada become Canadianized quite rapidly as they replace their former identity as Americans to embrace...
a new identity framed by a strong and abiding desire to become “Canadians.”

The next article by Godefroy Desrosiers-Lauzon builds a regional case study on the southward flow of Canadian snowbirds to Florida. His work provides a fascinating critique on the usual discourse about Canadians in search of the “American Dream.” According to Desrosiers-Lauzon, the “seismic mind-shift” in North America in the post-World War II years fostered the evolution of leisure retirement and encouraged more and more Canadians to move to Florida. Boosterism and the marketing efforts of eager entrepreneurs and politicians who promoted Florida sunshine, leisure activities, and economic development, (along with the social networks that linked Canadian migrants in the United States with friends and family at home), according to Desrosiers-Lauzon, resulted in the emergence of a re-imagined but lingering Canadian identity in the American South.

The next article by historian and national pollster, Jack Jedwab, presents a comparative study of recent migration flows across the Canada-U.S. border. His article is an overview of migration flows southward from Canada to the United States and offers an analysis of the large-scale patterns of Canadian settlement in the U.S. in the past and present. Basing his analysis on census reports, Gallup Surveys, and the results of a bi-national poll conducted by Leger Marketing commissioned by the Association for Canadian Studies, Jedwab found that Canadians who express an interest in moving to the United States most often also strongly agree that they would like to live there for at least part of the year. In the early twentieth century, Canadians flowed into the U.S. in large waves mainly for economic reasons. Similarly, many Canadians move to the U.S. today as “brain drain migrants” in search of economic opportunities in high tech and other professional fields with many depending on NAFTA visas for long-term residency south of the border. Other Canadians come to the United States as permanent or semi-permanent residents as retirees, vacationers, and others attracted to leave home by the perception of a sunnier climate and lifestyle amenities in Florida and other U.S. Sunbelt states.

Next, historian Hector Mackenzie provides a series of astute observations on the relationships between geography, identity, and politics in his contribution entitled “Mapping Canada’s World.” Mckenzie's examination of Canada's international relations in the twentieth century provides evidence that the shifting perceptions of Canada's geographical place in the world significantly influenced the nation's foreign policy during this time period. Canada's views of the world beyond its borders, (especially Europe and the United States), Mckenzie argues, were critically important for the development of Canadian policies on immigration and investments as well as the establishment of markets for Canadian exports. Of central importance to the themes in this issue is Mckenzie's reminder that the dominant trend of the past century was the broadening and deepening of Canadian-American relationships. This trend continues in the current century.

The following article, authored by historian Richard Jensen, is a study of historical and political patterns and processes in Canada and the United States. In Professor Jensen's discussion of “Comparative Nativism,” he looks at nationalism in three comparative nation states—Canada, the United States, and Australia. These countries, Jensen argues, have a great deal in common. Each espouses a strong commitment to human rights for all citizens, has highly developed political, economic and social systems, and depends upon similar legal systems. In addition, all three of these countries have long been dominated by Protestant majority cultures of British descent while also featuring large ethnic minority groups and relatively large numbers of Catholics. However, important differences exist in the ways that each of these countries have debated religious and ethnic issues over the years. Each one also continues to search for its own solutions and policies related to diversity and the integration of minority groups. Among many of the fascinating outcomes of Jensen's article is his finding that, despite often dramatic differences in viewpoints and negative attitudes about immigrants and religious diversity in Canada, the United States, and Australia, during the 1880 to 1914 period, not one single politician in any of these countries took up the cause of nativism or anti-Catholicism (even though it was well known that these issues would carry weight in popular elections for the majority of the electorate). Interestingly, he caps his argument that these similar attitudes led to the successes of both the McKinley Republicans in the United States and the Laurier and King Liberals in Canada.

Historian Jack Little’s article offers an analysis of the impact of the approximately 40,000 American Loyalists on Quebec’s Eastern Townships between 1792 and 1850. Adding to the important role of these English-speaking settlers in the construction of local identities in this region were the important impacts of British missionaries, loyalties established during the War of 1812, the rebellions of 1837-1838, and a drive for economic development in this part of Quebec in this “true American frontier” during the first half of the nineteenth century. Little’s observations on the differences between the landscapes and identities of residents of Quebec and Vermont during this time period provide important new evidence of the related historical and geographical processes involved in
shaping *local identities* versus *national identities* in the Eastern Townships.

This special issue on the impacts of borders and geographic boundaries in Canada and the United States culminates with a reflection on the status of human rights and identity in Canada by Roderick MacDonald, an expert in Constitutional and Public Law. His contribution is the text of a speech given at a symposium commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Canadian Declaration of Human Rights. Throughout his discussion, MacDonald invokes legal pluralism theory to analyze five vignettes during the past few years that illustrate some of the issues involved with human rights in Canada today. Each of these reflections provides a cogent analysis of the impacts of this important document for lives and livelihoods in Canada as well as a powerful conclusion for this collection on the status of geography, migration, and identity in North America.

**REFERENCES**


A division of the Association for Canadian Studies (ACS), the International Association for the Study of Canada (IASC) is a think-tank that promotes bilateral and multilateral exchanges of knowledge between Canada and other countries in areas of mutual interest and concern. It will pursue its mandate through the organization of forums, generating publications and engaging in joint research projects.

Étant une division de l'Association d'études canadiennes, l'Association internationale des études sur le Canada est une boîte à pensées qui promouvoit les échanges bilatéraux et multilatéraux, de connaissances entre le Canada et d'autres pays dans des secteurs ayant un intérêt mutuel. Elle poursuit son mandat par l'organisation de forums, la diffusion de publications et en s'engageant dans des projets de recherche conjoints.
AMERICAN KNOWLEDGE OF CANADA AND QUEBEC: A VIEW FROM MIDDLE AMERICA

James M. McCormick and Carol A. Chapelle are Professors of Political Science and Applied Linguistics at the Iowa State University

This research reports on a survey that was conducted for differing levels of Political Science and French classes at a major American university to assess the students’ knowledge of Canada. We selected these classes with the expectation that students in Political Science and French classes would be more likely to be exposed to Canada than those in other disciplines. We also expect that the longer students studied in these disciplines, the greater would be their knowledge of Canada. However, our results show that students—regardless of the course discipline—possessed limited understanding of the Canadian geography, economics, sports and French language and French culture and that their level of knowledge did not increase from the introductory to the advanced courses in these disciplines. The important implication of this result is that if students are to learn about Canada, a more explicit integration of the topic into their curriculum is necessary.

Americans’ lack of both knowledge of and interest in Canada is a source of regular comment by American Canadianists, who are perplexed and frustrated by the indifference to Canada they witness in the United States. Paul Gecelovsky (2007) argues that the lack of knowledge of Canada in the United States may have been of little significance at one time, as it allowed for the creation of an image of Canada as an idealized America of the past. However, the widely-cited erroneous idea that some of the 9/11 terrorists entered the United States from Canada, has transformed that lack of knowledge of Canada to a potential threat, according to Gecelovsky. He points out that the threat was seen as sufficiently urgent to have prompted several new initiatives by the Canadian government to close that knowledge gap.

As Americans’ knowledge of Canada has become important in the relationship between Canada and the United States, it also achieves a position of significance in Canadian Studies. What has in the past been the subject of anecdotes, observations, and frustration needs to be better understood. Who lacks knowledge of Canada? Is this a characteristic of the general population, or do some Americans have some knowledge about Canada? For example, some segments of the population may be unaware of the capital of Canada, but surely university students of Political Science would know this fact. The official French language policy of Quebec may be unknown to a majority of Americans, but students studying French at American universities seemingly would know about this policy. In this study, we begin to examine American university students’ knowledge of Canada and seek to determine whether university students are unlike the general public in the United States that Gecelovsky describes.

The public’s lack of knowledge of Canada is a finding that crosses the border, as demonstrated by the results of the annual poll by the Dominion Institute showing that Canadians themselves score very poorly when their knowledge of their history, politics, culture and geography are tested. The overall conclusion of the 2007 poll was that the knowledge about Canada among citizens had declined significantly over the ten years that the polling
had occurred (Campbell 2007). Some examples from the 2007 results are illustrative of this limited knowledge:

• 66 percent correctly answered “fur” or “beaver” to a question about the trade of the Hudson Bay Co.
• 8 percent identified the Queen as Canada’s head of state, and 50 percent incorrectly identified the prime minister as head of state.
• 59 percent were able to name four of the five Great Lakes.
• 32 percent correctly indicated how many provinces and territories Canada has.

The results reported in the *Globe and Mail* were for the complete sample of 1,005 randomly selected Canadians, but the story went on to acknowledge that citizens with a university education as well as those who are middle-aged and lived in urban centers had a high probability of obtaining a passing score. Whereas Canadians may have opportunities to learn about their country in higher education, it is not clear that similar opportunities exist in the United States. Indeed, a 2006 op-ed piece in a University newspaper, *The Iowa State Daily*, by a senior in Political Science raised the question of what students in the United States learn about Canada: “I—and I’m guessing that many of my fellow Americans are in the same boat—am unable to remember whether Montreal or Toronto is the capital of Canada, let alone locate it on a map.” Nicole Asmussen (2006) continues:

> Who even knows who governs Canada? When I asked one of my friends, she responded, “Isn’t that one lady still in charge?” I, on the other hand, as a political science major with a superior knowledge of world affairs, felt certain that Canada’s prime minister was a man, with a French-sounding name like Jacque and a last name beginning with the letter K. [Editor’s note: Jean Chrétien left his post as Canada’s prime minister in 2003.]

Consulting a newspaper I was amazed to learn that Canadians elected a new prime minister just last week. In a surprising victory, Stephen Harper and the Conservative party snapped the reins of power from the Liberals who had ruled for the last 13 years. This was tremendous news, but I was suspicious. Why was this the first I had heard of it? Why the low profile? Why was all quiet on the northern front?

The editorial achieved its goal of poking fun at Americans’ limited knowledge of Canada, but at the same time, one cannot help but wonder how such a large country with close proximity to the United States had escaped the attention of a Political Science major. Indeed, it invites us to investigate whether a university education is associated with a greater knowledge of Canada.

Our study investigated this question by testing knowledge about Canada of a sample of university students at Iowa State University. The sample was intended to include undergraduates whom we would expect to have had some exposure to Canada in their courses, and thus possess some demonstrable knowledge about our northern neighbor. One was a group of students in Political Science classes, whom we would expect to have studied various forms of government (such as the Canadian parliamentary system), foreign policy positions, and some economic information about other countries including Canada. We would expect students in Political Science classes to have had specific opportunities in their classes to learn about Canada; moreover, their interest and knowledge of politics should make them seek out opportunities to learn through the media about international politics. The Political Science sample was selected from two levels of students—beginners and advanced level students, from which we would expect to see an increase in scores reflecting an increase in knowledge of Canada from the beginners to the advanced levels. The second was a group of students taking French classes, whom we would expect to have been exposed to French Canadian culture, Canadian language policy, and the opportunity to study French in a study abroad program in Quebec. Like the Political Science students, the French students would be expected to increase their knowledge of particular aspects of Canada the more they study French.

**Research Questions**

Four specific research questions guided our inquiry in assessing these students’ knowledge of Canada and in comparing their relative level of knowledge by these different samples of students. In particular, four clusters of questions were investigated:

1. How well do students in Political Science and French classes perform on a test of knowledge of Canada and on individual items concerning politics, geography, and language and culture? Whereas the general population in the United States is assumed to be largely unfamiliar with Canada, it is possible that university students with some interest in issues beyond the United States would have some knowledge of Canada. If this is the case, we would...
expect students to achieve high scores on the Canada test we developed, which includes questions about geography, politics, culture, and language.

2. Do students in Political Science classes differ from those in French classes with respect to overall knowledge of Canada or in knowledge of any areas of Canada? We would anticipate that students in Political Science would perform better on those items pertaining to politics and that students in French classes would perform better on those items pertaining to Canadian language and French Canadian culture.

3. Do students taking an advanced Political Science course differ in performance from those who are beginners in Political Science? If students studying Political Science are exposed to and taught about Canada, we would expect to see better performance on the survey and on the specific questions targeting Political Science by the students in the 300-level Political Science class than by those in the 200-level Political Science class.

4. Do students in three levels of French classes differ in performance? If students studying French are exposed to and taught about Canada, we would expect to see better performance on the survey and on the specific questions targeting French language and culture by the students as their levels increase from 100-level to 200-level, and 300-level French classes.

METHOD

These questions were investigated through the use of a cross-sectional survey of university students sampled from the relevant courses. The survey was intended to be as brief as possible so as not to take too much class time. Instructors of the targeted classes were asked for 20 minutes of class time and were open to providing us with this time.

SAMPLES

For the Political Science classes, we surveyed two introductory comparative politics courses (Political Science 241), taught by different instructors, and an upper division course on Western European government (Political Science 346), taught by one of the same instructors. Both instructors indicated to us that they either do not discuss Canada or Canadian politics in those classes or do slightly around a particular issue (e.g., health care policy). For the lower division classes in Political Science, the number of respondents was 84 (40 in one, 44 in the other). For the upper division class, the total number of respondents was 63.

Ideally, we would have sampled advanced and beginning level French classes as well, but because of the smaller numbers of students in the French classes we ended up with classes spread across each of three levels. One class was at the introductory level (French 102) with 11 respondents, two classes at the intermediate level (French 202) with 37 respondents and one class at the advanced level (French 304) with 12 respondents. Three different French instructors taught these four classes. One of the instructors in the French 202 class has an interest in Canada and indicated that he had spoken about Canada occasionally. Analysis of the textbook used in the 102 class indicated that Canada was mentioned and information about French-speaking Quebec was included (Chapelle, in press); Celine Dion is mentioned regularly in such textbooks; it is very likely that students of French would be aware of this Canadian celebrity.

CONTENT OF THE SURVEY

We developed a twenty-five item, multiple-choice survey covering important aspects of Canadian society, politics, and culture. The questions targeted knowledge about sports, geography, economics, government and politics, as well as language and French culture. Table 1 identifies the questions addressing these areas of knowledge from the questionnaire and the research question pertaining to each area. (The complete survey is attached as Appendix A.)

PROCEDURES

Students in the three Political Science classes and four French classes were surveyed near the end of spring 2008 semester at Iowa State University. After the instructors had been contacted and an appropriate time has been decided upon, the surveys were conducted by a graduate assistant who read the same protocol statement to each of the classes. That protocol asked the students to participate voluntarily, promised confidentiality of the individual questionnaire responses, and noted that the results would only be reported in aggregate totals. The students could skip any question that they felt uncomfortable in completing. In general, the preponderance of students completed the questionnaire, although several students skipped one or more items. After examining the responses, we decided to not use two questionnaires
TABLE 1. Areas of knowledge of Canada reflected on the Canada test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA OF KNOWLEDGE</th>
<th>QUESTION NUMBER AND TOPIC</th>
<th>ANALYSIS PERTAINING TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>1-Most popular sport 20-Nickname of Toronto’s baseball team</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-Number of provinces 10-Population 11-Capital 14-Province north of Minnesota 18-Location of Canadian population 22-Location of Halifax 24-Newest territory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-Natural gas 21-Important oil center</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-NAFTA 6-System of government 8-Canada in Afghanistan 9-Party with most seats in Parliament 15-Border 17-Canada deployed in Afghanistan 19-Current Prime Minister 23-Universal health coverage 25-Leader associated with the golden age</td>
<td>1, 2, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7-Canada’s official language policy 12-Celine Dion’s place of origin 13-Québec’s language policy 16-Province with French-speaking majority</td>
<td>1, 3, 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where only a few questions at the beginning were answered, and the respondents did not appear to seek to complete the survey (rather than just skipping some questions). Hence, the total number of respondents for the upper division Political Science class was reduced by one to 62, and the total number of respondents in the intermediate French class was also reduced by one to 36.

The demographic profiles of the respondents are largely the same across the Political Science and French classes. For both of these types of classes, the year in school was distributed across the four years, but there were larger percentages of students in the freshmen and sophomore years among the respondents than in the junior and senior years. Since more of the classes were at the introductory level, this distribution would be expected. In the Political Science classes, about 56 percent of the respondents were freshmen and sophomores, and in the French classes, about 58 percent were at those years in college. Both of these classes had a graduate student respondent as well. The differing sets of classes also shared similar background with about 66 percent of Political Science students from Iowa and 54 percent of French students from Iowa. The states surrounding Iowa (Illinois, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Missouri) were the home state of most other students in these classes, but there were also a few students from eastern or western states. Both sets of classes had international students with the Political Science classes having about 4 percent (including one from Canada) and the French classes having 7 percent (including one from Canada). Most of the Political Science respondents indicated that their classes had little Canadian content and those that had such content was generally minimal. About a third of the French students, however, indicated that there was between 5 percent and 25 percent of Canadian content in their courses. Finally, only about a quarter of the Political Science and French respondents indicated that they had seen two or more stories about Canada in the media during the previous three months.

**ANALYSIS**

The responses were entered in to an Excel file by a research assistant and examined to identify any respondents who had obviously not attempted to complete the survey seriously. The item responses were then recoded as either correct or incorrect to create a file with individual item scores of one and zero. Subsequent analysis was conducted by using this file and running SPSS to calculate score reliability for the whole group, and then to calculate the scale mean and item means for the whole group. This same statistical package was then used to determine whether any statistically significant differences existed in the total scores and between the relevant items between students in Political Science classes and those in French classes. Furthermore, we undertook the same kind of analysis for students in the two different levels of Political Science classes and among the three different levels of French classes to see if differences exist within these groupings.

**RESULTS**

**AGGREGATE KNOWLEDGE OF CANADA**

The KR-20 reliability was .44 for the whole group with 25 items, which reflected the relatively small variance found in the scores and was due, in part, to the homogeneity of the total group with respect to their knowledge of Canada as well as the small number of items on the scale. Because of the low reliability, the item level
comparisons are more meaningful that those for the total score. Nevertheless, these scale totals and their standard deviations are reported for each of the groups. Across the entire set of respondents, the average percentage correct on the survey was 54.6 percent, or roughly 14 of the 25 questions were answered correctly, on average, by the students surveyed (see Table 2). Thirty-five percent of those surveyed correctly answered twelve or fewer questions, or less than half of the total. Fifty-three percent of the respondents scored between 13 and 17 correct, and only twelve percent obtained a scores higher than 17 (with the highest at 22 correct responses). By conventional standards of passing the test, fewer than 10 percent of the respondents achieved scores of 70 percent or better on the survey.

**TABLE 2. Average Scores among Political Science and French Students on a Twenty-Five Item Canadian Questionnaire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEAN NUMBER CORRECT (STANDARD DEVIATION)</th>
<th>NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Students</td>
<td>13.65 (2.77)</td>
<td>N=205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science Students</td>
<td>13.89 (2.80)</td>
<td>N=146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Division</td>
<td>13.77 (2.55)</td>
<td>N=84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Division</td>
<td>14.08 (3.13)</td>
<td>N=62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Students</td>
<td>13.05 (2.62)</td>
<td>N=59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introductory</td>
<td>14.09 (4.11)</td>
<td>N=11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>12.72 (2.12)</td>
<td>N=36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>13.08 (2.27)</td>
<td>N=12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the mean number of correct responses and the standard deviations for the Political Science and French students separately and for the different class levels within these two groups. For the Political Science students, only a slight difference appears between the two sets of classes, although the upper division students do somewhat better, as one might expect, than lower division students. For the French students, the average scores are lower overall than for the Political Science students, probably due to the greater number of questions about government and politics, but, somewhat unexpectedly, the introductory French students have a higher mean scores than the other levels of French students—and just slightly higher than the Political Science students. To determine whether any of these differences are significant between Political Science and French students or among the different levels of Political Science and French students, we calculated a series of difference of means test. In all instances, we found the difference of means between Political Science and French students, between lower division and upper division Political Science students, and among the three levels of French students were not statistically significant. Hence, the aggregate level of knowledge about Canada did not differ between any of these groups of students.

The percentage of correct responses for each question in Table 3 reveals areas of strength and weakness in Canadian knowledge by our respondents. Since the questions were all presented in a multiple choice format with four options, one could expect a 25 percent correct response rate by chance alone. In view of this fact, items for which the percentage was less that 50 percent might be highlighted as points of extreme weakness, whereas those at or above the 70 percent mark would be considered as areas where the sample has substantial knowledge. In that light, we see that these university students are strong on knowledge of Canada’s most popular sport, the location of most Canadians, Canada as a major supplier of natural gas to Iowa, members of NAFTA, the systems of government and health care, bilingual language policy, home of Celine Dion, and Quebec as the home of French speakers.

At the same time, areas in which the respondents had minimal knowledge were evident throughout the results. With geography questions, students had limited knowledge about Canada’s population, its total number of provinces, the capital of Canada, and the most recently established territory. Some of the most frequent incorrect responses to these questions are instructive. Many thought that Canada’s population was half the size of that of the United States; equal percentages of respondents thought that Montreal and Toronto were the capital as the percentage who correctly identified Ottawa; and the Yukon Territory and Prince Edward Island received about equal number of choices as Nunavut from the respondents as the newest established territory. Within the economics area, questions with extremely low percentages of correct responses were about Canada as the biggest trading partner of the United States (most thought China was), and about an important city in the Canadian oil industry (many selected Winnipeg rather than Calgary). In politics, very few students knew the party with the most seats in parliament (the modal response was the Liberals), Canada’s policy toward Afghanistan, the current Prime Minister (Trudeau and Chretien were about as equally likely to be selected as Harper), or the leader during the Golden Age of Canadian diplomacy (Lester Pearson). With respect to language and French culture, few students knew about the existence of Quebec’s French only policy; instead many selected the option of Quebec as a “distinct society” as a defining characteristic. In all, the respondents only demonstrated “substantial knowledge” of Canada on nine of the twenty-five questions.
Comparisons across French and Political Science students on the items

What about the differences between Political Science and French students? Does either group exhibit more knowledge than the other across the twenty-five items? As noted earlier, the overall mean scores for the French students (13.05) and the political science students (13.89) were very close. Does that overall similarity conceal differences in certain areas of knowledge about Canada? Particularly on questions concerning government and politics, Political Science students would be expected to have an advantage, whereas on questions pertaining to language and French culture, one would expect to see stronger performance by the French students. These were both areas in which individual questions produced either very high or very low mean scores for both groups, as Table 4 shows.

In the area of government and politics, the two groups obtained exactly the same scores indicating substantial knowledge or minimal knowledge. For example, Political Science students are no more likely to know the prime minister of Canada than are students of French. Only one question within the government and politics section yielded a significant difference in the hypothesized direction: Thirty-two percent of political science students knew the party holding the most seats in parliament while only 15 percent of French students responded correctly to that question. Although this difference was statistically significant, the absolute magnitude of the percentages suggests that neither group could be said to have any clear idea of the party composition of the Canadian parliament.

In the area of language and French culture, knowledge about Canada’s official languages and Quebec as the French majority province was substantial across the two groups, but knowledge of Quebec’s French only language policy was almost equally unknown across the two groups. It is particularly interesting that students of French do not know about the French only policy because this is a policy that would potentially make Quebec an ideal location for a study abroad choice for these students. Students of French are not eager to invest their time and money to travel to a place where people will speak English to them. Information about the French only policy in Quebec typically appears in beginning level text books in French. For example, this information appears in a cultural note in the book used by first year students of French at Iowa State University, Entre Amis:

By the beginning of the 1960s, French Canadians considered themselves not so much a minority in the Canadian Confederation as the Francophone majority in the province of Quebec. This
situation culminated in the passage of the Charter of the French Language in 1977, which established French as the sole official language in the province of Quebec. Its goal was to ‘ensure the quality and influence of the French language’ in North American civilization. (Oates, & Oukada, 2006, p. 84)

It is likely that students of French have been exposed to this fact, but did not remember it. The childhood home of Celine Dion is another fact that students of French would have been exposed to in their French classes. For example, in Entre Amis, students read a paragraph about Celine Dion, which includes the following: “Née le trente mars 1968 à Charlemagne, un petit village canadien près de Montréal, Céline a huit soeurs et cinq frères.” (Oates, & Oukada, 2006, p. 85-86). In this case the exposure or information obtained elsewhere was sufficient to allow students of French to remember this information—even to the extent that they perform significantly better on this question than do the students of Political Science. In this case, the group as a whole showed substantial knowledge on the question of Celine Dion’s home (75.1 percent), but this strong performance was because of the knowledge of the French students in particular and their 91.5 percent performance on the question relative to the fewer than 70 percent of the Political Science students who responded correctly.

Finally, in the area of economics, we found two significant differences between Political Science and French students. Political Science students were more aware of the rank of Canada as America’s trading partner and the source of Iowa’s natural gas than French students. While the differences are significant, the absolute level of knowledge on the rank of Canada as a trading partner is very low—and could be accounted for by guessing alone.

**Comparisons Across Lower Division and Upper Division Political Science Students**

Table 5 extends our analysis to compare lower division and upper division Political Science students and their knowledge of Canada. The overall scores obtained by the lower division Political Science students (13.77) appear similar to those of the upper division political science students (14.08). Yet, we should expect that if student in Political Science actually learn about Canada during the course of their study that greater differences should appear in the percentages of the items related to government and politics and perhaps in geography and economics.
The item-by-item analysis, however, suggests no statistically significant differences and no evidence that students in upper division Political Science courses had learned more about the government and politics of Canada than lower division students. The percentage of correct responses on all of the questions about government and politics are virtually the same for the two groups, and no statistically significant differences appear, except for one geography item. Upper division political science students are more fully able to identify correctly the province directly north of Minnesota, Ontario. Only 49 percent of the lower division students responded correctly on this item, while 71 percent of the upper division Political Science students did.

**Comparisons across three levels of French students**

Table 6 does the same kind of comparisons across the three levels of French as that done for the two levels of Political Science students. In drawing comparisons among the three groups of French students, we need to note the small sample sizes of the introductory and advanced groups. Small samples produce unstable results on item scores, but we will nevertheless look for the expected trends across the three groups on the item performance on the questions about French. One might expect the most advanced level learners to have the highest percentages correct on the questions concerning French, despite the fact that in overall scores on the survey, it was the introductory class that scored the highest (56.11, compared to 50.9 for the intermediate, and 52.3 for the advanced).

All three groups performed well on the three questions concerning Canada’s bilingual policy, the home of Celine Dion, and the province with the most French speaking people. These were three questions on which the French students were categorically strong, thus opening little space for variation across the three groups. The question about Quebec’s French Only policy, in contrast, shows considerable variation, albeit in the expected direction. Each group studying French progressively longer was more likely to know about the French Only policy in Quebec. Despite the appearance of the hypothesized trend, it is important to note the actual magnitude of the knowledge across all three groups, all of which would be defined according to the 50 percent cut off indicating little knowledge of this fact. In other words, fewer than 50 percent of the students studying French in the United States in a location that is a two day drive from Quebec know that Quebec has a French only language.
In view of the perceived importance of knowledge of Canada in the United States for maintaining accurate perceptions of and actions toward Canada, one might hope that students with a university education in the United States would have greater knowledge of Canada and that students studying longer would have more knowledge of Canada. Our survey indicated that students have some sporadic knowledge of Canadian geography, economics, and government/politics. In particular, our respondents were knowledge about Canada’s most popular sport, the location of most Canadians, Canada as a big supplier of natural gas to Iowa, members of NAFTA, the systems of government and health care, bilingual language policy, the home of Celine Dion, and Quebec as the home of French speakers. However, when students are asked more in depth questions in some of the categories, the limits of their knowledge were apparent. In this sense, these results are similar to other findings about both Americans’ and Canadians’ knowledge about Canada.

Our sample also allowed us to seek evidence about the development of knowledge of Canada in typical university classes in which one would expect Canadian content to come up and in which one would expect to find students interested in Canada. Based on comparisons across students in Political Science and French, as well as across students at different levels in each area, we found little evidence of any Canadian knowledge developed across levels of study. The only piece of information about Canada that may have been picked up by students of French was the hometown of Celine Dion. However, when students are asked more in depth questions in some of the categories, the limits of their knowledge were apparent. In this sense, these results are similar to other findings about both Americans’ and Canadians’ knowledge about Canada.
APPENDIX A

CANADA QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions: Please circle the ONE best answer for each of the following questions.

1. The most popular sport in Canada is
   a. baseball.
   b. basketball.
   c. football.
   d. hockey.

2. Which countries belong to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)?
   a. Canada and Mexico
   b. Mexico and the United States
   c. Canada, Mexico, and the United States
   d. Canada, the United States, and the European Union

3. Canada is
   a. the second largest trading partner with the US after China.
   b. the largest trading partner of the US.
   c. the country in NAFTA with which the US does the least trading.
   d. the second largest trading partner with the US after the European Union.

4. Most of the natural gas to heat the homes of Iowans come from
   a. Canada
   b. Saudi Arabia
   c. Mexico
   d. Texas

5. How many provinces does Canada have?
   a. 5
   b. 8
   c. 10
   d. 20

6. The system of national government in Canada can best be described as a
   a. parliamentary system.
   b. presidential system.
   c. unitary system.
   d. provincial system.

REFERENCES


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14. Which of the following provinces is directly north of Minnesota?
   a. Alberta
   b. Saskatchewan
   c. Ontario
   d. Nova Scotia

15. The border between the United States and Canada
   a. has been undefended for almost two centuries, allowing the 9/11 hijackers to enter the United States unimpeded.
   b. has over $1 billion in commerce crossing it daily.
   c. has recently been fortified with a new electronic fence to increase security between the two countries.
   d. is one of the few in the world that does not require any government documentation by individuals to cross it.

16. The province in Canada with the greatest number of French-speaking residents is
   a. Alberta
   b. Manitoba
   c. New Brunswick
   d. Quebec

17. Which statement is correct about Canada’s policy toward Afghanistan?
   a. Canada currently has its military deployed to Afghanistan.
   b. Canada will be bringing its troops home from Afghanistan by the end of 2008.
   c. Canada has refused to recognize the current government of Afghanistan.
   d. Canada has provided no economic or military assistance to Afghanistan.

18. The majority of Canadians live
   a. within 200 miles of the Pacific Ocean.
   b. within 200 miles of the Atlantic Ocean.
   c. within 200 miles of the American border.
   d. within 200 miles of the Arctic Circle.

19. The current Prime Minister of Canada is
   a. Pierre Trudeau.
   b. Jean Chrétien.
   c. Paul Martin.
20. The nickname of Toronto’s professional baseball team is:
   a. the Cardinals.
   b. the Orioles.
   c. the Blue Jays.
   d. the Canaries.

21. Which city is an important center of Canada’s oil industry?
   a. Calgary
   b. Bozeman
   c. Winnipeg
   d. Thunder Bay

22. Halifax is the largest city in the province of
   a. New Brunswick
   b. Nova Scotia
   c. British Columbia
   d. Manitoba

23. In contrast to the United States, Canada
   a. offers universal health coverage to its citizens
   b. has no unemployment insurance for its citizens
   c. requires compulsory voting in elections
   d. has no standing army

24. Which is the newest territory that was established in Canada?
   a. Northwest Territory
   b. Yukon Territory
   c. Nunavut
   d. Prince Edward Island

25. The political leader most often associated with the “golden age” of Canadian diplomacy is
   a. Lloyd Axworthy.
   b. Lester Pearson.
   c. Pierre Trudeau.
   d. Tommy Douglas.

Background Information about the Respondents

26. What is your year in school?
   a. Freshman
   b. Sophomore
   c. Junior
   d. Senior

27. What state or country are you from? Please list.

____________________________________________________________________

28. How many courses have you taken in Political Science that included Canadian content?
   a. None (Go to Question 30)
   b. One
   c. Two
   d. Three or more

29. If you have taken Political Science classes with Canadian content, what percentage of the course content was about Canada?
   a. 1 percent
   b. Less than 5 percent
   c. 5 percent to 25 percent
   d. More than 25 percent

30. Have you taken any university-level French language courses?
   a. None (Go to Question 32)
   b. One semester
   c. Two semesters
   d. Three semesters or more

31. If you have taken French classes, what percentage of the course content included Canada?
   a. 1 percent
   b. Less than 5 percent
   c. 5 percent to 25 percent
   d. More than 25 percent

32. In the past three months, how much media coverage have you seen about Canada?
   a. None
   b. One story
   c. Two stories
   d. Three or more stories

An earlier version of this research was presented at the joint conference of the American Council on Quebec Studies and the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, November 13-16, 2008, Loews Le Concorde Hotel, Quebec City.
BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES: GEOGRAPHIES AND IDENTITY IN CANADA AND THE U.S.

Susan W. Hardwick is a Professor of Geography at the University of Oregon. Her research and teaching specializations focus on immigration, identity, and place at the Canada-U.S. borderlands. She is author or co-author of nine books including a widely-used textbook on the geography of North America published by Prentice Hall in 2008. She has also authored a long list of research articles and book chapters on immigration and identity in the North American context. Dr. Hardwick’s Ph.D. in Human Geography was earned at the University of California, Davis.

This article provides an analysis of the migration pathways, settlement patterns, and national identities of American immigrants now residing in Canada. There are currently more U.S.-born residents of Canada than at any time since the Vietnam War, which was the largest politically motivated out-migration of people in the history of the United States. To document and analyze the patterns and related processes that shaped the experiences of this increasingly large group of immigrants in Canada depended on a variety of mixed methods including cartographic analysis, structured and unstructured interviews, focus groups, and survey questionnaires. Following an introductory overview of migration and settlement at the national scale in Canada, the article provides a more in depth provincial level analysis of the related political, socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental processes shaping the American exodus to British Columbia. This province was selected for closer examination because of the relatively large number of Americans living there, its role as an important magnet for U.S. settlement in the early 21st century, and the diverse spatial patterns of Americans residing in various places at different scales in the province (ranging from large metropolitan areas to small towns to remote, more rural locales). Findings reveal that the majority of U.S.-born residents in this province become Canadianized very rapidly after their arrival in Canada despite the close proximity of their homeland and the potential ease of maintaining a cross-border network of transnational linkages, relationships, and identities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

Funding to complete the fieldwork for this article was provided by the generous support of a Canadian Embassy Faculty Research grant. I also appreciated support for securing the Canadian census data needed to complete this analysis provided by the Social Science Instructional Lab at the University of Oregon.
INTRODUCTION

There are a lot of great people in the United States of America, but I just see everything going in the wrong direction. (Ralph Appoldt as cited in Walsh 2004, A10).

I started planning for this move to Canada the day after Bush was re-elected. There are lots of other Americans living here in Vancouver now and everyone I know just really always wants to be a Canadian. (Kristin, Vancouver, BC, 2008).

Canada has long been a magnet for Americans who are disenfranchised by the politics of their homeland. By 2006, more Americans had migrated to Canada for permanent residency than at any time since the Vietnam War era more than three decades ago (Statistics Canada 2006). At least 10,942 U.S.-born immigrants settled in Canada in 2006 according to the most recent Canadian census—a twenty percent increase over the previous year and almost double the number who arrived in 2000 (Baram 2007; Jedwab 2008). Despite these increasing numbers, and the long history of American migration to Canada, very few prior publications have been published on the migration experiences and shifting identities of this group of immigrants to Canada, especially those who left their homeland during the first decade of the 21st century.

Many of the Americans who now reside north of the 49th parallel were initially attracted to Canada by their rejection of the ultra-conservative political climate that dominated the eight years of the George W. Bush administration in the United States. Others are drawn north by Canada’s universal health care system, gay and lesbian rights, employment opportunities, environmental amenities, anti-gun laws, and a search for safety and security, far from the higher crime rates that exist in the United States. Recent polls indicate that Americans between the ages of 18 and 29, in fact, are twice as likely to worry about crime, moral decline, and ethnic conflict as their Canadian counterparts (Adams 2003). The sum total of these differences in political, environmental, and socio-cultural values in Canada is the popular U.S. perception that Canada has become ‘America idealized’ (Gecelovsky 2007, 519).

What processes helped shape the migration pathways and settlement patterns of this relatively large group of immigrants in Canada, especially during the first decade of the 21st century? Do these predominately white migrants of choice adopt and embrace Canadian values and Canadian national identities after their resettlement to Canada? Or, conversely, do Americans in Canada construct and maintain a blended transnational identity because of the close proximity of their homeland to their new place of residence and the ease of maintaining cross-border relationships and networks?

This article offers answers to these related questions. It begins by analyzing the primary waves of American migration to Canada from the Loyalists up to the present time. Following this general overview of the migration flows and predominant settlement patterns of U.S.-born migrants in Canada at the national scale, the next section provides a more in depth provincial level analysis of the patterns, experiences, and shifting identities of former Americans in the province of British Columbia. Data from this empirical case study in the Canadian southwest were gathered and analyzed from structured and unstructured interviews and focus group discussions with seventy-eight U.S-born immigrants in B.C., responses gathered and analyzed from over three hundred survey questionnaires, and on-site participant observation between 2006 and 2009 in five ‘American-rich’ towns and cities in British Columbia. As discussed below, findings from this mixed methods study indicate that a variety of related social, economic, political, cultural, and environmental factors shape the spatial patterns, migration experiences, identities, citizenships, and senses of belonging of this immigrant group in Canada.

FROM LOYALISTS TO LIBERALS: HISTORICAL MIGRATION FLOWS AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Canada’s perception as a “place of refuge” for disenfranchised migrants from the United States began in the Revolutionary War-era when “Loyalists” who remained loyal to England decided to leave the renegade new nation (Marshall 2004). These earliest U.S. migrants were later joined by African American slaves who were also seeking refuge from the 1840s to the early 1860s (Winks 1997). Many of these escaping slaves found refuge in churches and homes just across the Canada-U.S. border after being secretly transported there for protection. Following the passage of a strict fugitive slave law in the Compromise of 1850 in the United States, ever larger numbers of African Americans made their way north to seek new and safer lives in Canada. Most ended up in small towns located in southern Ontario and Halifax, Nova Scotia joining other freed and runaway ex-slaves who had congregated there (Mensah 2002).

These earliest U.S. migration pathways into Canada were followed by a larger wave of American settlement...
during the first decade of the 20th century. This much larger flow of migrants from the United States was dominated by farmers from the interior western states who were in search of available, fertile and affordable land in Canada for their crops and cattle (Harvey 1991). The rich prairie soils, abundant and affordable level land, and active immigrant recruitment efforts by the Canadian government attracted thousands of American agriculturalists across the border. They developed farms in southeastern British Columbia and Canada’s prairie provinces with many arriving as part of distinctive religious groups such as the Latter Day Saints and Mennonites.

Harvey categorized the mid-20th century waves of Americans in Canada into four distinctive groups: wilderness seekers, trekkers and adventurers; homesteaders; communitarians; and spiritual seekers (1991). Other Americans came during this time period, filling teaching positions and research and administrative jobs at Canadian colleges and universities in the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, changes in Canadian policies that allowed the expansion of American businesses into Canada attracted other well educated and economically secure American migrants to Canada in the 1970s, with the majority settling in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver (Harvey 1991).

The largest migration wave from the United States to Canada occurred during the Vietnam War years. In the early years of the War, Canada accepted 1,700 American war resistors in 1963 as “landed immigrants” (Hagan 2000). Soon thereafter, the migration stream north of the border expanded exponentially after American involvement in Vietnam intensified in the mid-1960s. Four years later, Canada’s Minister of Immigration announced that “American Vietnam draft and military resistors, that is, both ‘dodgers’ and ‘deserters’ would be admitted to Canada without regard to their draft or military status” (as quoted in Hagan 2000, 609).

Thereafter, the total number of draft-age migrants from the United States in Canada increased exponentially as the news of this more formalized Canadian policy reached the American media and circulated through underground channels of war resisters (Dickerson 1999). The result was that there were more than 100,000 Americans living in Canada at the end of the Vietnam War (Jones 2005). Thereafter, the former Americans who made up more than 20% of all immigrants to Canada during this time period leveled off to
about 5,000 new arrivals each year (Jones 2005; Kobayashi and Ray 2005, 2).

As summarized on the graph in Figure 1, during the peak of the Vietnam War in the 1970s, 26,541 Americans became legal residents of Canada. From 1974 up to 1998, the numbers held fairly steady except for an increase in 1981 (probably due to the arrival of large numbers of K-12 teachers and professors, economic elites, and entrepreneurs from south of the border by the late 1970s). The population of documented immigrants from the United States has once again been on the rise with a total of 10,943 by 2006. This most recent period of expansion in the number of ex-Americans in Canada closely corresponds with the years following George W. Bush’s election in 2000 and his re-election in late 2004.

A CLOSER LOOK AT MIGRATION, IDENTITY, AND PLACE: AMERICANS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

The province of British Columbia was selected as a focus for this article for the following reasons: (1) its location in close proximity to the United States on a shared international border; (2) the long history of migration of people from the United States to selected places in the province; (3) British Columbia has more American immigrants than any province other than Ontario, thereby having a sufficient number of U.S.-born residents for meaningful study; (4) a significant number of immigrants from the United States reside in places that represent a variety of scales (ranging from large metropolitan areas to smaller cities and towns to village-scale settlements), allowing an analysis of U.S. migration, settlement, and identity in a variety of diverse sites.

During the U.S. war in Vietnam, the cities of Toronto and Vancouver emerged as early focal points of American war resistor migrant settlement in Canada (Hardwick 2009, 2010; Jones 2005; Hagan 2000, 2001). Today, at least forty percent of the American men who dodged the military draft and other war resisters of both genders who came during the Vietnam War now reside in British Columbia. Many live in the Vancouver urban area and on Vancouver Island and environs. Others reside in south-eastern British Columbia in the rugged Kootenay Mountain region.

Despite common misperceptions that male draft dodgers dominated this migration stream, more women than men left the U.S. for British Columbia and other parts of Canada during this time period and more recently as well (Statistics Canada 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006; Hagan 2001; Hardwick 2009). Many came on their own as war protestors, civil rights activists, students, and teachers. Others arrived with their families to seek new lives north of the border. As cited earlier (Hardwick and Mansfield, 2009), one of these American migrants in Canada, a sixty-five year old African American woman from Minneapolis who relocated to Vancouver with her husband in the 1970s, reports that:

We felt that we had made the best possible decision to leave the U.S. considering the politics and existing war. I feel that some of the lifestyle opportunities I/we experienced... in Canada... would not have been available to us as a mixed heritage couple had we been living in the United States.

In recent years, political ‘refugees’ escaping U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have added to the mix of politically motivated Americans living in Vancouver and other parts of British Columbia. It is estimated that there are now approximately 200 Iraq War deserters in Canada with most residing in Vancouver and Toronto. However, Canada is no longer the open sanctuary it was for war deserters during the Vietnam era. Although the public is generously supportive of this latest group of war deserters being awarded permanent residency in Canada, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has uniformly rejected asylee claims or petitioners from the U.S. military (Kovach 2009). As a result, deserters continue to be deported to the United States where most have received long sentences in military custody (Hardwick 2009).

Along with these politically motivated arrivals from the United States, British Columbia is also an important settlement destination for U.S. retirees and “midlife mavericks” seeking new lives in Canada. Many have settled in Vancouver due to its booming real estate market and cosmopolitan culture, while others have moved to smaller cities and towns on Vancouver Island and the Kootenays in many of the same places that attracted Americans in the past. In addition to these recent war resisters, retirees, and investors from the United States have come several thousand southern Californians who are attracted to Vancouver’s thriving film industry and hip cultural scene. Others migrated to British Columbia from the United States as communal farmers, journalists, artists, and academics. As a result, there are now significant clusters of former American citizens in the province with the U.S. Consulate in Vancouver estimating that at least 250,000 American-born residents lived in British Columbia in 2006 (Scandola, 2006).

Data on Canadian identities that was gathered and analyzed for this study revealed a strong sense of Canadian-ness among almost all respondents regardless of the time of their arrival in Canada or their specific
settlement site in British Columbia. The only exception to this dominant finding occurred among retirees since this migrant group predictably expressed a stronger connection with family networks at home, and thereby possessed a less “I am Canadian” identity after resettlement in Canada. However, except for this group, there were literally no differences in responses to questions about the shifting identities of other migrants from Vietnam War resisters to more recent arrivals. Likewise, gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, and age played very minor roles in differing responses to our questions about the adoption of a Canadian national identity.

The analysis of the perceptions of U.S. immigrants in British Columbia related to their national identity post-migration, is drawn from responses to the following two survey questionnaire questions: (1) Do you identify yourself as Canadian, American, or both? and (2) Are you an American citizen, a Canadian citizen or both? Why?

RESPONSES TO QUESTION #1:
DO YOU IDENTIFY YOURSELF AS CANADIAN, AMERICAN, OR BOTH?

All but four of the 300+ survey respondents of all genders, ages, dates of arrival, and places of origin (who were not retirees) claimed a Canadian identity. Some of these new Canadians also claimed a dual American identity, but the majority defined themselves as Canadian and only Canadian with common answers including becoming a “Canadian on the same day I crossed the border.”

In contrast, only four of the non-retiree participants in our study reported their identities in a more transnational way, although even in their cases, their blended U.S.-Canadian mixed identities seem to favor Canada. As quoted in a prior publication by the author (Hardwick and Mansfield, 2009), according to Rob: “Sometimes I still feel American, sometimes both. I always say I’m Canadian though.” Similarly, Jim reported that he’s “a Canadian with extensive American experience but I usually just say that I’m a Canadian from Texas.” A university professor who’s lived in Vancouver by choice since the 1960s insists, “I always say I’m a Canadian or a Californian but I never say ‘American.’”

RESPONSES TO QUESTION #2:
ARE YOU AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, A CANADIAN CITIZEN OR BOTH? WHY?

Less than half of the participants in this study retained dual citizenship despite often intense emotional attachments to their new Canadian identity. Others never became Canadian citizens despite most claiming to perceive themselves fully Canadian. This is undoubtedly at least partially due to the deportation fears of migrants who left the United States illegally during the Vietnam and Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This disconnect between the lack of interest among the majority of American immigrants in becoming Canadian citizens, while, at the same time, expressing a strong desire to declare their Canadian-ness and sense of belonging to Canada may also be explained by the lesser benefits accrued to citizens in Canada as compared to the United States (where there are economic benefits as well as voting rights awarded to immigrants who seek citizenship). According to a U.S. migrant who has lived in Vancouver for more than a decade:

It just doesn’t feel important to me to become an official Canadian citizen, at least not right now. I have a strong sense of belonging here because I share the values, politics, and personal belief system of my Canadian friends and co-workers. I really don’t need to become a citizen to prove this to anybody.

CONCLUSIONS

Canada has long held utopian appeal for people in the United States because of its more open political system, strong network of government sponsored economic and social systems, and plethora of environmental amenities. The election of George W. Bush to the U.S. presidency nine years ago (and the subsequent ultra-conservative policies that ensued), added momentum to a migration stream northward from the United States that continues till today. Indeed, Canada’s universal health care system, gay and lesbian policies, abortion rights, anti-gun laws, opposition to the current Iraq war, ban on capital punishment, and support of multicultural policies mirror many of the values of American liberals who are unsatisfied with political and social systems in their homeland (Lanzendorfer 2004).

Findings from data gathered and analyzed on American migration, settlement, and identity in the province of British Columbia revealed that the majority of these new immigrants construct and maintain distinctive Canadian national identities soon after their arrival north of the U.S.-Canada border. Being and becoming Canadian, in fact, is more important to most than maintaining ties and relationships with their homeland. In an era when most other immigrant groups in North America depend upon a host of transnational networks,
relationships, and identities, Americans in Canada are more eager to rapidly give up their connections with home and embrace their new identity as Canadians. This is surprising since Canadians and Americans share the same languages, religious beliefs, cultures, and politics—all factors that should help encourage ongoing transnational connections that continue to link the homeland and hostland of this immigrant group after resettlement.

A second unexpected and seemingly contradictory finding from data reported on in this paper is the decreasing number of Americans who have become Canadian citizens in recent years. Satzewich and Wong (2006) found that while 70 percent of Americans in Canada made the decision to become Canadian citizens in the 1980s, by the late 1990s, the number had dropped dramatically. Compared to a 78 percent Canadian citizenship rate for all immigrants in Canada, a more recent study by Jedwab (2008) revealed that only 56 percent of Americans had become citizens of Canada by 2006. This is especially surprising since Americans in Canada are allowed to hold dual citizenship, a choice which provides them with options to live in “an alternative country in which to live, work, and invest; an additional locus and source of rights, and additional obligations and communal ties” (Schuck 1998, 163).

Becoming a Canadian citizen also requires a significant time commitment. It takes a minimum of five years of residency to apply. In addition, the decision to officially renounce one’s American citizenship is very challenging and even more time consuming because of the myriad of paperwork required to complete the process (Stevens 2004). As a result, the majority of people interviewed for this study as well as responses listed on our survey questionnaires revealed that the majority of Americans who have relocated to Canada remain American citizens no matter how long they have lived north of the border or how vehemently they express their attachment to now “being a Canadian.”

Finally, increasingly strict and stringent Homeland Security-era politics in the United States have tightened down border crossings in recent years. Since 2007, in particular, it has become a very arduous process to return to the United States even if only for family visits, shopping trips, and/or cultural events. These restrictions at the border are eased by proof of American citizenship, thereby encouraging American residents of Canada to hold onto their old political identities (while, at the same time, clinging to their strong attachment and sense of belonging as new “Canadians”).

Despite these many challenges, Americans continue to move to Canada in record numbers during this first decade of the 21st century. Despite the more liberal politics in the United States following President Obama’s election and the increased cost of housing in Vancouver and other large Canadian cities in recent years, Americans will no doubt continue to migrate to Canada in large numbers. Chief among the factors encouraging this northward flow by retirees, midlife mavericks, and professional class migrants from the United States will be a search for safety and security, cleaner air and water, environmental amenities, and more open and accepting policies for non-traditional lifestyles and the diverse cultures of differing ethnic and racial groups. However, due to the dramatic increase in housing costs in places like Vancouver in recent years (which currently features the highest housing costs in North America), it is predicted that many of these post-Obama-era Americans will settle in Canada’s smaller cities and towns or establish their new lives in rural places.

This study of American migration, settlement, and identity in Canada opens the door for additional research about Americans in Canada, especially in francophone Canada. How do the spatial patterns and identities of U.S. immigrants in the city of Montreal, for example, compare to those living in Vancouver, Toronto, or other metropolitan areas located in Anglophone Canada (where U.S.-born migrants share a common language with the majority of local residents)? How does the process of becoming a Canadian and forming a strong sense of attachment to Canada differ in Francophone locales as compared to places in English-speaking Canada? Other related questions on ex-Americans who migrate to Canada in the Obama and post-Obama years are also in need of further exploration. Now that factors shaping the decision to leave the United States for permanent residency in Canada have shifted from being politically motivated because of today’s more liberal political policies in the United States, will the desire to embrace Canadian values and a strong sense of Canadian-ness among American immigrants be replaced by the adoption of a more integrated transnational identity and the adoption of transnational behaviors among these flexible North American citizens in the future? Answers to these and other questions about the patterns and related processes shaping the experiences of Americans living north of the 49th parallel will go a long way toward casting new light on the larger story of North American immigration, identity, and place.
The term “American” is used throughout this article to refer to migrants from the United States who currently reside in Canada. Although this term actually refers to not only residents of the United States, but also to people living in all of the countries south of the U.S. border, since Canadians refer to migrants from the United States as “Americans,” it is appropriate for use in the study reported on in this publication.

For exceptions to this shortage of published work on Americans in Canada in the early 21st century, see, for example, Vic Satzewich and Lloyd Wong’s important book, Transnational Identities and Practices in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006); Audrey Kobayashi and Brian Ray’s “Placing Americans in Context” published online in early 2005 by the Migration Policy Institute; and two prior publications by the author: Susan W. Hardwick and Ginger Mansfield, Discourse, Identity, and ‘Homeland as Other’ at the Borderlands” in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers (Vol. 99: pp. 383-405, 2009) and “Fuzzy Transnationals: American Settlement and Belonging in Toronto, Halifax, and Vancouver,” The American Review of Canadian Studies (2010). I also gained invaluable insights into the importance of understanding the political, cultural, economic, and environmental dynamics affecting the U.S.-Canada border as related to American immigration and identity in Canada from Heather Nichol’s “Resiliency or Change: The Contemporary Canada-U.S. Border” in Geopolitics (Vol. 10: 767-790, 2005) and the results of recent surveys conducted and analyzed by Jack Jedwab.

ENDNOTES

1. The term “American” is used throughout this article to refer to migrants from the United States who currently reside in Canada. Although this term actually refers to not only residents of the United States, but also to people living in all of the countries south of the U.S. border, since Canadians refer to migrants from the United States as “Americans,” it is appropriate for use in the study reported on in this publication.

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REFERENCES


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Canadian Snowbirds as Migrants

Godefroy Desrosiers-Lauzon’s doctoral dissertation was about the history of Canadian and American snowbirds in Florida. Since graduating from the University of Ottawa in 2008, Godefroy has been working as a postdoctoral fellow in urban studies at the Institut national de la recherche scientifique (INRS-UCS) in Montreal.

Abstract

Canadian snowbirds, seasonal migrants wintering in the southern United States and the Caribbean, have been seen by Canada’s nationalist elites as signs of Canada’s demise as a strong, autonomous nation. This paper outlines a few parameters of that phenomenon, to demonstrate that Canadian snowbirds were and remain strongly attached to their Canadian (or Québécois) identity. What is being said about snowbirds and other Canadians travelling to the United States is more an avatar of nationalist discourse than anything else.

If the greatest threat to Canadian sovereignty and cultural uniqueness is the American Babylon to the south, then annual dosages of Americanism administered in a beguiling vacation atmosphere must rank with the invasion of American television as one of the chief impediments to the emergence of a Canadian people.1

The late Robert Harney, American-born migration historian, thus captured humorously the Canadian intelligentsia’s aversion to the Florida Dream—even as millions of Canadians sought a share of that Dream, as tourists, snowbirds, or migrants.

How justified were the fears of Canadian nationalists? First, Canadian tourism and migration to the Sunshine State draw their saliency from sheer numbers. Although it has been taking place since the end of the nineteenth century, their story largely takes place after 1945. By the late 1940s, a sizable French-speaking community was gathering around Miami, mostly fed by fortune-seeking migrants from the Franco-American settlements of New England. The increasing tourist and migrant numbers were the result of rising disposable incomes, increasing vacation time, and improvements in transportation technology and accessibility (such as cheap oil and cheap automobiles, improved highways since the 1940s, the Interstate network since the 1960s, and the democratization of air travel during the 1970s and 80s).

Yet these factors do not explain why South Florida itself became the tourist and migration magnet—why not Georgia, why not Texas? Sunshine State historians tell us that generations of canny entrepreneurs constructed and broadcast the Florida Dream, a unique version of the American Dream, by using and re-interpreting the edenic repertoire of Western culture, especially its components about eternal youth and a divinely-ordained, benevolent, bountiful nature.2 That Dream was the work of Florida-based dream entrepreneurs: Florida boosters, real estate investors, businesspeople, civic leaders and the like, who framed this repertoire into enticing evocations of warmth, comfort, and pleasure, and beamed them to the population of the frigid North. Most notorious instances of Florida Broadcasting are when the Flagler and Plant railways connected the Gold Coast and the Tampa Bay to the rest of the continent during the 1880s, when Carl G. Fisher promoted Miami Beach during the 1910s and...
1920s, and when Dick Pope broadcast images of water-ski stunts from his Cypress Gardens theme park after the 1930s. Therefore, when Disney World opened near Orlando in the Fall of 1971, Florida had had its own well-known brand of Sun and Fun, different from the Hollywood version, for many decades.

Snowbirds and elderly migrants came with tourists. The implications of such a phenomenon cannot be understated: before the 1950s, elders used to be too poor, too sick, too dependent on their siblings to move very far from “home.” Technology, consumerism, social programs, and longer life expectancies fostered a “seismic mindset” in postwar culture, that allowed the creation of leisurely retirement beyond the upper-class confines of Palm Beach.

In 1960, the United Stated census found that Floridians’ median age, at 35 years, was already a good five years higher than the US median, thanks to elderly migrants. By 1962, Canadians contributed annually around 500,000 tourists to a total of thirteen million—up from 4.5 million in 1946. By 1980, the annual number of Canadian visits to Florida reached the million mark. The 1980s were banner years for Canadian snowbirds: in 1987, one estimate put the Canadian snowbird total at more than 300,000 in all of Florida, over a total of around 800,000, American snowbirds included. Canadian tourist counts in Florida ballooned as well, to 2.5 million in the early 1990s, then decreased to 1.7 million in 1999, under the repeated blows of rising health insurance costs, high-profile crime against tourists in the Miami area, and a worsening exchange rate between the Canadian and American currencies. In the late 1990s, the Canadian Snowbirds Association estimated that the number of Canadian snowbirds in South Florida at between 150,000 and 200,000. Meanwhile the total figure (Americans included) has remained stable from the mid-1990s until now, near the million mark. Canadian patronage of Florida then increased again, to 2.1 million in 2005, a good year for Florida tourism. With these sorts of numbers, English-speaking and bilingual Canadians had a lot of choice when they came to Florida—blend in, stand out, congregate, disperse—and it stood to reason that their snowbird communities were very much an artifact of their own devising. What about French speakers? As geographers Louis Dupont and Remy Tremblay have shown, the language limitations of French-speaking snowbirds fostered their congregation around Hollywood, north of Miami, since the 1960s, where a community of permanent and seasonal migrants thrived on catering to the needs of an unashamedly captive tourist clientele.

How did Canadian snowbirds get to Florida? Our research showed that a surprisingly high proportion of them drove their cars all the way down south, years into the so-called Jet Age. Statistics Canada and the Florida Development Commission reported in the 1980s and 1990s that 31 to 48 percent of Canadians going to Florida chose to drive. And in 1999, the Canadian Snowbirds Association estimated that 88 percent of its members drove their own cars to the US South and Southwest.

How did snowbirds chose their destinations? Robert Harney and other scholars found that most of them had previously visited as tourists, and had friends or kin who vacationed or wintered in or near their chosen destination. In the words of migration scholarship, snowbirds migrated through network recruitment, channels, and nodes. Migrants put to work social networks to facilitate their information-gathering and movement. Entrepreneurs specialized in migration brokerage; in Florida’s case, motel owners, real estate agents, transportation companies and others have competed for, and prospered in, the Canadian “migrant market.” When they got South, snowbirds tended to congregate by places of origin, just like other migrant communities.

Did snowbirds really justify the Canadian nationalist intelligentsia’s fears about American influence? Apparently not. Canadian snowbirds seem to have remained faithfully Canadian, even when larking about in Florida. An Orillia snowbird declared in 1986 “If there was a place in Canada with this climate, most of us would be there. We’re Canadians and we don’t want to forget it, but we’re in heaven down here.” In 1999, a report of the Canadian Snowbird Association trumpeted the attachment of its members to their nationality:

Snowbirds have been around for a long time, and are exceptionally proud to be Canadian... We know how to work and how to play and are willing to fight for the wonderful country we have helped build. We may be retired from our professions, but not from our love of Canada and all it stands for.

Sure, talk was cheap during the patriotic 1990s. But obviously, wintering in Florida does not require a complete repressioin of one’s Canadian—or Northern—identity. Yet something changes during the sojourn, albeit slightly.

In the 1980s, Robert Harney suggested that Canadian snowbirds in Florida experience, not so much a demise, but a regression of their Canadian identity. As they become less Canadian, they become more “hyphenated,” more ethnically characterized. Thus most Ontarians seem more Anglo-Celtic: they introduced lawn bowling in Florida and members of the Canadian Club of the Palm Beaches drink tea at four o’clock. Similarly
Québécois have become more French Canadian when down South: they play pétanque, they patronize restaurants and retailers that offer traditional Québécois dishes and staples, they exhibit *a joie de vivre* and a noticeable lack of inhibition in dress and beach behavior. This regression is also illustrated—and encouraged—by the relative lack of contact between the two linguistic groups when in Florida. In 1990, a Toronto journalist noted that “the French and English Canadians seldom mix except for watching NHL games on huge screens in places such as the Penalty Box in Fort Lauderdale. ... ’We see Anglos at the flea markets .... We sure don’t see them in our neighborhoods,'” commented a French-speaking snowbird.

The geographic clustering of snowbirds by region of origin is a likely cause of ethnic regression: in the process of finding and joining snowbird communities through social networks and north-south roads one is likely to seek and find kindred spirits, reinforcing ethnic traits in the process. Snowbirds, and the people catering to them, are agents in their own clustering, by displaying signs of their regional and ethnic identity. Hence the display and assertion of one’s mores and origins become a useful way to identify and join a group, thereby creating communitarian bonds and asserting inter-communitarian distinctions. The need for friendship and belonging while spending the winter in Florida commanded a hyphen, an overstatement of one’s background and peculiarities. Hence the flag-waving of the Canadian Snowbirds Association and of many Canadian snowbirds played a part in their clustering, but did not mean a shift in their Canadian nationalism.

Atavistic hyphenation was a coping strategy already known to Floridians, for New York Jews had become more ethnically Jewish after they reached Miami Beach. Meanwhile, other Americans had joined snowbird affinity groups that had effectively created a state or regional “ethnicity” for them. Consequently, Canadians were both typical in becoming simultaneously more hyphenated, while standing out as they paraded their somewhat visible “Canadian” identity. As all the snowbirds “put their roots on display,” Canadians mounted distinctive displays as they built distinctive communities in Florida.

If Canadians in Florida did not lose their soul, why all the fuss? In our view, the Canadian “counterdiscourse” on tourism and migration to Florida said more about fears of American influence in Canada than about the actual loyalties of sun-seeking Canadians. As this country was built on shared understandings of shared institutions (e.g. the federal state), history (e.g. ethnoracial conflict and empire), and geography (e.g. northernness), the looming modernization of Canadian culture, when mediated by a growing American influence, appeared to threaten the building of a strong, autonomous Canadian nation.

In this sense, Florida was seen as a sign of the declining significance of winter or northernness. In Canada, the embrace of winter as an opportunity to wear woollens draws most of its potency from the belief—widespread amongst the Canadian chattering class—that winters are an essential part of national identity. It worries defenders of the “True North Strong and Free” whenever winter is lamented by the media, avoided in heated rinks and malls, or escaped outright. Geographer Louis-Edmond Hamelin thus complained that,

Some social ideas have hindered a better acknowledgement of winter. ... Meteorological agencies and the media are prone to alarmism on the topic of winter storms: Alert! Don’t go out! Leave at once for the tropics...! However useful, these dramatized news reveal an aversion toward, if not a hatred of winter.

Some commentators blamed the un-Canadian aversion to winter to urbanization:

Tanning studios sent out the lure of endless summer. Radio and television stations issue the siren song of free trips to Florida. Revisionists are hard at work constructing, in our large cities, indoor streets, complete with glass walls, high ceilings and real trees.... It is the dream of such people that Canadians abandon their obsession with the outdoors, the loon, the lake, the snow, the cold, and get on with the important business of moving indoors and becoming truly cosmopolitan.

The reference to “becoming truly cosmopolitan” hued to the dominant frame of historical explanation—the metanarrative—of postwar Canadian history, namely that—take your pick—urbanization or modernization or the technological imperative was, in a context of American hegemony, making Canadian nation-building ever more problematic. As winter faded from significance, intellectuals and politicos feared, the Canadian nation-state might shrink or melt away entirely. To be sure, the Canadian alarm about the declining significance of winter was a local version of concerns shared by other Westerners: the same threat to nation and tradition brought about by technology was noted by American historian Daniel Boorstin, and French philosopher Jacques Ellul.

Boorstin wrote, in *Hidden History,*
Technology is the natural foe of nationalism. With crushing inevitability, the advance of technology brings nations together and narrows the differences between the experiences of their people.... Each forward step in modern technology tends to reduce the difference between the older categories of experience... Technology aims to insulate and immunize us against the peculiar chances, perils, and opportunities of our national climate, our raw landscape.17

The popularity of winter travel to Florida was used as an illustration of this crisis in Canada’s nation-building. Robert Harney, when studying the snowbird phenomenon, noticed that there was a Canadian counter-discourse on Florida, and likened it to other counter-discourses found in all places experiencing an important emigration. What was being said and written about Florida had been written, for instance, in Ireland about the United States in the 19th century and in Quebec about New England in the early 20th century.18 This version of Florida is an iconic, somewhat caricatured symbol of the American menace to Canada’s existence. Specifically, it is an encompassing metaphor for the seductions of modernity and technology: comfort, geographic mobility, leisure, and consumerism. Florida embodies, for many Canadian and Quebec nationalists a subtropical version of the American Dream or even worse, a pseudo-place (as defined by Boorstin) where technology uproots culture from nature, nation, and tradition. In one set of instances, throughout the 1960s-1980s period, the popularity of Florida amongst Canadians was often evoked to illustrate the imbalance of payments between Canada and the US, especially between 1976 and 78, when the Canada-US balance of payments worsened only slightly faster than Canadian travel to Florida increased.19

Florida was also used in a similar fashion by representatives of the Canadian tourist industry to frame their demands for lower taxes, less stringent labor regulations, and improved roads—Sunshine State’s tourism thrived, they argued, because it was a right-to-work state, with lower business and consumer taxes, and better roads. Occasionally, similar arguments were used in Canadian legislative bodies, federal and provincial, and in the press.20 Tourism and migration to Florida—including a much-debated “brain drain” of health workers21—illustrated, to some right-of-center commentators, the defects of the Canadian model of economic regulation and state involvement in social and economic affairs. Conversely, the left-wing side of the debate used the example of Florida to outline the defects of the American Dream, and stake their position as critics of the right-wing drift of the 1980s and 90s. For them, Florida was the epitome of what was undesirable in the United States. In Florida, there were instances, often extreme ones, of crass commercialism22, environmental degradation23, poorly funded public services, and the dog-eat-dog economic liberalism that they rejected for Canada and Quebec.24

In other words, the Canadian and Quebecois fascination with Florida and the United States is best understood as a peculiarly Canadian way of making sense of modernity; discussions of Florida thus fit into metanarratives of national construction—or deconstruction.25 Recent scholarship on Canada-US borderlands26 and on perceptions of the United States in Canada have proposed less dichotomous, more ambivalent, polysemous interpretations, that contend that Canadians did have the power to construct their own meanings of what it meant to be Canadian, meanings that were grounded in their actual experience of North America, more than in the nation-building metanarratives. This empowerment tapped on their traditions and worldviews, and on the ongoing collective conversation that constructed a folk knowledge about life in North America. Paradoxically, the repertoire of popular culture beamed from the United States as well played a part in Canadians’ empowerment, for instance on the many occasions where American images were folklore-ized into some foreign Other; from Florida, images such as Walt Disney World, Cape Canaveral, cocaine cowboys, or roaming alligators, however fascinating, were understood by Canadians to understand themselves as not American. Snowbirds themselves, as we have shown, were using Canadian symbols and in a less dichotomous and defensive fashion than academic nationalists supposed. In combination with gestures of appreciation for the American Good Life, they congregated with their compatriots in the southlands even as they reached out to their American neighbors.

In this way they reached their own conclusions about Canadian identity, remaining surprisingly Canadian. By this enduring Canadian character, they put into question the view common to borderlands scholarship that liminal places foster multinational “blends.”27 Snowbirds were not exactly blending. They were mingling, to be sure, but mostly so that they could experience their own, unique version of the Good Life. This finding supports the “people’s agency” interpretation of North American popular culture, an interpretation that allows persons and groups to find meaning outside of metanarratives and other top-down discourse.28

Today, Canadian snowbirds still migrate each year in large numbers—if the exchange rate between the Canadian and US dollars may have slowed them down circa the year 2000, currency is no longer a factor in 2009. Yet snowbirds and other Canadian sun-seekers have
arguably become less visible. This may be a vindication of modernization theory: Canadian nationalism may have become less strident, less defensive, less likely to lament the declining prospect of an autonomous Canada. This transformation is all the more counterintuitive to the nationalist standpoint considering the number of ongoing, simmering controversies around the meaning of the Canada-US relationship, and given the sorry legacy of the Bush years.

Part of the snowbirds new toned-down look is a result of their own agency: they became, like most denizens of late modernity, much harder to encapsulate with simple labels. For instance, other states—and a number of Latin American and Caribbean nations—have become snowbird havens, albeit on a smaller scale. And Floridians themselves have changed a lot. Since the 1960s, the Sunshine State has slowly, haltingly moved away from its origins as a fast-growth tourist magnet. In the state with the fourth-largest population, Floridians have to cope with issues typical of a populous, cosmopolitan, modern (shall we say “mature”) polity: international migration; interracial strife involving African-Americans, American Indians, Cubans and Whites; housing shortages; environmental degradation; traffic gridlock, and the like. If, for a moment during the 1980s and 90s, these changes were addressed by using tourists and snowbirds as scapegoats to denounce the Florida model of growth-at-all-costs, nowadays tourists and snowbirds as scapegoats to denounce the Florida model of these changes were addressed by using tourists and snowbirds as scapegoats to denounce the Florida model of modern (shall we say “mature”) polity: international migration. But the Canada-US relationship, and given the sorry legacy of the Bush years.

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28 Harney, 27, 28, 32.

29 Remarks of G.H. Aiken (PC, Parry Sound-Muskoka), mention Florida as illustrative of Canadian tourism’s underperformance: House of Commons Debates (hereafter HCD), 2:26, v. 9 (16 October 1984), 9125; comments of Mr. Stevens (PC, York Simcoe), on lack of promotion and high wages, detrimental to the travel account deficit, of high domestic air fares of bad perception and promotion on winter: HCD, 1:31, v. 1 (10 October 1979), 382, 383; R.M. Whicker (Lib, Bruce) names Florida when discussing the tourist deficit and provincial promotional efforts: Legislative Assembly of Ontario Debates, 4:27 (14 March 1966), 1486; Walt Disney World is still competition for Ontario, according to S. Cureatz (PC, Durham), Legislative Assembly of Ontario Debates (hereafter LAOD), 4:31 (13 March 1988), 52.


23 When development threatens the Muskoka cottage area, in Ontario, a Gravenhurst resident suggests “It could end up looking like Miami Beach.” Peter Gorrie, “Muskoka: Growing Pains in Cottage Country,” Canadian Geographic 109 (June-July 1989); 20; Comment of Claude Simard (Lib., Minister of Leisure, Hunting and Fishing, Richelieu) on the regulation of roadside billboards in Quebec: the roads to Miami exemplify the “pollution” that we want to control and avoid: Débats de l’Assemblée nationale, Commission permanente de l’industrie et du commerce, 2:30 (23 May 1974), 2312; similar comments by constituents of Brenda Elliott (PC, Guelph), on new roadside signage “the last thing in the world we want in beautiful Ontario looking like Florida”: LAOD, Standing Committee on Estimates, 1:36 (20 November 1996), E80; when discussing the water supply problems of Ontario, Ernie Parsons (Lib., Prince Edward-Hastings) gives the much worse example of Florida: LAOD, 1:37 (23 October 2000), 4924.


Over the course of the twentieth century, well over three million Canadians migrated to the United States. A considerably less important number of Americans moved to Canada over the same period. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the American advantage over Canada in migration between the two countries has been substantially reduced. Canadians have a strong affinity for the United States but are more attracted to living there part-time rather than permanently. This essay will look at historic and recent patterns of migration between the two countries and employing survey data explore current attitudes on the part of Canadians to the idea of living in the United States.
with the United States. It is contended that historic and current migratory trends and public opinion are complex and it is difficult to make generalizations about the ties between the two countries.

2. HISTORIC PATTERNS OF MIGRATION

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the number of Canadian migrants to the United States can be estimated at 210,000 persons. As observed below, while that figure is considerably less than the total number of Canadians that migrated to the United States during the 1960’s, (approximately 433,000) it is greater than the number of departures that occurred in each of the last three decades of the twentieth century.

Those persons in the United States that report French Canadian and Canadian ancestry are spread across much of the United States. According the 2007 American Community Survey of the US Census Bureau, of the approximately three-quarters of a million reporting Canadian ancestry, the biggest concentrations are in the states of California and Florida. Those Americans reporting Cajun descendants are mainly concentrated in Louisiana and Texas (data for those reporting “Canadian” and “Cajun” ancestry were not provided for 2008). As for Americans of French Canadian ancestry, as observed below, in 2008 the largest number was in Massachusetts, followed by Michigan, New York and California.

2000-2009 210 1

TABLE 1. Numbers of persons migrating from Canada to the United States by decennial periods during the period 1900-2009

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<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>210</td>
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</table>

Sources: Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States/Department of Homeland Security

1 Represents the actual figures provided from the Immigration authorities of the United States for the years 2000-2008 and an estimate for the year 2009 based upon the annual average for the previous 9 years.

TABLE 2. French Canadian total Ancestry tallied for people with one or more ancestry categories (Estimate), 2008

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<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>58595</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>57225</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>54161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>51083</td>
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<td>Vermont</td>
<td>50774</td>
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<td>Illinois</td>
<td>36250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>35655</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>34605</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>32957</td>
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<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>31132</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
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<td>Oregon</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
<td>25391</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>25197</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>19771</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>18265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>16402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>15473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>15058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>14377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>10876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. RECENT PATTERNS OF CANADIAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

The number of persons whose last permanent residence was Canada that were admitted to the United States in 2008 remained relatively consistent across the first decade of the twentieth century. The number of
migrants from the United States to Canada has steadily risen since 2002 but not enough to substantially diminish the net migratory gain made by our neighbors to the south.

The preferred destinations of the Canadian-born population that moved to the United States between 2005 and 2008 were California, Florida, New York and Texas. Despite declines in the total numbers of the Canadian-born settling in the US over that period, the numbers moving to California and New York have remained relatively stable.

**TABLE 3. Immigrants Admitted from Canada to the United States and Americans to Canada by country of last permanent residence 1991-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Canadians Admitted to the United States</th>
<th>Americans Admitted to Canada</th>
<th>Net Loss to Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>22,366</td>
<td>11,216</td>
<td>11,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20,324</td>
<td>10,449</td>
<td>9,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>23,913</td>
<td>10,943</td>
<td>12,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>29,930</td>
<td>9,263</td>
<td>20,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>22,439</td>
<td>7,507</td>
<td>14,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>16,447</td>
<td>5,990</td>
<td>10,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>27,142</td>
<td>5,288</td>
<td>21,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>29,991</td>
<td>5,902</td>
<td>24,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>21,289</td>
<td>5,809</td>
<td>15,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12,948</td>
<td>5,578</td>
<td>7,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>14,295</td>
<td>4,773</td>
<td>9,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>15,788</td>
<td>5,043</td>
<td>10,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>21,751</td>
<td>5,789</td>
<td>15,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>18,117</td>
<td>5,185</td>
<td>12,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>22,243</td>
<td>6,234</td>
<td>16,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>23,898</td>
<td>8,014</td>
<td>15,884</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**4. CANADIAN MIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES: MANY CONTEMPLATE, FEW DEPART**

Between 2006 and 2008, Gallup surveys conducted in over 80 countries revealed that at least one in four people around the Globe would choose to relocate in another country if the option were available to them (the specific question was “...if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country or would you prefer to continue living in the same country”). There was considerable variation globally in terms of people saying they would like to migrate. Majorities in some of the world’s poorer nations expressed a desire to migrate (i.e. Sierra Leone, Guyana, Congo (Kinshasa), and Nigeria). Few expressed a desire to leave in such countries as Saudi Arabia, Australia, Thailand, and South Africa. But the desire to migrate was not only limited to some of the world’s poorer nations as people in such countries as the United Kingdom (27%), Germany (27%) and France (18%) expressed a preference for living abroad. The Gallup poll also asked respondents across Latin America that wished to leave to what country they would like to relocate. The United States was the single most popular choice, selected by a third (33%, average) of respondents across the region. In Mexico, some 45% cited the US as their preferred destination. Others cited Spain and several South American countries.

A recent analysis of Gallup surveys on international migration revealed that: “…16% of the world’s adults would like to move to another country permanently if they had the chance. This translates to roughly...
700 million worldwide—more than the entire adult population of North and South America combined. As to their preferred destination it is the United States where nearly one-quarter (24%) or roughly 165 million adults would like to relocate permanently. With an additional estimated 45 million saying they would like to move to Canada, Northern America is one of the world’s two most desired regions (Esipova and Ray, 2009).

While, it is difficult to say how many Canadians would like to live in another country, in a survey conducted in November 2007 by the firm Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, some 17% of Canadians said that they had considered moving to the United States, some 67% of Canadians said that they never considered moving to the United States, some 29% of Canadians said, “I would like to live in the United States part of the year” A majority of Canadians recognize that there are important obstacles to making such a move, as some 59% say, “It is too complex to move to the U.S.” Another concern of 55% of Canadians surveyed is that: “Those people who move to the US will lose the benefits of being Canadian”. In a similar survey conducted in 2009 some one in four Canadians said they have considered moving to the United States (an increase of 8 points over the 2007 survey). Additional insight into this perspective emanates from the finding that more than one in three Canadians would like to live in the United States part of the year. Those Canadians who like the idea of being “part-time Americans” are most likely to reside in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. It might be argued that since the survey places no conditions on residing part time in the US it is not surprising that such an important share of Canadians express a desire to live there. In this regard, it is worth bearing in mind that the principal destinations that Canadians have chosen when settling south of the border. As noted previously, some four in ten of the Canadian-born that moved to the US in 2008 chose the states of California, Florida, Texas and New York.

The ACS Leger Marketing survey reveals that: Some 62% of Canadians report that they have travelled to the United States over the past few years with British Columbians (76%) most likely to report doing so and Quebecers least likely to have done so (49%).

In fact, over one in three Canadians report frequently travelling to the United States. British Columbians (43.7%) and Atlantic Canadians (42.1%) are most likely to report that they frequently travel south of the border while Quebecers (28%) are least likely to report doing so.

Yet another telling statistic is the percentage of Canadians that would favor eliminating the border with the United States. In 2009 (26.5%) and in 2007 (23%), some one in four Canadians agreed that we should get rid of the border with our neighbor. The idea is especially popular in the Prairies (31.5%) and Quebec (31.7%) and is least popular in Ontario (21.6%). Age plays an important factor in the degree to which Canadians feel we should get rid of the border as some one in five under the age of 45 in favor compared with one in three over that age that would endorse the proposal.

A narrow majority of Canadians (54%) agree that the United States is our best friend in the world. Albertans (72.4%) and Prairie residents (59%) are most likely to feel that way, while Quebecers (48%) and British Columbians (41.6%) are least likely to think so. On the basis of age, the youngest are least likely to agree that the United States is our best friend with forty percent between 18 and 44 holding that view compared with sixty percent of those aged 45 to 64 and over seventy percent of respondents over the age of 65.

Not surprisingly, those Canadians that are most likely to have considered a move to the United States strongly agree that they would like to live there part of the year. They are also more inclined to agree that we should get rid of the border, are more likely to have travelled to the United States, and are more likely to think that the United States is our best friend. Whether or not Canadians have considered moving to the United States, the majority also seem to think it is good for our dollar to rise against the American currency.

5. Conclusion

As observed above, an important percentage of Canadians have considered moving to the United States. But there is a big gap between thinking about such a move and actually making it as revealed in the data on the actual number of Canadian migrants to the United States. In the first half of the twentieth century, large waves of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>I Have Considered Moving to the United States</th>
<th>I Would Like to Live in the United States Part of the Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba/Saskatchewan</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, August, 2009
such migration were made in challenging economic conditions with many hoping to improve their circumstances. More recent migration to the United States often generates debate about “brain drain” that is the extent to which the US attracts some of Canada’s most educated people. But that cuts both ways as the more recent migrants going to the United States and those coming to Canada tend to be more educated than the overall population in each country.

TABLE 6. Agreement over whether Canadians have considered moving to the United States correlated over selected statements pertaining to the relationship with the United States, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I HAVE CONSIDERED MOVING TO THE UNITED STATES</th>
<th>AGREED</th>
<th>SOMewhat AGREED</th>
<th>SOMewhat DISAGREED</th>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would like to live in the United States part of the year. (2)</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should get rid of the border with the United States.</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I frequently travel to the United States.</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States is our best friend in the world.</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think that it is good that the Canadian dollar rises against the US dollar.</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, August, 2009

What the numbers and the survey data above reveal is that making broad generalizations about Canadian’s views on the United States and their relationship to the country likely fails to capture the complex pattern of thinking on the part of the population when it comes to our neighbor. Regional differences, age and the degree of travel to the United States have an important impact on Canadian views on the United States and on the northern side of the divide there are differences of opinion on various matters. Future research will need to think carefully about the variation in opinion amongst Canadians rather than attempt to offer broad generalizations designed to capture the Canadian perspective on the United States.

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In examining Canada’s international relations in the twentieth century, it seems appropriate to begin with a quotation from the most successful Canadian political leader of that era, William Lyon Mackenzie King. “If some countries have too much history,” King opined, “we have too much geography.” In fact, geography—or the perception by Canadians of Canada’s place in the world—significantly influenced Canadian foreign policy and the conduct of Canada’s international relations in the twentieth century. For Canada, the world beyond its borders—especially Europe and the United States—was vital for immigrants and investments as well as for potential markets for Canadian exports. For most Canadians, the salient aspect of their diplomatic and political relationship with the rest of the world at the beginning of the twentieth century was the territorial and material predominance of the British Empire. Membership in the Empire shaped Canada’s situation and prospects. Perhaps no image conveyed that so well as the stamp issued with abundant hubris by Canada’s post office at Christmas 1898. Rather than the familiar cameo of Queen Victoria, it displayed a map of the world, with the British Empire portrayed boldly in red, the oceans in pale blue, and everything else drab and undifferentiated. Across the bottom was an inspirational inscription: “WE HOLD A VASTER EMPIRE
Canada in the World

Government Statement

Sources: Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1995

Sources: Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987

Sources: Canadian Postal Museum website: http://www.civilization.ca/cpm/chrono/images/1898a1b.jpg, downloaded on 2/8/03.

Sources: Da Capo Press, 1988
THAN HAS BEEN.” That evoked the allegiance of Canadians and their government—or, at least, of the Postmaster General—at the time.

As the twentieth century began, Canadian volunteers, with some support from the government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, fought in a distant imperial clash in South Africa. Meanwhile, settlement of the last major territorial controversy between Canada and the United States (over the boundary between Alaska and the Canadian northwest) also had an imperial aspect. The decisive vote of the British member of the arbitration panel conceded the American claim to the critical headlands and inlets of the panhandle that controlled access to the Klondike goldfields. Canadians might grouse about a sacrifice of Canadian interests on the altar of Anglo-American friendship, but no country gained as much from that amity as Canada.

The naval rivalries that preceded and the military escalation and entangling alliances that provoked the Great War seemed distant from Canada’s shores. Partisan considerations had complicated the handling of imperial questions before 1914. When war broke out, however, there was no question of neutrality for Canada—unlike its continental neighbour—nor was there doubt about its allegiance. “When the call comes,” Laurier affirmed, “our answer goes at once, and it goes in the classical language of the British answer to the call of duty: ‘Ready, aye, ready.’” The King’s proclamation on behalf of the Empire made clear constitutionally what was obvious politically—when Britain was at war, Canada was at war.

Consequently, another part of the world became very familiar to Canadians. With newspapers vying to explain what was happening (and where) to readers, the people of Canada received a geography lesson. Perhaps most remarkably, the bulk of Canada’s army was engaged in combat along entrenched lines that traversed an extraordinarily small tract of land. When Canadian (and Australian) forces spearheaded an offensive that defeated the German Army, they were not far from where they had first taken the field more than three years earlier.

At the Paris Peace Conference, Canadian delegates, as representatives of Canada and members of the British Empire Delegation, were, with victors and vanquished, redrawing the boundaries not only of Europe, but also of the Middle East, Africa, Asia and elsewhere. The Treaty of Versailles included the covenant of a League of Nations, to bring order and stability to world affairs. With no territorial ambitions, minimal interest in reparations and little to gain from collective security, Canada had not much at stake there other than recognition of its international status as a nation. That modest goal was designed to acknowledge its contribution to victory and to offset the disadvantage of imperial nomenclature which obscured differences among self-governing colonies, dominions and independent states. After the war, the horizons of Canada’s world might have been broadened by membership in the League of Nations.
But that was not how Canada situated itself on the globe. As evident at successive sessions of the League’s assembly, Canada was most interested in status, not responsibility. Membership was not an avenue for international engagement. Canada’s imperial bonds may have slackened as greater autonomy was emphasized, but that gradual shift was offset not by another tie to the rest of the world but by rediscovery of the advantages of its continental location, which was contrasted to that of so many other members of the League (notably European states). Canadian speakers often juxtaposed the enlightened tendency of the “New World” (Canada and the US) to settle disputes peacefully by negotiation or arbitration to the belligerent predisposition of countries in the “Old World.” Geographic expressions of continental superiority included frequent references to “one hundred years [or more] of peace on the North American continent” and to the “longest undefended border in the world.”

Perhaps the most infamous statement of this smugness was a Canadian delegate’s explanation of why Canada would not underwrite western Europe’s security by signing the Geneva Protocol. As Senator Raoul Dandurand put it, arrangements for collective security among nations were analogous to a “mutual insurance” pact against fire. The risks for Canada were not as great as those of European nations, so that it should not be expected to pay the same premiums. Canadians lived “in a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.”

Less often quoted from that speech—but better explaining Canada’s aloof and indifferent interwar policies—is the next passage, stressing that “a vast ocean separates us from Europe,” the most likely source of policies—is the next passage, stressing that “a vast ocean separates us from Europe,” the most likely source of conflagration. That is the geographic expression of Canada’s outlook in this period. Its cartographic articulation may be found in Canadian school atlases between the wars, with their comforting emphasis on Mercator’s projection. That image pleased Canadians for two principal reasons: first, it exaggerated Canada’s size, particularly in the North (thus magnifying the territorial advantage over its southern neighbour); secondly, it placed the vast Atlantic and Pacific oceans on either side of Canada, with potentially troublesome Europe and Asia far from Canadian shores.

Canadian policy may have been misguided, irresponsible or simply incoherent as the world confronted (or not) crises in Manchuria and Ethiopia in the 1930s (places about which most Canadians knew or cared little), but it hardly mattered. In his second and last speech to the League’s assembly, in September 1936, King chose not to recite the familiar clichés about harmony in Canadian-American relations, nor to preach about the moral superiority of the New World over the Old World. Such lofty condescension was inappropriate in a dangerous world beset by calamities. Instead, King admitted that Canada was in a uniquely favourable location. “We recognise that we in Canada,” he acknowledged, “are particularly fortunate both in our neighbours, and in our lack of neighbours, and we agree that we cannot reasonably expect our relations and our attitude to be wholly duplicated elsewhere.”

Perhaps appropriately, the most important pronouncements affecting Canada’s international relations in the inter-war period involved continental defence. At Queen’s University on August 18, 1938, the American president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, affirmed that his country would “not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened” by a foreign foe. Two days later, King voiced the “warm appreciation” of Canadians for Roosevelt’s pledge. “We too have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour,” King attested, “and one of them is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea, or air to the United States across Canadian territory.” Even so, it was neither Canada’s continental relationship nor its membership in the League of Nations which drew it into the second global conflict of the twentieth century.

Whatever its distance from the immediate clash of arms that commenced the Second World War—and advances in its constitutional status that were underlined by a week of rather ambiguous and remarkably belligerent neutrality—Canada entered that conflict, while the US did not, as a result of its traditional ties to the UK. For Canadians serving overseas as well as for those at home, the European war soon became a world-wide confrontation. When Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, it transformed popular and official attitudes towards the USSR as well as the prospects for eventual victory, while posing challenges of materially assisting a new ally.

Japan’s attacks, notably on Pearl Harbor and on Hong Kong, whose defenders included Canadians, further broadened the struggle and fortified the alliance. The formidable neutral, whose relationship with Britain and Canada had already been close, became a powerful ally. The vulnerability of the British Empire and Commonwealth—and consequent strains for Canada—had prompted extraordinary measures of mutual assistance between a neutral and belligerents, including the “destroyer-bases deal”, the Ogdensburg Agreement, Lend-Lease and the Hyde Park Declaration, and many other collaborative military and economic arrangements. With formal American entry into the war, the continental partnership became explicit and wide-ranging, even as its elements were eclipsed by greater and potentially decisive overseas commitments.
As in the Great War, making sense of what was happening abroad—and where it was happening—increased awareness in Canada of otherwise remote and unfamiliar locales. Once more, there was a crash course in geography. For most Canadians—though not necessarily those on the western coast—the principal focus of attention remained Europe and the ominous threat of Nazi Germany. More so than the Great War, the Second World War also brought the overseas conflict to North American shores. U-boats roamed the Atlantic coast and ships were sunk in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Japanese forces invaded islands in the Aleutian chain in the Northeast Pacific. Consequent awareness of unaccustomed vulnerability necessitated a considerable build-up, particularly in Canada’s coastal defences, to counteract actual dangers and to reassure Canadians.

Enemy threats and allied needs prompted Canadians to do something that, for a self-described “northern people,” albeit mostly settled near Canada’s southern border, they so rarely did: look and act northward. When they shifted their gaze to Canada’s north, Canadians found that Americans were already there. Even before US entry into the war, a map of the “Arctic Front” published in the *Montreal Gazette* noted the significant American presence in Alaska, as well as US bases in Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland. This circumpolar projection, the newspaper commented, “serves best to give a true conception of the struggle’s relationship to the Far North.” As the caption presciently advised, readers should “study” the map “carefully” because they would “hear more of the Arctic later on.”

American concerns about protecting Alaska prompted a network of military projects across Canada’s northwest. Most were initiated by the US, with its military and civilian personnel in the vanguard. As the range and extent of the activities expanded, however, this considerable foreign but allied presence in an underpopulated part of Canada posed challenges to Canadian sovereignty there. Most of the roads, pipelines, airfields and other establishments were later transferred to Canadian ownership and control on the explicit understanding that this change would not affect operations.

The significance of the Arctic (and of Canada’s location generally) was enhanced when the USSR shifted from ally in the Second World War to most likely adversary in a Third World War. Not coincidentally, there was greater attention in Canada’s school atlases and elsewhere to circumpolar projections. That map form was much less comforting to Canadians than had been Mercator’s projection. The more disquieting depiction, with Canada situated between the US and the USSR, recalled an earlier worry about whether Canada would become “the Belgium of the next world war.” One significant difference from the Belgian precedent was that Canada would not be neutral in any clash between the rival superpowers. A principal aim of Canadian policy in the early years of the cold war was to entangle Canada, the US and others (notably the UK and western Europe), in an alliance to deter or thwart any Soviet threat. That objective was overwhelmingly endorsed by Canadian public opinion.

Thus, Canadian fears of annihilation in a global clash trumped sensitivities about protecting national sovereignty. The traditional situation and alignment of Canada in world affairs was expressed geometrically and geographically by the evocative image of a “North Atlantic Triangle.” Participating in the United Nations, contributing to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and collaborating to defend North America, Canada assumed responsibilities that it had eschewed a generation earlier. Canada became inextricably entangled in organizations and measures that defended its continent and its region.

Canadians had anticipated that Europe would, as before, be the principal battleground for any global struggle, but the first major clash occurred instead in the Far East. The US government unexpectedly responded forcefully to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea and it enlisted UN support for its action. That response and approach enabled the government of Louis St. Laurent, with Lester B. Pearson as foreign minister, to escalate its contribution from a small naval force to significant armed forces consisting predominantly of volunteers. The Korean War and Canadian deeds increased awareness in Canada of that part of the world. It may since be regarded justifiably as Canada’s “forgotten war” but for three years it dominated front pages of Canadian newspapers, necessarily illustrated with informative maps.

Canada’s next major international engagement under the UN’s mantle was prompted by diplomatic efforts to resolve a dangerous conflict and salvage western unity by extracting two traditional allies of Canada—Britain and France—from a treacherous morass into which they had waded. Diplomatic efforts, led by Canada’s foreign minister, to settle the Suez Crisis in 1956 ultimately earned Pearson the Nobel Prize for Peace. That singular achievement has inspired Canadian commentators to regard peacekeeping as a Canadian invention and to construct a mythology of Canadian internationalism, dominated by Canada’s UN commitments.

That initiative and intervention inspired a succession of later, usually more modest, involvements by Canada in UN missions elsewhere. Indeed, recent critiques of Canadian foreign policy have lamented Canada’s unwillingness and/or inability to muster the frequency and level of commitments to peacekeeping (or peacemaking and peace-building) missions that have been viewed since
1956 as hallmarks of Canadian engagement in world affairs. In fact, this participation (and other overseas ventures), often came about directly or indirectly as a result of Canada’s partnership in the western alliance. In other words, its UN engagements complemented rather than contradicted or qualified its alignment in the cold war.

Other undertakings by Canada more obviously and explicitly illustrated its geopolitical situation. To meet the Soviet threat to North America, first from long-range bombers and later from inter-continental ballistic missiles, Canada and the US collaborated in measures for continental defence, most notably a series of warning systems and ultimately the North American Air Defence Command (or NORAD). [MAP] Canada’s defence and strategic interests—as well as its economy—were effectively integrated with those of the US long before the end of the twentieth century. In its final decade, Canada’s most significant military interventions abroad—in the first Gulf War and in the Balkans—were linked to the UN and NATO, though arguably both engagements were ultimately determined by Canada’s ties to the US.

When the nineteenth century had closed, Canada’s international presence, such as it was, was largely delineated by its membership of the British Empire, and its actual or potential military engagements abroad were likely to derive from that relationship. In all aspects of international affairs, Canada’s inter-dependence with the rest of the world has been enhanced by the events and influences of the twentieth century. No major country is more dependent on international investment and trade for its prosperity. Even so, that image (or self-image) as a global nation can be misleading. So much of Canada’s international involvement is centred on the continent of North America and the bilateral relationship with the United States, though Canadians are often understandably reluctant to concede the implications of that situation for Canada’s options in foreign, trade and defence policy.

The last statement of foreign policy by the Canadian government in the twentieth century was entitled Canada in the World. The only illustration accompanying this document was a map of the world on its cover, with some curious features. First, it is a profoundly traditional display in one sense—the nationalist temptation to place Canada in the centre of the world has been resisted for a familiar alignment, with what was formerly known as the Meridian of Greenwich in the middle. Secondly, it is a strange hybrid (a cartographical travesty), involving a flat representation of the whole world squeezed awkwardly onto one visible surface of a sphere. Last but not least, the dominant power in Canada’s world at the beginning of the twentieth century has disappeared entirely—the British Isles were sunk without a trace, presumably to simplify the central line of longitude. Whatever the explanation, that would never have been countenanced in 1900.

Notwithstanding this evidence of geographical ignorance, the image was intended to convey the message that, in the words of the inevitable executive summary that introduces Canada in the World, its government was “committed to ensuring that Canada will continue to do its fair share for the world, maintaining our proud and uniquely Canadian contribution to global governance and prosperity.” Yet the most distinctive feature of Canada’s place in the world, particularly when viewed from abroad—throughout the twentieth century and still in the twenty-first century—has been its proximity to the United States. The dominant trend of the century past, and likely also the century ahead, has been the broadening and deepening of Canadian-American relations. Canada’s world today and tomorrow thus poses different challenges and opportunities from those encountered by Canadians and their government in 1900.
COMPARATIVE NATIVISM: 
THE UNITED STATES, CANADA 
AND AUSTRALIA, 1880s-1910s

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The United States, Canada and Australia in the period between 1880–1920, had similar political, legal and cultural systems, and so provide a natural test for the interactions of ethnicity, religion, nationalism and nativism. For example, Germans and other European immigrants were welcomed before 1914, but wartime patriotism pushed them out of the consensus. As a result, in the U.S. and Canada, they were forced to assimilate, and in Australia, they were deported. Increasingly, in Canada and Australia, nativism became a question of loyalty to the country or to the British Empire. The manifestation of this was Anglophones pushing the French in Canada to the wall because they were too traditionalistic and not sufficiently imperial and Irish Catholics who were loyal to their country and to Rome, but hostile to Britain. Drawing from these case studies, this paper posits that nativism can be better understood as a matter of defining the nation to which loyalty is due.

INTRODUCTION

Pluralism is the political acceptance of distinctive groups with varying beliefs and customs. Nativism, on the other hand, proclaims the superiority of a cultural nation, based on language and customs, and forces outsiders to the periphery, if not expelling them all together. Old definitions in terms of reactionary attitudes or psychological pathologies represent polemical judgments rather than analytical categories. The goal here is to use comparative analysis to see how and when nativism takes action in politics. Historically, pluralism was not much in evidence around the world in the period spanning 1890-1910—hatred was more like it. Violence was the norm for the Russian pogroms, the Armenian massacres and the Boxer rebellion. In Africa, formal warfare broke out between the Boers and the British. The Kulturkampf against German Catholics had just subsided and anti-Semitism was growing rapidly, as the Dreyfus Affair in France demonstrated. In the United States, the Indian wars had only just ended at Wounded Knee in 1890, as lynchings of blacks soared in the south. This paper does not attempt to present a general history of hatred, instead, the problem addressed is how, in the past, democracies handled ethnic, cultural and religious tensions.

In order to do so, we look at the United States, Canada and Australia—three democracies with a commitment to equal rights for all citizens, all with very highly developed political, economic and social systems, all using similar legal systems, and all having Protestant majorities of British descent, with large ethnic minorities, and a large Catholic population. Each had a strong
tradition of anti-Catholicism and a love-hate relationship with the British Empire.\textsuperscript{1} Compared to other nations, they were peaceful countries and all used their political system instead of violence to handle disputes that arose.\textsuperscript{2} They all also debated religion and ethnic issues and came to quite different solutions in democratic fashion.\textsuperscript{3} The Australians, for example, expelled two large ethnic groups (Kanakas and Germans), while the Americans debated the restriction of immigration (but did not restrict it until later). Note that nativism and immigration restriction are separate issues, for the chief support for restriction came from the labor unions of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), whose leaders and members were mostly Irish, German or Jewish immigrants.\textsuperscript{4}

This paper attempts to answer two related questions. The first basic question that arises is how a nation decides who represents the true citizen and so, who is entitled to participate in a republic. Every state imposed restrictions dealing with loyalty to the nation, independence, civic virtue, and freedom from corruption. The nativist is one who imposes severe restrictions on specific groups that seem to have values alien to those of the nation. In the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, people thought much more in terms of group identity than today, and to explore nativism we need to explore how groups were treated. More exactly, how groups interacted with each other.

The second basic question is how politicians handled these issues. That is, in democratic societies, how do established political parties and professional politicians handle divisive issues? In all three countries, popular voting behavior was partially, but not entirely, correlated with ethnocultural affiliations. For example, in the U.S., Catholics and liturgical Protestants favored the Democratic Party, while pietistic Protestants (in the North), were Republicans, but the groups were far from unanimous. In Australia, after parties formed in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the working class Irish Catholics supported the Australian Labor Party while the middle class of British Protestants favored the Liberals, again with cross-cutting minorities. In Canada, the ethnoreligious links to parties depended on the province, and there was a much weaker degree of party loyalty that allowed fluid movement between parties. The anti-Catholic Canadian movements of the 1880s and 1890s were more identified with the Conservatives, and led to the success of the Liberal party in French Canada.

**UNITED STATES**

The American mood ranged between buoyant optimism for most of the 1890-1905 period, but was punctuated by the intense economic panic and conflicts leading to the Depression of 1893-97. The pace of immigration accelerated, but increasing numbers were new ethnic groups who did not quickly become voters; they were targets that did not fight back.

In the United States at the time, the pietistic Protestants, including Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians and Congregationalists, were aggressively committed to reforming society. Instead of identifying specific sinful groups, like Catholics, as the enemy, they looked for sin itself and identified social evils, fighting against the perpetrators or defenders of those negative factors. The saloon, debauchery and social drunkenness was a high priority in the 1870s and 1880s, but in state after state, the dry crusade fell short. This was due to the fast growing numbers of high church liturgicals (especially Catholics and German Lutherans), who resented the idea that an outside group could define their moral standards. By the 1890s, the prohibition movement was in the doldrums, and played only a slight role in the ethnoreligious battles.\textsuperscript{5}

The Catholic Irish were doing very well in America, Canada and Australia in terms of status and prosperity, though most were locked into low-skilled jobs where they used gangs and solidarity to strengthen their bargaining powers, and were starting to form (and dominate) labor unions in each country. They played major roles in politics, especially in the Australian Labor Party and the U.S. Democratic Party, where they were especially notable in the machines emerging in patronage-rich, fast-growing American cities that lacked the civil service regimes in Canada and Australia. The Irish largely controlled the Catholic Church in the U.S., Australia, and in Ontario, thanks to their organizational skills and their alliance with the Vatican to favor ultramontane policies that put power in the hands of the bishop. Nevertheless, the Irish suffered from an inferiority complex in all three countries—they imagined seeing non-existent signs everywhere that said “No Irish Need Apply.” This myth of Protestant hostility greatly strengthened Irish solidarity.\textsuperscript{6}

The Republican Party had its main base among pietistic Protestants, but had a large unaffiliated and liturgical element. The pietists took the initiative in reforms such as prohibition that alienated the liturgicals and weakened the GOP in state after state. When Republican James G. Blaine tried in 1884 to gain a sliver of the Irish Catholic vote, he carelessly allowed a supporter to ridicule the Democrats as the party of “Rum, Romanism and Rebellion”, thus angering the very Irish who were targets of his overtures. Professional Republican politicians tried to suppress the liquor issue, while trying to confine its pietistic enthusiasm to the small Prohibition Party or to the amateurish Woman’s Christian temperance Union [WCTU] whose members were nonvoters. Amateur
moralists used the system of local democracy, in which open township and county conventions controlled party decisions, to take control of the Iowa GOP in 1889; the dry crusader they nominated took the party down with him and threatened permanent alienation of wet voters. The party professionals fought back in 1893, outvoted the crusaders (whose enthusiasm had run dry), and ensured that a newly visible tolerance for diverse customs allowed the drinkers to return to the GOP.7 Prohibitionists returned later after 1905, with a much more effective strategy and the professional leadership of the Anti-Saloon League. However, the battle lines between the pietistic reformers, and the liturgical reformees remained a keen memory.8

**BENNETT LAW**

The Bennett Law was a highly controversial state law passed in Wisconsin in 1889 that allowed only the use of English to teach major subjects in all public and private elementary and high schools. Schools that failed to comply would not be recognized by the state and the students who attended would be treated as truants. The law affected Wisconsin's many German-language parochial schools (and also the handful of Norwegian Lutheran parochial schools), and was bitterly resented by the state's large German-American population. The German Catholics and German Lutherans each operated large networks of parochial schools in the state, hence the language used in their classrooms was German; the Bennett Law would force German language teachers to be replaced with bilingual teachers.7

Wisconsin’s Republican politicians were controlled by a statewide machine that had long avoided antagonizing the Germans. However in 1888, the professionals were pushed aside and the party nominated William D. Hoard, a journalist who found the opposition of the Germans to the Bennett Law an insult to the English language. Hoard worked outside the party organization to rally the Yankee population of the state behind his reelection in 1890 by hammering at the necessity to have all children speak English. (Most German children were bilingual in the cities and towns, but not in rural Wisconsin.) As opposition swelled, Hoard escalated to a defense of the public school system (which was not under attack); “The little schoolhouse--stand by it!” he cried out. Hoard ridiculed the Germans by claiming he was the better guardian of their children than their parents or pastors. Hoard counted votes and thought he had a winning coalition by whipping up nativist distrust of Germania as anti-American. In Milwaukee, a predominantly German city, Hoard attacked Germania and religion:

“*We must fight alienism and selfish ecclesiasticism.... The parents, the pastors and the church have entered into a conspiracy to darken the understanding of the children, who are denied by cupidity and bigotry the privilege of even the free schools of the state.*”10

The Germans were incensed not only at the blatant attack on their language and culture, but also on their religion, for the parochial schools were set up and funded by the parents in order to inculcate the community’s religious values. Most importantly, the idea that the state could intervene in family life and tell children how to speak was intolerable, not just to the Germans, but to many English-speakers as well. By June 1890, the state’s Missouri Synod and Wisconsin Synod (the two main German Lutheran groups) had denounced the law. The German Catholic leadership of the state swung into line. Democrats, led by Yankee William F. Vilas took up the German cause and secured the election of George W. Peck, a Yankee, as mayor of Milwaukee. They then nominated him for governor. Irish Catholics, who had been feuding with the Germans, generally supported the law, but did not bolt to the GOP. The Germans organized thoroughly and supported Peck. Vilas crisscrossed the state defending Germania and German culture, and calling for tolerance and an end to nativism.

1890 was a major victory for the Democrats, their first in decades in Wisconsin. The law was repealed in 1891, but Democrats used the memories to carry Wisconsin and Illinois in the 1892 presidential election. The Bennett Law was the last major attack on German language schools until 1914.

The smashing defeat of the Bennett law by the voters helped establish the principle that parents, not the state government, had the primary responsibility for the education and language skills of their children. It caused Republican leaders, especially William McKinley, to shy away from attacking ethnic or religious groups; instead they promoted pluralism. However, there were unintended consequences for the victory of the machine over the moralists. Republican Robert LaFollette was outraged at the crushing of the popular will by the bosses, and he and Hoard fought back, creating the Progressives faction that fought for control of the GOP for many decades.11

**AMERICAN PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (APA)**

The American Protective Association was a mass-membership organization as well as a coordinating body for anti-Catholic groups. Formed in Iowa in 1887, it grew in the wake of the Bennett campaign and was strongest in the upper Midwest, especially among Protestant Irish
immigrants from Canada and Ulster, and from Lutheran immigrants from Scandinavia and Germany. It drew primarily upon European traditions of anti-Catholicism. Apart from sponsoring lurid talks by ex-priests and runaway nuns, the APA’s list of achievements was short indeed. Its main role was as a sparring dummy for the Democrats, who rallied support among Catholics by repeated attacks on the Republican Party as tainted or even controlled by the APA. When the economy went into a tailspin in 1893-94, the APA shed members but gained more attention, as the desperate Democrats rallied again and again against the APA. The APA members were immigrants, not nativists, and were astonished and alarmed by the success of Catholic politicians in this new country. They certainly had never seen anything like it in Europe. When Irish Protestants pushed the APA to endorse an English language test for voters —a test Irish Catholics could pass more easily than Swedes, the Scandinavians started to leave the APA. One APA marching song summed up their hapless self image: “Noble men are in our ranks / We are not a band of cranks/ We are not a lot of bigots or of fools”. The major parties had effective ways of dealing with the APA. They attacked it to solidify their own base of support, while making clear America opposed anti-Catholicism and nativism.

For the Democrats, pro-business conservative Episcopalians allied with President Grover Cleveland came to the rescue of the German Catholics and Lutherans, and pounded away at the theme the GOP was increasingly controlled by the nativists. These so-called “Bourbon Democrats”, such as Vilas of Wisconsin, were ousted on economic issues by the radical agrarian and silver wings of the party in 1896. Many bolted the party and supported the Gold Democrats in 1896, or sat on their hands to watch Bryan go down to defeat. The Irish Catholic city politicians did not like Bryan either, but they worked on his behalf in 1896 and used the opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the Bourbons, taking increasing power inside the Democratic party away from the Bourbon Democrats in major cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago after 1896.

In the GOP, the professionals took control at the state and local levels to make sure that troublemaking amateur moralists would not inflict defeat on the party by raising issues like prohibition, anti-Catholicism or nativism. McKinley took the lead, calling for “America for Americans, native and naturalized.” He wanted America to be open to immigrants “who are well disposed to our institutions, seeking new and happier homes.” High levels of immigration for McKinley were indicators of prosperity. The 1896 Republican Campaign Textbook summed it up: “Immigration follows high wages—high wages follow the tariff.” The strategy worked as McKinley assembled a coalition based in industrial, urban America that lasted until the Great Depression.

GOP Congressional leaders in 1897, supported by big business and German groups, blocked the intellectuals (led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, at this time still an outsider and not accepted by the leadership) to restrict immigration from eastern and southern Europe using literacy tests. The leadership was highly impressed that the nation’s immigrant strongholds had voted decisively for McKinley in 1896, deciding the election and dispelling fears of nativists that immigration was politically unhealthy. By the time the restrictionists tried again in 1898, they were out-organized by immigration advocates.

**GERMANY**

The largest and most diverse American ethnic group in the late 1800’s, were the Germans. They were well established throughout the urban and rural Midwest, and the urban east, with flourishing communities to show for it. The communities were based on skilled workers and owners of small crafts businesses. There was a striking absence of politicians among the Germany, although they did vote along the standard pietistic-liturgical lines. The Germans communities were divided along lines of religion, with about equal numbers of Catholics and Protestants, but the Protestants included liturgical Lutherans (esp. Missouri Synod, as well as pietistic and in-between groups). There were also large anticlerical and Jewish elements. Germany showed unity on the importance of preservation of religion, language, customs, social organizations and paternalistic traditions. But there was a failure to set up a system for training new leadership; they never set up the network of colleges and universities, which they needed to ensure long-term language maintenance. The result was that generational tensions were building up, especially as the younger generation clearly favored use of English language.

The Germans felt highly defensive on issues of prohibition. They also showed a striking commitment to hard money and opposition to inflation, which caused them to reject free silver and Bryanism. They were famous for their beer gardens and rejected the “puritanical” strains of reformism exhibited by pietistic Protestants.

The Irish were outnumbered by the Germans in the pews of the Catholic Church, but controlled the levers of power and held most of the bishoprics. When the Germans attempted to promote German language parishes and programs, the Irish (led by Archbishop John Ireland) counterattacked against “Cahenslyism” in the 1890s, insisting on English-language based assimilation. By their ultramontane loyalty to the Pope, the Irish secured Vatican approval and decisively...
defeated the Germans. On the other hand, the Catholic Church needed the Germans, and so tolerated a high degree of Germania in areas where Germans had large majorities.

One dog that did not bark was anti-Germanism as a political device. The temperance reformers attacked saloons endlessly, but at this time, did not focus on the German dimension; that was added later by the Anti-Saloon league. Two of the most bitterly hated politicians of the 1890s were born in Germany—Governor John Peter Altgeld of Illinois and Governor William Goebel of Kentucky. It is hard to find a third politician in American history as reviled as these two—and not surprisingly, Goebel was assassinated by his Republican opponents. However, the German theme was never used against them. As the World War experience showed, the opposition was quite capable of attacking Germania in the harshest terms, it is just that they did not do so in the U.S., Canada or Australia before 1914. Indeed, in Canada and Australia, German immigrants were quite welcome in the early 20th century.

The World War changed everything. It forced ethnicities to define and display their relative loyalties to the old country, to the traditional culture, to their current ethnic group, to their country of residence, and to show their assimilation to its cultural norms. The war allowed dominant groups to define the acceptable identities of aliens, especially enemy aliens. Groups loyal to the war effort measured the Germans and found them wanting. This led to a systematic assault on the culture of Germania, especially the use of the German language, in all three countries. German spokesmen were marginalized and ignored, and suspicion and restrictions of all sorts were imposed. Germans were numerous in Queensland and South Australia; most had arrived before 1890 and they were very well accepted until the Great War. The 2900 adult men with German citizenship were interned; the restrictions on the loyalty to the British Empire. In the U.S., by contrast, no immigrants were interned; the restrictions on the Germans were almost all symbolic, focused on language, and reflected nativism.

**CANADA**

The Canadian case involves a much more complex situation than the American one, set against the backdrop of a newly formed nation (Confederation came in 1867), and continued membership in the British Empire. ‘Who is a “true” Canadian?, the citizens of the new country asked. The French said they were, for not only had they arrived first, their loyalty to Canada was pure and paramount, and not contaminated by trans-Atlantic loyalties to either Paris or London. It proved the justification for largely sitting out the Great War, and fiercely resisting conscription then (and in the Second World War as well).

The British Canadians retorted that the French claims were spoiled by their lock into a highly traditional form of Catholicism, which permanently made them an ignorant and backward people—a theme repeated ever since Lord Durham attributed the backwardness of French Canadians to their language and religion in his 1839 report, which stressed their inferiority and of the need to assimilate them and uplift them to British standards. Assimilation had clearly failed by 1880, so the French Canadians took the position that the backward French should be contained in Quebec, and should not be allowed to export their backwardness to Ontario or the new Western Territories.

The French had numerical strength and cultural fortitude, but suffered systemic economic weaknesses. French Quebec was based on poor rural habitants; the strong and growing elements of the Quebec economy were controlled by British businessmen. All the French were strongly committed to their language, but religion was a different matter. They were divided among an ultramontane faction that looked to Rome, a Gallican faction that tried to be more independent of Rome, and a small but powerful anticlerical element. The Irish, with their
strong Vatican connections, at several decisive points, tipped the balance to the ultramontane position. The French had demographic strength—based on a high birth rate, although that was offset by a continuous stream of emigration to the textile mills of New England. The population growth meant the French could force the Anglophones out of their districts in rural Quebec and also spill over into eastern Ontario, where the issue of French language schools became a bitter dispute. British Canada worried that the French would eventually dominate because of their numerical growth, a factor that led to support for higher levels of European and American immigration. However, the French had a sense of falling behind economically and politically, as British Canada was industrializing and growing noticeably wealthier year by year. They knew they were unwelcome outside Quebec, which was industrializing and growing noticeably wealthier year by year. They knew they were unwelcome outside Quebec, and the execution of Louis Riel in 1885 for his rebellion was a stunning shock to the French, who saw Riel as a hero (or rather, his hangmen as villains). In politics, the Liberals of the 1850s in Toronto used anti-French rhetoric to demand more political power. Their leader was George Brown, editor of the Toronto Globe, but he was defeated in a critical election when the Irish Catholics mobilized against him. Accordingly, Brown dropped his harsh rhetoric after Confederation. There was relatively little anti-French rhetoric in Ontario politics in the 1870s and 1880s. But Confederation was not an economic success, and the growing pull of the United States alarmed supporters of the Empire, who became increasingly vocal in their loyalty to the Empire.

French nationalism became a potent political force in the hands of Honore Mercier (1840-1894), the Liberal premier of Quebec from 1887-91. Mercier proved brilliantly adept at organizing grass roots support on the basis of French nationality, and he governed by using the emotions conjured up by the words 'national,' 'French,' and 'Catholic,' thus building upon and enlarging the old Catholic self image as a saving remnant of God's true religion in a hostile Protestant land. In 1888, he achieved a settlement of the longstanding issue involving Jesuit estates. After the Jesuit order was dissolved in 1773, its large landholdings became the property of Quebec, but the Catholic factions fought bitterly over a solution for a century. Mercier cut the Gordian knot by giving the Catholic Church $400,000 to relinquish all its claims, and then going to Rome for a solution on dividing the money, (thus satisfying the ultramontanes and the Jesuits), but giving most of the money to the Gallicans and buying off the Protestants with cash for their schools too. It was a brilliant solution and enabled the French to develop a common front for the first time among all the factions. The downside was that Protestants, especially those outside Quebec who received no cash, took umbrage that the Pope was allowed to make a decision for Canadians. They demanded that the national government overturn the decision, producing an issue that lit the fires of religious hatred.

Meanwhile, Manitoba repudiated the old agreement that called for government funded French Catholic schools. The issue was used by British nationalists to demand the government stop French expansion. D'Anton McCarthy, a top Conservative leader, took up the challenge, advising, “This is a British country, and the sooner we take in hand our French Canadian fellow subjects and teach them the English language, the less trouble we will have to prevent,” he warned darkly of a future civil war. For McCarthy, Canada’s national mission was to bring British civilization to North America, replacing the French variety as soon as possible. The Manitoba Schools Question did little to change schools, but it did outrage the French and did split the Conservative party, with the Quebec wing demanding the national government reverse the ruling while the Ontario wing, with strong Orange representation, celebrated Manitoba’s apparent destruction of French schools. The Manitoba issue became central to the 1896 national election. The Liberals won under French Catholic Wilfrid Laurier, who took control of the national parliament by building on Mercier’s groundwork and making major gains in Quebec. 1896 was thus a realigning election in Canada as well as for the U.S. The Liberals refused to let the national government overturn Manitoba, citing provincial rights. Laurier then found a compromise that allowed limited French schooling in Manitoba, and which satisfied the Vatican. Laurier proved a master of inter-ethnic and inter-religious compromises that kept his Liberals in power with himself as prime minister from 1896–1911 (the first time the post was held by a French Canadian).

Orange lodges had emerged in Ireland as strongholds of Protestant anti-Catholicism and although Orange lodges existed among the Protestant Irish in Australia, they were not important factors. Orange lodges in the U.S. virtually collapsed after the violent Catholic attack on the Orange Parade in New York in 1871. In Canada, however, the Orange Lodges flourished, promoting Protestant Irish solidarity while spreading horror stories from ex-nuns and priests. The commitment of the Orange Lodges to the Conservative Party was consistently exaggerated by the Liberals, for the order was internally divided and not geared to operating political campaigns. A separate organization, the Equal Rights Association (ERA), was set up in Ontario to battle the Catholics. Led by D’Alton McCarthy, it tried to force the Conservatives to ride the anti-Catholic horse. The Conservatives refused, and when the ERA tried to run separate candidates, its basic weaknesses became apparent and it collapsed.
McCarthy’s narrow focus on the ethnoreligious enemy ruined his Conservative career. The Toronto Mail likewise took up the anti-French crusade and was repudiated by the Conservative party, as Conservative Prime Minister John MacDonald insisted on the importance of his Catholic supporters. The Manitoba Schools Question was decisive in defeating the divided Conservatives in 1896, as Wilfrid Laurier managed to hold together the Liberals and win over more Catholics. It took 15 years for the Conservatives to make their comeback at the national level, by winning the 1911 election on the basis of anti-Americanism and an appeal to the British Imperial nationalism. The Conservative party was held together mostly by nonideological thirst for office or “corruption”, but key leaders like John Macdonald (prime minister 1867-73 and 1878-91) and Robert Borden (prime minister 1911-20) had a broad vision of Canadian nationalism, based on the dominion's unique role in the Empire.

The language issue repeatedly proved a loser on election day, but the undaunted reformers pushed on. In province after province, the Anglo-Canadians tried to reduce or abolish the role of French in schools and block state support for Catholic schools in new provinces. Modernizers emphasized that their motivation was to end the backwardness of the French Canadians by uplifting their schools. Protestants who demanded and received state support for their schools in Quebec now refused support for French-language schools in Ontario. The final crisis came in 1915-16 in Ontario where Regulation 17 promised to impose English on all schools in Ontario. The Catholics split, as the Irish joined the anti-French coalition and won Vatican support.

Defeat on the Ontario Schools Question was the last straw for the French. Although the French had originally supported entry into the Great War, they now rejected the war effort and refused conscription into the army. From 1916 forward, there were two Canadas, one looking outward as part of the Empire, the other looking inward. The Liberal party split in two on the war issue and almost collapsed. But as the war ended, the new leader William Mackenzie King found a way to reunite the Liberal party, while the Conservatives mishandled the postwar chaos.

The end of World War I brought the sense of a new independence, wrought by war time sacrifices, that created a new form of nationalism in British Canada that looked inward to Canada, not outward to the Empire, for inspiration and identity. The refusal of the French to support the Empire was no longer so horrifying to the Anglophones. The Anglophones did not make it a political issue because they too had turned away from the Empire as Canada took its own place in world affairs, with its own seat in the League of Nations and shook off practically all remaining control of its affairs by London. The Liberal party accepted the inward-looking nationalism in Quebec and gained a political lock on the province for two generations after 1917, as well as the votes of most Catholics outside Quebec, giving the Liberal party a dominance that was rarely broken.

Australia

Politics in Australia were more factionalized, and probably milder, than in Canada or the U.S. during this period. The dominant liberal mindset of the 19th century deplored sectarian conflicts as outdated and unwise. The tighter bond with Britain perhaps had a moderating influence. In religious terms, Australia was about equally divided between Church of England and Church of Scotland at the upper end, evangelical Methodists and Baptists in the middle, with the Irish Catholics most numerous “wherever the hours were long, the climate merciless, the labour unskilled, the comforts few, and the remuneration small.” Political and social tensions among Australia’s European groups were quite mild, though there was an outburst of anti-Catholic outrage in 1869 when a Fenian terrorist tried to assassinate a royal visitor. The most serious dispute erupted in 1879 in New South Wales, which was 20 percent Catholic, over schools. Both public and Catholic schools received state aid, but the Catholic bishops decided to promote their parochial schools attacking the “godless” public schools as “seedpots of future immorality, infidelity and lawlessness.” A storm of protest ensued and premier Henry Parkes, who strongly disliked the Irish, retaliated by ending funding for Catholic schools. Politics was based on factions not parties, and so there was no party to rally either the Catholics of their opponents.

Evangelical Protestants made temperance their favorite cause, and they formed a Woman’s Christian temperance Union (WCTU). Class factors were similar too, with the pub the same sort of target as the American saloon. But Australia had a Labor party which was comfortable in the world of pubs, as well as an Anglican establishment that disparaged revivalistic crusades and the “wowers” who led them. The “drys” affiliated with the Liberal Party, and the Methodists in New South Wales in 1907 saw a cultural war between decency and middle class virtue on their side, and on the other, Labor’s unholy coalition of “Rum, Romanism, Socialism and Gambling”. The democratic solution was an emphasis on local option (an echo of popular sovereignty) and the plan to close drinking places at 6pm. The temperance crusaders achieved modest successes, especially the 6pm closing hour, during the First World War.

Partisanship developed in the early 20th century, with the working class Irish Catholics dominating the Australian Labor Party, and middle class British Protes-
tants affiliating with the Liberal party.45 Class, religion and loyalty were mutually reinforcing to form permanent party identities.46 In the Great War, the Labor party split, with the British/Protestant factions in control of the government and pushing conscription to help the Empire, while the Irish Catholic faction and the socialists broke off, and managed to defeat the referendum on conscription. In a very similar split in Canada, the minority Liberal Party split over conscription.47

The gold rush brought tens of thousands of Chinese men (and no women) to Australia. Most went back to China, but hostility levels were high against the “threat” of an alien culture. However, laws to ban further immigration were disallowed by London. But after a surge of Chinese immigration in the late 1880s, the Australians used narrower restrictions, such as arrival taxes, to limit new arrivals.48 Much the same happened in British Columbia.49

The most controversial group was the Pacific Islanders (called “Kanakas” at the time), brought to Queensland on three year contracts to work in the sugar fields. White labour strenuously objected to their presence. Outmaneuvering the business interests who wanted the Islanders, the government of the new federation passed a “Pacific Islands Laborers Act” in 1901, inaugurating a “White Australia” policy that ensured that no further Islander or Asian immigration would take place. The explicit goal was a nation united in mateship in a common nationality—indeed a sense of nation built on what Parkes called the “crimson thread of kinship” that tied together Britons and Celts (and no one else—“we should be one people, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin explained, “without the admixture of other races.”).50 Unlike Canada and the U.S., Australia funded a program that sent most of the Kanaka back to their original islands, allowing a few thousand who had become well established to remain. The White Australia policy remained in effect until after World War II, when the need for more immigrants, and for better relations with Asia, combined with a more tolerant outlook, reversed the policy.51

Nativism in Australia took a new turn with the formation of the Australian Natives’ Association in 1885. Only people born in Australia were eligible, so it represented a generational revolt against the older settlers who had indeed built Australia, but who had loyalties to the Empire. The ANA successfully promoted a spirit of localistic nationalism and worked hard for Federation in 1901. Like every other major group it insisted on a “White Australia”. By 1900, it had 20,000 members in 150 branches across the six colonies.52

**THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK**

With Canada and Australia part of the British Empire, it is worth noting that London generally let them do anything they wanted with one exception. Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain pointed out that it was unwise for one part of the Empire to ban imperial subjects. Chamberlain said that London sympathized, “with the determination of the white inhabitants of those Colonies ...that there shall not be an influx of people alien in civilization, alien in religion, alien in customs, whose influx, moreover, would most seriously interfere with the legitimate rights of the existing labour population.”53 He recommended the “Natal solution”, a literacy test that was on its face fair to all, but which could be adjusted locally to keep out any unwanted group. Natal had been inspired by the U.S. where literacy tests were first used by Mississippi to disfranchise Blacks in the South.54

The Boer war of 1899-1901 rallied imperial supporters in Canada and, especially, Australia, while the Irish Catholics favored the Boers and the French Canadians kept quiet.55 London appreciated the unofficial support of the U.S. government in the crisis, realizing that Americans in general favored the Boers. Payback came in the Alaska boundary dispute, in which the British representative on an arbitration panel sided with the American claim against Canada, shocking the Canadians to the sudden realization London was prepared to sacrifice their interests in seeking closer relations with Washington. The British policies paid off, as Canada and Australia officially supported the war effort in 1914 in unified fashion. But the loyalty to the Empire was not deep, as the conscription debate convulsed both countries, causing severe disruptions in the Australian Labor Party and the Canadian Liberal party.

Rome had its worldwide religious empire and followed its “colonies” closely. Rome typically sided with the Irish position, recognizing the Irish as the best supporters of ultramontane policies, despite the grief this favoritism caused in French Canadian and German American circles.56 In Australia, the Irish comprised practically the entire Catholic population, apart from a few English Benedictines who were soon brushed aside.

Finally, we need to address our second basic question on how politicians handled the existent issues. In democratic societies, how do established political parties and professional politicians handle divisive issues? It is striking—astonishing really—that from 1880 to 1914, not a single major politician in any of our three countries took up the cause for nativism and anti-Catholicism, even though everyone knew those issues had traction in large elements of the population. On the contrary, the profes-
sional politicians systematically suppressed efforts by amateurs and moralists to interject these issues into the political arena. In Canada, Prime Minister Laurier tried to stifle anti-Japanese sentiments on the West Coast for reasons of state. He did not want to alienate a major trading partner with a powerful navy and the proven capacity to equal Europeans. In the U.S., President Theodore Roosevelt sent William Howard Taft to negotiate a gentleman’s agreement in 1907, whereby there were no official restrictions on Japanese immigration but Tokyo did not allow emigration. The conclusion is that the professionals took a broad, long term look at the society from the point of view of the entire electorate (not just their own supporters). The mistreatment of non-voting groups, such as the Chinese and Kanakas, demonstrate that the politicians were not looking beyond the electorate. The success of the professionals in stopping the nativists led to long-term political success by the McKinley Republicans in the U.S. and the Laurier and King Liberals in Canada.

CONCLUSION

Examined in a comparative perspective, nativism shows unexpected complexities. Old definitions in terms of reactionary attitudes or psychological pathologies represent polemical judgments rather than analytical categories. Defined in terms of intense loyalty to the nation, coupled with a demonstrated intolerance of alternative loyalties, is a beginning, but it begs questions. Loyalty to a nation is the most important factor, but to what nation? How much loyalty are immigrant groups allowed to have to the old country, or to the current group? When an empire is involved—here, the British Empire and the Roman Catholic Church—there is another level of divided allegiance, which flares when the Empire is at war.

In all three countries, the Irish Catholics showed a loyalty to Rome mixed with hostility to the British Empire, but there were levels of complexity. In Canada, the long-standing battle between the Anglophone Protestants and the Francophone Catholics found the Irish in the middle; they opted for the Anglophone position and thereby gained control of the Catholic Church outside Quebec. In the U.S., battles in the 1880s and 1890s over prohibition and the German language saw the Democratic Party triumphant, with the Irish poised to take advantage by replacing the Protestant Democrats who had led the party.

In all three countries the Germans, outsiders in politics, managed to defeat forced assimilation before World War I, but their enclaves of Germania proved so isolated from the mainstream that they were marginalized in the War and forced to give up their language. In Australia they had no allies and were deported after the war because they represented an alien threat to both the Australian and the Imperial nationalism. Perhaps some similar fate was possible in Canada, but the Anglophones were locked in battle with the Francophones and had no time for the relatively small German population.

The paradox of Anglophone imperial nationalism was that the World War turned the British in Canada and Australia inward, as they celebrated their psychological and political independence from Britain, and indeed effectively graduated from the British Empire. In Canada that meant that both the Anglophones and Francophones had turned inward to define their Canadian nation, yet they were unable to this day to find a common language and had become two nations. When the French Catholics in Quebec underwent the “Quiet Revolution” in the 1960s, they dropped traditionalistic Catholicism and became just as modern as the Anglophones, but defined themselves even more intensely in terms of language in a way that made many of them nativistic and hostile toward minorities in Quebec to the point of seeking secession from Canada.

The empires, based in London and Rome, wisely avoided a heavy-handed intervention. When the Canadian language crisis reached Rome, the Vatican sided with the Anglophone Irish for strategic reasons, for throughout the Catholic empire the Irish were the most ultramontane and pro-Vatican ethnic group. London did not interfere in its Empire, expect to prevent any colony from officially excluding subjects from another colony. London did tolerate the solution that Canada and Australia found to exclude nonwhites, which was a variation of the Mississippi solution that kept American blacks in second class status despite Constitutional guarantees.

Professional politicians wanted to avoid or suppress ethnocultural conflict. In complex democracies they realized that they had to build complex coalitions that cut across many lines of ethnicity, religion, region and class. When grass roots forces tried to launch cultural wars, the professions resisted and rallied behind politicians like Laurier in Canada and McKinley in the U.S. and Deakin in Australia who had a pluralistic vision. When the Great War came, the spontaneous demand for national unity and national purity gave nativism enormous momentum, excusing rash moves like the suppression of foreign languages, the roundup of Ukrainian aliens and the expulsion of Australia’s Germans. The professional politicians had no choice but to denounce “hyphenated” or divided loyalties. In conclusion, the War created a new sense of independent nationalism in Canada and
Australia that dissolved most of the wartime grievances among the majority. The War thus forced the rapid assimilation of the ethnic groups in all three countries, leaving nativism with fewer targets for attack.

NOTES

1 We can leave out Britain, where nativism was weak and ineffective (as typified by the British Brothers League), but where the Irish issue was overpowering.

2 Except of course for the Civil War and Reconstruction era in the U.S.

3 “Whiteness,” which some historians have used as a solvent to dissolve ethnic and racial issues, was never alluded to regarding a European group in any of the primary documents from any of the countries in the controversies examined here. But see Marilyn Lake, “From Mississippi to Melbourne via Natal: the invention of the literacy test as a technology of racial exclusion,” in Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, eds. Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective (2006) ch 13 online


7 Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest, ch 5;

8 The anti-polygamy campaigns of the 1880-1900 period fit our ethnocultural conflict model, but with the reformers localized in Utah, and the reformers spread nationwide, it had a dynamic that was played out in not the states but in the U.S. Senate. Kathleen Flack, The Politics of American Religious Identity: The Seating of Senator Reed Smoot, Mormon Apostle (2003)


10 Whyte, “The Bennett law campaign” p 388

11 Robert LaFollette, Autobiography (1913) p 190


13 Donald L. Kinzer, Episode in Anti-Catholicism: The American Protective Association (1964), p. ??


15 William McKinley, Speeches and Addresses (1893) p 547, 1891 speech; see also ibid p 238.

16 In 1896 McKinley’s campaign manager Mark Hanna wrote of the “prime importance” of rallying “to the support of Republican ticket many thousands of Roman Catholics.” Kinzer, Episode in Anti-Catholicism, p 224

17 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (2002) pp 83-5; Paul Kleppner, Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893-1928 (1987) pp201-3 However Natal copied the Lodge literacy test to keep out the Chinese, and Australia copied it to form the “White Australia” policy. Lake, “From Mississippi to Melbourne via Natal: the invention of the literacy test as a technology of racial exclusion,”


19 Colman Barry, Catholic Church and German Americans, (1953) chapter 4.


33 The Prime Minister warned the newspaper’s editor, “We get a strong support from the Catholics as a whole in the Dominion,” mentioning the Maritimes in particular and insisting they not be alienated. McDonald to C. W. Bunting, 25 May 1886, in Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald (1921) p 380


56 Brown and Cook, Canada: 1896-1921 pp 254-62


53 Supposedly from the slogan in South Australia, "We Only Want Social Evils Remedied."

54 Macintyre, The Oxford History of Australia: vol. 4, p 112


56 Judith Brett, Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class (2003) ch. 3

57 Conscription was much more successful in the U.S. and there were no schisms.


59 W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy toward Orientals in British Columbia (1978)


62 Cited in Australia Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (13 Sept 1905) p. 2150

63 Marilyn Lake, "From Mississippi to Melbourne via Natal: the invention of the literacy test as a technology of racial exclusion," in Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, eds. Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective (2006) ch 13 online. In practice, ships no longer brought in Asians and the literacy test was seldom used.


65 Roberto Perin, Rome in Canada: The Vatican and Canadian Affairs in the Late Victorian Age (1990)


67 Church groups sometimes spoke for the disfranchised, and played a major role in eventually reversing the White Australia policy in the 1950s, as well as black disfranchisement in the U.S. in the 1960s. In Canada, however, the churches were at the center of the controversies and did not engineer compromises.
Association for Canadian Studies and the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association Joint Conference: Ethnicity, Governance and Social Justice: Linking Canada to the World

The Association for Canadian Studies and the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association invite proposals for our joint conference Ethnicity, Governance and Social Justice: Linking Canada to the World November 5 and 6, 2010 in Toronto at the Holiday Inn Toronto Airport-East, 600 Dixon Road, Toronto, Ontario. This conference also marks the 20th biennial conference of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association.

Conference organizers welcome proposals for papers, sessions, panels, roundtables, and poster presentations that address the topics of ethnicity, immigration, diversity, and multiculturalism in Canada, particularly in relation to social justice and governance. Organizers invite submissions from a variety of perspectives, academic disciplines, and areas of study, including the humanities and the social sciences. Travel assistance is available for some presenters, the amount to be determined based on number of participants.

Who should attend? In addition to members of the Association for Canadian Studies and Canadian Ethnic Studies Association, the conference will be relevant to a wide range of people interested in ethnicity, race, immigration, multiculturalism, and related diversity issues in Canada, particularly as they intersect with issues of social justice and governance. University professors, graduate students, and other researchers and teachers; policymakers and civil servants from all levels of government; those who work in various non-governmental organizations, as well as those involved as frontline workers delivering various kinds of social services—all of these will find that this conference offers them worthwhile information, challenging critical perspectives, and an opportunity to network and discuss important issues with people from across the country and from a variety of academic disciplines and institutional perspectives. A special issue of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal will showcase selected papers from the conference. Shorter papers can be submitted for consideration in ACS’s Canadian Diversity. To be considered for publication in the either journal, papers must be submitted no later than two weeks after the conference. Papers must be written in accordance with the journal’s guidelines.

All abstracts should be no longer than 250 words and will be refereed by the joint ACS/CESA Program Committee. Individual conference presentations will normally be 20 minutes in length, and conference sessions will be 90 minutes. Please visit our websites: cesa.uwinnipeg.ca and www.acs-aec.ca for more information. Submissions should be directed electronically to James Ondrick, Director of Programs, Association for Canadian Studies at: james.ondrick@acs-aec.ca

The deadline for submission of proposals for papers, sessions, panels, roundtables, and poster presentations is 15 September 2010.
Canadians, if not Americans, are accustomed to referring to the border between the United States and Canada as the 49th parallel. In 2001, for example, James Laxer published a book titled *The Border: Canada, The U.S. and Dispatches from the 49th Parallel*. The fact is, however, that if the 49th parallel actually did define all of the border Canada—US border, most of the people of Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes would be citizens of the United States. But Laxer’s title is somewhat fitting inasmuch as his travel account depicts him to be rather disoriented when he reaches the border area between Quebec and Vermont, passing through it with little comment. That disorientation reflects the vacuum left by historians who have largely ignored the closely interknit communities of the forty-fifth parallel. For example, we know almost nothing about the historical cross-border interaction between towns such as Rock Island, Quebec and Derby Line, Vermont, even though some of their shops, factories, and community buildings once straddled the border, or the ties between the manufacturing centres of Newport, Vermont and Magog, Quebec, lying at opposite ends of the same lake. The fact that Newport had a long history as a lumbering centre processing logs that mostly came from Canada, while Magog was once a textile town processing cotton from the United States, surely suggests a lot about the importance of national policies in shaping distinctive economic development within the same geographic region.

Laxer might have pointed out that the border between Vermont and Quebec is actually quite sharply defined because most of the inhabitants on the Canadian side are now Francophones. Despite their recent interest in *Américanité*, however, Quebec historians and social scientists have failed to examine the American influence on French Canadians living in the province’s border townships. And, while historians of the United States have written excellent studies on their southwestern borderland, they have shown little interest in the influence of Canada on communities in northern New England and New York where a considerable proportion of the population is of Canadian (including Quebec) origin.

Aside from several micro-historical studies, my own research on the border townships of south-central Quebec has focused largely on the first half of the 19th century when their population was largely English-speaking. In contrast to most borderland studies, my focus has neither been on the cultural blending of two distinctive peoples, or on how a common people tran-

**ABSTRACT**

This essay briefly examines how the largely American-settled borderland region known as the Eastern Townships became increasingly conservative and ‘Canadian’ during the first half of the nineteenth century. It argues that British missionaries, the War of 1812, the Rebellions of 1837 and 1838, and the drive for economic integration and development were all important factors in this cultural transition.
scended an externally imposed boundary. Rather, I have explored why and how the 45th parallel came to distinguish the people who identified themselves as Canadians from their American relatives and neighbours. In short, while Canadians have long been preoccupied with the ‘threat’ of Americanization, my focus has been on the unfamiliar theme of Canadianization.

A relatively small number of Loyalist refugees remained in the Missisquoi Bay area of Lake Champlain after the American Revolution, but the non-seigneurial territory that would become known as the Eastern Townships was not officially opened to settlement until 1792. Families then arrived from southern New England in search of inexpensive land, relief from taxation, and, in some cases, freedom from the restrictive forces of religion and the law. The old Puritan religious establishment was obviously not recognized in the British colonies, and town meetings were proscribed because they were assumed to have been a cause of the War of Independence. The result was that there were no taxes and no local governing bodies in this isolated region until municipal government was introduced in the 1840s, by which time the largely American-descended population had reached approximately 40,000 people.1

During the early nineteenth century this was a true American frontier in the Turnerian sense, with potato whiskey being one of the only commodities that could bring a profit after being transported to outside markets. A supplementary activity was the counterfeiting of American bank notes, which were exchanged for stolen American livestock. One of the counterfeiters was the notorious American exile, Stephen Burroughs, defined by literary scholars as the quintessential new American man because of the rebellious self-fashioning identity described in his famous memoirs. Once he crossed the border permanently in his early twenties, however, he fashioned himself as a respectable colonist willing to spy for the British during the War of 1812, and eventually opening a school in Trois-Rivières. There he fell under the influence of an aristocratic French émigré priest and became a fervent convert to Catholicism.2 While Burroughs is an extreme example, his story reflects how American settlers soon became either Anglicans or Wesleyan Methodists. They certainly did not shed their independent religious outlook or behaviour overnight, for they were often church adherents in name only, but the Eastern Townships was spared the full intensity of the radical religious revivals that repeatedly swept the ‘burnt-over country’ of northern New York and New England. And the British missionaries realized that time was on their side, for their Sunday schools would have a significant impact on the younger Canadian-born generations. English-Canadian historians have generally steered away from the study of religion, but it is impossible to understand how political and national identity evolved in this country without examining the influence of religion and religious identity in this country, as in the United States.4

The 45th parallel defined two distinct political outlooks as early as the 1830s, for that was the decade that Vermonters elected the candidate of the anti-Masonic party as state governor,3 yet there was little echo of this paranoia-driven movement north of the border where Masonic lodges had taken root with the first American
settlers. In fact, the people of the Eastern Townships were abandoning their flirtation with the radical Parti patriote as the colony moved towards rebellion in 1837. Eastern Townships residents resented the government’s obsession with St Lawrence canals at the expense of transportation links to the region, and the fact that all significant local offices were filled by British outsiders, but they also feared the prospect of a nationalistic French-speaking republic. Through the Hunters’ Lodges, the French-Canadian rebels enjoyed strong support in the northern states, being provided with refuge as well as weapons to launch the second phase of the rebellion in 1838. But the militia of the Eastern Townships prevented incursion from south of the border, and the terrorizing night raids from Vermont during the following two years only intensified anti-American sentiment in the region. There would be a brief wave of annexationist support at mid-century, but this would quickly evaporate when the United States lowered its trade barriers.\(^6\)

The Eastern Townships was once a rather unique Canadian region insofar as it was cut off culturally from the rest of Lower Canada, and it was largely bypassed by the large-scale British influx experienced by Upper Canada and the Maritimes in the early nineteenth century. But political and religious developments that were common, in many respects, to all the British North American colonies go far toward explaining the emergence of a more conservative identity north of the 45\(^{th}\) parallel. And, with the arrival of the railway and state forming institutions such as municipal and school councils, the still highly localized outlook of the largely rural population at mid-century would gradually become reconciled with a broader sense of British North American loyalty. The border, nevertheless, remained porous with localized socializing and trading networks followed by large numbers of Americans arriving as summer tourists on the steamboats of Lake Memphremagog,\(^7\) and Canadians seeking better economic opportunities in the rapidly industrializing United States.\(^8\)

In fact, the border has been a greater barrier to historians than to the people who live on either side of it, serving as a zone of interpenetration between the two countries but also as a political, economic, and cultural divide that cannot be ignored.

REFERENCES


5. See John J. Duffy and H. Nicholas Muller, III, Anxious Democracy: Aspects of the 1830s (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982).


The burden of legal philosophy is to propound universal truths. To do so requires philosophers to abstract from the complex, diverse, messy world in which real people lead real lives, and in which tyranny, slavery, inequality and injustice are everyday experiences. By contrast, the burden of the sociology of law is to explore how human societies function and to draw appropriate distinctions between what may look like identical situations. For better or for worse, most law teaching, and for that matter most theorizing about human rights by professors, lawyers and judges, approximate the philosophical rather than the sociological viewpoint. Indeed, the topic I am meant to address—“Human Rights and Identity”—and the title of this Symposium—a celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—reveal the tendency.

Let me straightaway register a counterpoint. In my research in constitutional and administrative law over the past 35 years, I have found nothing but plurality and diversity. For this reason, I have inverted the theme that has been offered to me, emphasizing instead particularity over universals, and on-the-ground practices over abstract declarations.

I’d like to introduce my point by calling forth what has been described by many critics as the “best first sentence in western literature”. That sentence is:

All happy families are happy alike; all unhappy families are unhappy in their own way.

So begins Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina. To me the opening of Anna Karenina reveals a meta-fact about human beings, about human society and about human institutions—except that I believe that Tolstoy got the formula exactly backwards. In my experience all unhappy families are unhappy alike, and all happy families are happy in their own way. Happy families that reflect on their happiness, it seems to me, realize that there is no formula for happiness. Happiness results from attending to the specific features of a relationship, the specific character and personality of each member of the family, and the specific circumstances within which the family finds itself.

By contrast, unhappy families that reflect on their unhappiness are wont to seek some recipe, some distilled wisdom of the ages that can be expressed in a universal formula to ensure their happiness. For members of such families, happiness is not something that demands an investment of emotional energy, a humility about one’s own circumstances, and an ongoing quest for grace that fails as often as it succeeds. No, for them, happiness is the necessary outcome of adhering to an apparently proven and if possible, memorizable, mantra.

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As meditation on the human condition, the inverted form of Tolstoy’s epigram may be deployed to guide reflection upon “all things human” and, in particular, “human justice.” The transposition would then come out something like this:

*All happy experiences of human rights are happy in their own way, and all unhappy experiences of human rights are unhappy alike.*

My goal in this short essay is to tease out the implications of this revised epigram for reflection about human rights—not in some far off locale “in need of guidance”—but right here in Canada. When we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, what exactly are we celebrating? In more ways than one, we are celebrating the kind of abstraction against which we should be on guard. Consider, for example, what is so special about 60 years, as opposed to 59 years or 61 years. Is not our fixation on round numbers to which we have ascribed something transcendent (in the instance, a diamond jubilee) an example of the pernicious urge to universalizable abstractions? Furthermore, there is a substantial literature contesting the usefulness of a document that purports to state “universal human rights” as an inventory of abstract propositions. I do not propose to revisit these critiques of legal abstraction here. They are useful in pointing to on-the-ground issues to which we should attend whenever international norm entrepreneurs seek to homogenize social diversity. But, abstract declarations of rights are not without their value. That is, contemporary critiques often miss this point because they fail to account for the symbolic importance of “human rights” as a way of talking about and emphasizing the dignity of human beings and the dignity of diverse human identities.

I am sceptical that much is to be gained from taking a simple Manichean or dualist “yeah-boo” approach to the idea of universal human rights. The world we now inhabit is not the world of 1948, either in form or in substance. The increasing scope and scale of interpersonal and inter-group interaction across social, religious and cultural boundaries means that the world in shrinking in ways scarcely imaginable half a century ago. Transfers of ideas, institutions and values are creating a new, dare I say multi-centred, dialogue about the human condition; we may be forging a global commons but it is a richly textured, richly coloured and multivariate commons. In addition, we are witnessing a greatly increased capacity of organized interests (be these in the form of the State, private militias, the mafia, multi-national corporations, international trade unions and NGOs) to impose their will on others. In combination with the incredible effectiveness of weapons of violence and oppression (notably those associated with the arms trade), the resources now wielded by organized interests threatens the always fragile processes and institutions through which law may discipline power.

Once we acknowledge the scope of transnational interaction and recognize the challenge that cross-border violence and oppression by non-governmental forces poses for State-based legal institutions, we begin to see how these manifold centres of power threaten human rights in ways that States do not. In my view, the traditional conception of law as being exclusively linked to the political State and as consisting of a set of rules hierarchically arranged in a single system lacks the normative purchase to rein in both State and non-State human rights abusers. I suggest, in counterpart to this monistic, Statist vision of law, a “legal pluralistic” conception of the legal endeavour. “Legal pluralism” foregrounds four key ideas: (1) in any given environment, several legal orders are in direct competition for authority; (2) each of these legal orders is self-legitimating—it does not derive its legitimacy from another legal order; (3) the State legal order may not in fact be the most powerful legal order in a given environment; and (4) the trajectory of legal rules among these various legal orders is bi-directional: sometimes, the rules of the State legal order (including any rules that may derive from international instruments) penetrate into the legal systems of non-State actors; sometimes the rules of non-State legal orders (especially those that would offend accepted notions of due process) are imported into State legal systems (Macdonald, 1996, 2007).

What might legal pluralism theory have to contribute to our understanding of human rights? Does thinking about law as a complex set of interacting legal systems even within a single State assist us to address the contemporary critiques of universal human rights discourse and to recast the contribution that human rights declarations can make to human flourishing? Recall my inversion of Tolstoy’s epigram. States that respect human rights realize that there is no one formula for achieving this state of grace. Only by attending to the specific features of the official legal system actually in place, only by attending to the specific features of the diverse legal systems that are in competition with it, and only by attending to the specific contextual circumstances that the State legal system is called upon to regulate can the contingency of success be managed. Not only are the universal mantras so familiar to in human rights law too abstract to provide workable guidance for States in this governance project, they often require conduct that many States under economic and political stress are simply incapable of achieving.

To explore the legal pluralist hypothesis in action, I’d like to offer five vignettes about human rights as lived
today in Canada. I use these vignettes to illustrate our arrogance in holding other States to account for their failure to live up to our understanding of the principles of the Universal Declaration (while failing to do so in myriad ways ourselves), and to ground my plea for a more variegated appreciation of the means by which States might seek to live by its counsel.

I. A grounded culture of human rights? Let me begin by reflecting on the different resources at our disposal for promoting a culture of human rights, and how we might use them. Do the abstract categories of legal declarations of rights provide useful purchase in the everyday lives of officials and citizens? When we think of our most effective compasses for orienting reflection about the human condition, law rarely ranks at the top of the list. What, we might ask, is the relative contribution of the Parable of the Good Samaritan, Gabrielle Roy’s Bonheur d’occasion, Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, Victor Hugo’s Les misérables, James Agee’s Now Let us Praise Famous Men, the movies Goin’ Down the Road and Lives of Others, and the Range’s 1986 pop-music classic “The way it is” to our understanding of identity and human dignity? I believe that we might best celebrate the Universal Declaration by imagining the destroyed or compromised lives that have been evoked by our cultural artefacts. Much more than abstract texts, the judgements of courts, and the speculations of legal philosophers and lawyers, these grounded, contextual evocations of the human aspiration to interpersonal justice confront us with our social pathologies. No doubt, these contextual evocations can be read as vehicles of some universal insight. But they speak powerfully mainly because they speak locally, in local idioms, to local concerns. When I talk of cultural resources in different media, I do not mean subway advertising posters celebrating ethnic or religious diversity. Propaganda, like law, forecloses self-examination. Literature, theatre, music, art, and dance, by contrast, compel self-examination precisely because they directly invite performance by the reader, listener, watcher and audience. Our challenge as human rights proselytizers is to use these cultural resources to best effect locally, while inviting others to use their own analogous resources to promote a culture of human rights. A legal pluralist analysis takes on the Statist assumption that official documents are the primary drivers of a cultural practice of human rights.

II. Human rights as the problem of the foreign other? Before adopting a censorial attitude towards various State practices, we should ask whether we are trapped by a structure of thinking that imagines human rights only as the response to the foreign other, and that leads us to remain silent and unmoved when the other is among us. Consider the case of human rights as a matter of humanitarian regard for the plight of refugees. A refugee is as equally a refugee when he or she shows up “at our gates” or “at our embassy”, as when in an internment camp in Darfur. The humanitarian regard applies just as forcefully in both cases. Moreover, not all refugees are from abroad. We might ask whether there is a significant difference between the experiences of internal and external migrants. Do issues of social exclusion apply in the same way to Bangladeshi immigrants in Toronto and to Gaspésiens in Montreal? To Mexican agricultural workers in B.C. and to Newfoundlanders working in Alberta’s tar sands? To undocumented refugee Filipino domestic workers Saskatoon and to Inuit peoples in Winnipeg? Typically, the internal migrant—the Gaspésien, the Newfoundlander, but not the Inuit—is afforded recognition as a full member of the host political community, but receives few or no social services meant explicitly to foster participation in the new socio-cultural community; typically, the external immigrant—the Bangladeshi, the Mexican, the Filipino—receives a number of social services but is denied the recognition. To imagine that the issue of identity recognition applies only to the external immigrant misses the point. Social exclusion is a human rights issue regardless of ethnicity, religion, place of origin, citizenship, or other marker of identity. This exclusion is not overcome by legal definition. It resides in attitudes and a failure to provide the services needed to actually achieve law’s promises. Until we, as citizens of a politically stable country with vast economic resources, are prepared to address basic issues of social exclusion in our own communities, it lies ill in our mouths to decry other less-endowed States for their failure to do so. A legal pluralist analysis cautions us not to over-rely on nationalism /citizenship political markers in deciding what constitutes a human rights issue.

III. The excluded other among us? We Canadians in Quebec also like to impose on others, in the manner of the Universal Declaration, a particular version of human rights virtue. We take for granted that, by virtue of our two wonderful Charters of Rights and Freedoms, we are fully compliant with the norms we mandate for others. And yet, in action, the record does not look so good. Take, for example, the Code de vie of the Municipality of Hérouxville. This Code de vie purported to set out the basic values of Hérouxville and to formalize behavioural norms for its residents. Unsurprisingly, the litany of rules included in the Code de vie tracked the list of incidents reported in the popular press where courts, administrative agencies, municipalities, school commissions, and private institutions like the YMCA, soccer leagues or commercial sugar shacks adjusted their practices at the request of a religious or cultural group. In each case, the Hérouxville prescriptions directly sought to contest the
In Hérouxville, the affirmation of “freedom” under the *Code de vie* would be taken as self-evident. Some may say that the norms of the *Code de vie*, as the legislative enactments of a municipality, are *ultra vires*, and that this proves the force of documents like our *Charters of Rights and Freedoms* that instantiate the *Universal Declaration*. I, like the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, take the opposite view (Bouchard-Taylor, 2008). The *Code de vie* reveals that xenophobia is, in practice, closer to expressions of official law than to the high-sounding universals of our *Charters of Rights and Freedoms*. A legal pluralist analysis enables us to see the ways in which many of our own normative systems fail to meet the human rights standards we impose on others.

**IV. Human rights as social and political practice?** We may also wish to inquire into the manner in which the aspirations of the *Universal Declaration* are inscribed in our social, political and constitutional practices. Does our politics truly reflect us? In December 2008 we witnessed what some have called a “constitutional crisis” in which different constellations of federal political parties sought to have the Governor-General exercise her prerogative powers in a particular way. Media coverage was extensive during the event, and yet in the programmes I watched on three different television networks, every single media interviewer, and every single “expert” commentator was a white male professor of at least 50 years of age, and most were over 60. Moreover, all four leaders of the political parties jockeying for position were of the identical demographic. Here we have a representation of democratic politics in a Canada committed to the values of the *Universal Declaration*, in which every media, academic and political player—with the sole exception of the person who actually possessed the authority to exercise the relevant discretion—was from a demographic that comprised at best 10%–12% of the Canadian population. This is hardly a sterling international advertisement for how Canada puts universal human rights principles into practice. If we adopt a legal pluralist analysis we can take on the assumption that the existence of representative institutions automatically ensures true representation, an apparent precondition for a State’s commendation as a respecter of human rights.

**V. Human rights and multiple identities?** The interplay of universal norms and particular identities is becoming increasingly complex as we come to a better understanding of human psychology. Today we recognize that people use identities not just to isolate themselves from others, but also to claim relationships. Consequently, the meaning of identity is now quite removed from the list of 14 markers of invidious discrimination identified by *Human Rights Codes* and a far cry from the historic analytical triptych of gender, race and class. To be a vegetarian, a vegan or a tea-totaler is to claim a particular space more important for many than gender; to adopt a libertarian political stance, or to be a Marxist, or in Quebec to be a separatist, is to make a powerful identity claim. Yet it is important not to overstate the extent to which people can ‘choose’ any of these identities. However much Felix Leclerc may consider herself to be a female, hispanophone, lesbian, vegan dancer of sub-Saharan African ancestry, it is difficult for others not to see him as a male, francophone, heterosexual, *Québécois de souche*, *poutine*-loving, singer. Moreover, were Felix Leclerc to make such claims, it would be obvious that he was mobilizing certain acknowledged identity categories to present himself to others. Whether those who also make such identity claims recognize him as one of them and whether those who disparage such identities will visit disadvantage upon him cannot be known in advance (Macdonald, 2003). For Canada’s self-positioning in discussions of human rights, it is paradoxical that, on the one hand, we continue to expand our list of protected identity claims while simultaneously denying that identity involves a complicated interplay between self-ascription and other-ascription, and on the other hand, we fail to do much about basic exclusions like socio-economic class that we have long recognized. Human rights cannot be reduced to a bourgeois flavour-of-the-month that bears little connection to foundational generic exclusions or to individualized perceptions of particular mis—or non-recognition. A legal pluralist analysis reveals the dangers of our assumption that legislative categories can exhaustively capture the diversity of human identities.

In presenting these five vignettes of failed human rights practice in Canada, I am not making the claim that the *Universal Declaration* is a flawed instrument because of its “universalizing” Western imperialism. Nor should I be taken as arguing a strong version of the “cultural defense” to legitimate egregious practices. Cultural relativism is undeniable, but simply because it may be invoked particularistically does not mean that it must always trump norms set out in the *Universal Declaration*. The point can be made allegorically. The injunction “render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s and render unto God that which is God’s” reminds us...
that our lives are lived in multiple normative universes. Whether “Caesar” is a Roman emperor in 0009 or a political State in 2009, and whether “God” is a Supreme Being or an aspiration to human justice expressed in a *Universal Declaration*, matters little. Moreover, cultural relativism enables us to see, by attending to all aspects and all artefacts of a given culture (including our own), how people instantiate the norms of the *Universal Declaration* in their everyday practices.

Many theories of human rights today presuppose that the idea of “law” is itself relatively uncontroversial: law is a phenomenon that is just “out there”, represented in canonical texts enacted or adopted by States. I dissent, on two accounts. To begin, law is a label we attach to a set of human phenomena. Before we apply the word law, there are just data in the world. Through our labeling, we interpret human phenomena as “law” rather than as something else. Second, we often forget that every conception of law is a simplification of a complex web of human engagement. We deploy assumptions, protocols and stipulations to identify, to simplify and to frame issues that we have decided are properly those of law.

It follows that any discussion of human rights implies not only the framing of the inquiry in relation to the *Universal Declaration*, but also in respect of any claim to cultural specificity. In the lens of legal pluralism, one no longer imagines the inquiry as merely opposing “universal western law” to “local culture”. The query is rather about competing legal orders. We need to ask: What is the meaning for citizens of “universal” western law, both as concerns its rationalistic aspirations and its actual outcomes in decisions by official institutions in the West? In like manner we also need to ask: What is the meaning of indigenous local law, both as concerns its actual practices and outcomes in decisions by official institutions and the rationalistic aspirations which it implies? If we are to truly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the *Universal Declaration* we can no longer smugly characterize as human rights unhappiness the textual failure of other States to adopt by the *Universal Declaration*, while ignoring their local on-the-ground practices and indigenous critiques of other practices that reflect the Declaration’s aspirations. And, if we are to truly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the *Universal Declaration* we can no longer excuse our own humanitarian failures by pointing to universal formulas for human rights happiness that we adopt, and ignoring the specific practices in the particular contexts of everyday human experience that testify to these failures.

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**REFERENCES**


Haggard, 1969—Okie from Muskogee, composed by Merle Haggard and Roy Edward Burris, 1969


