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Canadian Issues is a quarterly publication of the Association for Canadian Studies (ACS). It is distributed free of charge to individual and institutional members of the ACS. Canadian Issues is a bilingual publication. All material prepared by the ACS is published in both French and English. All other articles are published in the language in which they are written. Opinions expressed in articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the ACS. The Association for Canadian Studies is a voluntary non-profit organization. It seeks to expand and disseminate knowledge about Canada through teaching, research and publications.

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LETTERS

Comments on this edition of Canadian Issues?
We want to hear from you!

Canadian Diversity / ACS
1822A, rue Sherbrooke Ouest
Montréal, Québec H3H 1E4

Or e-mail us at <james.ondrick@acs-aec.ca>

Your letters may be edited for length and clarity.

@CANADIANSTUDIES
In my Southern Ontario hometown, the spirit of 1967 was made manifest by the construction of a hockey arena. As in hundreds of communities across Canada, where new rinks, schools, libraries, meeting halls and other public places were built to mark that year’s centennial of Confederation, the country’s gift to Grand Valley, Ont. (population 800 or so at the time, about 1,600 today) achieved its central purpose — and then some.

Hockey games — boys and girls, house league and travelling teams — became a focal point of community life. The curlers and figure skaters and broomballers, too, had a new place for their sports, and the arena’s upstairs hall became the go-to venue for wedding receptions, charity fundraisers, community dances and just about everything else of note that happened in our village: awards banquets, ecumenical church services, summer camps and Fall Fair exhibits; a childcare service, a 50th anniversary party and a benefit gathering for my sister’s boyfriend — a hockey all-star left paralyzed by a motorcycle crash.

Nation-building isn’t only about intangibles such as pride and cohesion and identity. There’s also literal, bricks-and-mortar nation-building, and places like the Grand Valley and District Community Centre have been essential in fostering the simple, warm-blanket sense of togetherness found in countless Canadian communities — rural hamlets and urban neighbourhoods alike — that eventually knits together the nation and provides the basis for broader social and economic development.

So thank you, 1967, for that tremendous legacy of community infrastructure. I was born on the eve of that auspicious date, and I’ve only ever known the post-Expo Canada that — for all of its cultural divides and social inequities, its historic injustices and...
contemporary challenges — seems to me, overall, to be progressing in the right direction, towards greater tolerance and fairness and peaceable prosperity.

Safe to say, I think, that women, immigrants, Indigenous people, and members of Canada’s LGBTQ communities wouldn’t want to turn the clock back 50 years, no matter what battles lie ahead.

It’s a rosy view, perhaps — a wide-angle-lens perspective on Canada in this sesquicentennial year rather than a zoomed-in look at the country’s carbuncles. But even a superficial scan of what goes on in the rest of the world’s 200 or so nation states offers reassurance that the geopolitical project set in motion 150 years ago in the northern half of North America has been largely successful — so much so, in fact, that we can engage in microscopic scrutiny of our worst failures and still retain a semblance of satisfaction with what’s generally been achieved, as well as a sense of optimism about what’s to come.

And we can do all of that, over drinks and donuts at a minor hockey dance, with our signature traits of humility and humour intact.

This collection of essays, which explores the evolution of Canada over the past 50 years from a variety of vantage points, was conceived of as a way to take measure of the country’s progress between the milestone years of 1967 — when the country celebrated its Centennial and Montréal hosted Expo, the World’s Fair — and 2017, the ongoing 150th anniversary of Confederation.

Contributors were asked to tap their areas of expertise, personal experiences and other sources of insight and inspiration in considering the transformation of Canada over the past half-century. We wondered what those respective societies, separated by five decades, were actually celebrating. We wondered how technology, modes of communication, concepts of identity and the Canadian population itself had changed the nation in 50 years, and how Canadian values — as expressed through government policies, social mores, intercultural relations, consumer choices, citizen movements and more — had evolved over this same stretch of time. Fundamentally, we asked: Is Canada happier, more prosperous, more cohesive, more influential, more compassionate — in short, a better country — 50 years after the heady days of Expo 67?

Jack Jedwab, president of the Association for Canadian Studies, helps frame the conversation with an illuminating then-and-now comparison of public opinion surveys from 1967 and 2017 that examine — among other things — views about Québec separatism. What’s revealed is that, 50 years after then-French president Charles de Gaulle sparked a national uproar with his “Vive le Québec libre!” speech, — and more than 20 years after the close-shave referendum of 1995 — a much smaller portion of the population today than in 1967 believes Quebecers want to separate from Canada, and a much greater portion of the population today than in 1967 believes relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians are improving.

Jedwab makes the point, too, that the relative economic prospects of French-speaking Canadians — and their share of employment and leadership influence in the federal public service — have risen dramatically since 1967, so much so that certain grievances stoked by de Gaulle’s speech at the time
are barely remembered by today’s young Quebecers.

Jack Bumsted, the distinguished Manitoba historian, wonders aloud if Canada — despite profound changes in communications technology, for example, and immigration from non-European nations — is not as deeply altered since 1967 as many would think. “With the possible exception of our food culture,” he observes of the influx of many new immigrant communities, “there is an argument to be made that Canada has been more influential on these groups than they have been on Canada.” And while noting that landmark apologies have been made, for example, to Japanese, Sikh and Jewish communities for historical injustices inflicted by past Canadian governments, these did not fundamentally challenge the nation’s sense of itself: “Apologies to Indigenous people, on the other hand, have been so difficult because they came close to striking at the foundations of our society.”

Dominique Clément, University of Alberta historian and human rights scholar, traces the roots of a transformative shift in the past 50 years in the way Canadians seek state protection of their fundamental rights. Certain rights in this country were once only safeguarded as tenets of British and later Canadian citizenship, he argues. But the passage of the country’s first human rights laws in the 1960s — including landmark statutes in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia in 1967 — redefined such protections as inviolable in a broader sense, for any human being. “For most Canadians, the centennial celebrations and Expo ’67 symbolized a coming of age for the country and an asserting of its place on the world stage. The transformation of Canada’s rights culture at this time was equally symbolic of a new engagement with the world.”

Prize-winning popular historian Ken McGoogan, author of Lady Franklin’s Revenge and 50 Canadians Who Changed The World, offers an insightful and entertaining interpretation of how the Baby Boom generation — which came of age at about the time Canada turned 100 in 1967 — have been spearheading Canadian political and social change from the era of Trudeau I to today’s age of Trudeau II, “turning Canada into a global beacon of tolerance and diversity.”

Veronica Strong-Boag, pioneering Canadian scholar of women’s and gender studies, argues that continued critical scrutiny of the use of language and the framing of historical narratives is needed to keep Canada progressing towards a more just and equitable society. With a teacher’s classic assessment that the country has strong potential but needs to work much harder to reach its goals, Strong-Boag states that, “When I survey Canada, my vision takes hope, admittedly sometimes fragile, from our collective capacity to embrace language that extends the idea and the practice of equality and fair dealing.”

Victor Rabinovitch, former CEO of the Canadian Museum of Civilization (today’s Canadian Museum of History) and now a Distinguished Fellow at the Queen’s University School for Policy Studies, sounds an alarm about the future of Canadian culture. He explains first how a uniquely Canadian “affirmative cultural model” — a skilful orchestration of state funding and policy instruments to unleash the creative energy of the nation — had a transformative impact on Canada’s cultural industries over the past 50 years. But this post-Centennial “blossoming of Canadian content in virtually every sector of cultural production,” he warns, is now at
risk of being reversed: “Today’s rapid rise of digital distribution systems owned by American Internet giants is, by far, the greatest threat to Canadian cultural expression.”

Concordia University historian Jean-Philippe Warren looks at the wider canvas of Canadian history since 1760 to explore the unexpected ways in which the country has evolved. As he puts it, his essay is meant to show “how history, far from being a rectilinear and perfectly planned march, follows unpredictable curves and bumps.” Among the examples he offers of how “chance and luck” have so frequently shaped Canada’s destiny is the back-firing of Bill 101 – the Québec language law that was intended to both bolster the protection of French and advance the cause of Québec independence, but the success of which unexpectedly reduced the sense of urgency around the sovereignty project.

Finally, University of Toronto political scientist and Canadian Studies Program director Nelson Wiseman paints a vibrant picture of post-1967 Canada as “more secular, polyethnic and religiously diverse.” At the same time, he highlights certain tensions — best symbolized, perhaps, by the niqab, now the focus of political furor in Québec — that have emerged as Canadians try to come to terms with the “construction and reconstruction of Canadian society” over the past 50 years, and the fact that “national identity has always been provisional, continuing to evolve...”
HOW CANADIAN BOOMERS SPIRITED THE SIXTIES INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

KEN MCGOOGAN

Ken McGoogan has published a dozen books, among them How the Scots Invented Canada, Fatal Passage, and Lady Franklin’s Revenge. His honours include the Pierre Berton Award for a body of historical work, the UBC Medal for Canadian Biography, and an American Christopher Award for “artistic excellence.” After working as a reporter at The Toronto Star and an editor at The Montréal Star, Ken spent two decades writing for The Calgary Herald about books, authors, and publishing. Ken has served as chair of the Public Lending Right Commission, writes for such magazines as Canada’s History, Canadian Geographic, and Maclean’s, and sails with Adventure Canada as an author-historian. He teaches creative nonfiction through the University of Toronto, and in 2010 won an award for teaching excellence.

We oldest Canadian Boomers, born in the later 1940s, came of age in the Sixties. Entering our twenties, we discovered strength in numbers. When the Beatles sang, “You say you want a Revolution,” we said: yes! Yes, we do! We were going to change the world. We heard Bob Dylan. The times they were a changin’. We heard Timothy Leary: Turn on, tune in, drop out. Never trust anyone over thirty. Some of us hitchhiked to San Francisco with flowers in our hair. Meanwhile, during Expo ’67, the world came to Montréal. The year after that, hundreds of thousands of Boomers became eligible to vote in a federal election for the first time. We created Trudeaumania. We turned a provocative intellectual into a political rock star. Trudeau the Bold stared down rock-throwing separatists, removed the state from the bedrooms of the nation, and began turning Canada into a global beacon of tolerance and diversity.

Where earlier generations could look only to those who preceded them, we Boomers revelled in a vast peer group. We gazed out at an international youth culture. As teenagers, we had caught James Dean in Rebel Without a Cause and Marlon Brando in The Wild One. A decent, law-abiding citizen asks the Brando character, “What are you rebelling against?” From his motorcycle, the leather-jacketed Brando responds: “What have you got?”

Along came the swivelling Elvis, and then Motown, Baby Love, soul music, Midnight Train to Georgia, and through it all the transcendent Dylan. He went electric but never stopped protesting. I Ain't Gonna
Work on Maggie’s Farm No More. From our American cousins, we learned how to protest: civil rights, ban the bomb, women’s liberation. The Sixties blasted into the early 1970s. The youngest Boomers were children, but the insurgents were eighteen to twenty-seven.

In his book Sex in the Snow: Canadian Social Values at the End of the Millennium, sociologist Michael Adams calls us Autonomous Rebels. We were numerous enough to create our own heroes. Those we accepted as “tribal elders” included the nationalist Pierre Berton (b. 1920), who attacked organized religion in The Comfortable Pew; political journalist Peter C. Newman (b. 1929), who took a scalpel to The Canadian Establishment; and Mordecai Richler (b. 1931), a literary superstar who rejoiced to puncture pretension and political correctness. Oh Canada, Oh Québec. Yet probably our all-time favourite elder was Leonard Cohen (b. 1934), the romantic troubadour who insisted that Magic Is Alive while celebrating sex and revolution.

By the 1980s and ‘90s, the Autonomous Rebels were producing leaders. Maude Barlow (b. 1947) fought first for women’s rights, then against too-free-trade with our mighty neighbour, and finally, globally, to halt the sale of water rights. Linda McQuaig (b. 1951) decried the rich and reactionary so effectively that one of them suggested she should be horsewhipped. More recently, Naomi Klein, who wasn’t born until 1970, has emerged as an international leader in the Boomer tradition. She is spearheading the charge against globalization and increasing inequality. What are we rebelling against? What have you got?

Back in 1960s Canada, female Boomers learned from such Americans as Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem, who emulated the civil-rights movement to launch “women’s liberation.” Feminist elders in this country included journalist Doris Anderson (b. 1921) and Flora MacDonald (b. 1926), who came to political prominence in the mid-1970s. Fiction writer Margaret Laurence (b. 1926) wrote powerful novels and battled fundamentalist Christians, and led us in recognizing that Canadian writers constitute “a tribe.”

Feminism soon found younger champions: Margaret Atwood (b. 1939), Joni Mitchell (b. 1943), Judy Rebick (b. 1945). Women gained editorial control of Canadian book publishing, among them such figures as Anna Porter, Louise Dennys, Phyllis Bruce, Iris Tupholme, Cynthia Good. Boomers like Maude Barlow created their own platforms, and today new revolutionaries are reshaping the feminist landscape, among them Irshad Manji (b. 1968), Karen Connelly (b. 1969), and thirty-something Lauren McKeon, whose first book is F-Bomb: Dispatches from the War on Feminism.

Today, when Americans visit Canada, often they remark on the number of “visible minorities” that appear on our TV screens. Canadian Boomers took the American civil-rights movement (We Shall Overcome) and turned it into a drive for multiculturalism. Everybody Needs Somebody to Love. Down through the decades, French Canadians celebrated not just Pierre Elliott Trudeau but René Lévesque. Immigrant West Indians looked to Austin Clarke, who styled himself “the angriest black man in Canada.” The Japanese got Joy Kogawa, who launched the redress movement with Obasan. An Ojibway, Norval Morrisseau, became the “Picasso of the North.” And Buffy Ste. Marie gave inter-
national voice to indigenous Canadians.


One-sixth of Boomers, or more than one million Canadians, fall into a tribe Michael Adams calls Connected Enthusiasts. Their outlook “revolves around a desire to interact with and understand others... They crave a sense of being ‘plugged in.’” Because they are tuned in, creative, and expressive, they are more influential than their numbers might warrant. They “have a strong spiritual side,” Adams writes, and are continually searching “for spiritual renewal and everlasting youth.” They are not themselves rebellious or suspicious of authority, yet traditionally they ally themselves with Autonomous Rebels.

Their leading tribal elder is Marshall McLuhan (b. 1911), the guru of connectedness and the Global Village. Boomer examples include cyber-sage Don Tapscott (b. 1947), who heralds a new age of collaboration, and Mike Lazaridis (b. 1961), who invented the Blackberry. The Enthusiasts revere Boomer authors who explore technological connectedness, among them Vancouverite William Gibson (b. 1948) and Mississaugan Robert Sawyer (b. 1960). On the spiritual side, they like Robin Sharma (b. 1965), who dramatized connectedness in The Monk Who Sold His Ferrari.

The environmental movement is rooted in 19th-century Europe and North America. But it became a global force in the Sixties with Silent Spring by Rachel Carson (1962), The Population Bomb by Paul Erlich (1968), and The Limits to Growth, by the Club of Rome (1972). Here in Canada, Boomer environmentalists found a tribal elder in the strident and theatrical but wickedly effective Farley Mowat (b. 1921). Directly behind him came the living legend David Suzuki (b. 1936).

While looking also and again to Margaret Atwood, Boomers themselves began leading the way: Bruce Cockburn (b. 1945), Captain Paul Watson (b. 1950), Wayne Grady (b. 1948), Ronald Wright (b. 1948), and, again, Maude Barlow. Today, this Sixties tradition is alive in post-Boomer writers like Taras Grescoe (Bottomfeeder, Straphanger).

Moses Znaimer, creator of Zoomer magazine, calls himself a scout. Born pre-Boomers in 1942, he writes: “I go ahead, I suss out the terrain, I take some of those early risks, and I bring the report back. And the report is that we’re into this cataclysmic change in human life.” Znaimer explains that the Boomers are not going to retire at age sixty-five, the way our parents did. Given a longer life expectancy than previous generations, we are bent on creating a new life stage that will probably involve second careers and part-time work. Among the healthy, retirement is for sissies.

Political changes are harder to predict. Michael Adams writes that four in ten Canadian Boomers are Disengaged Darwinists. Look to this quiet plurality of Boomers, he writes, if you wish “to understand the roots of the neo-conservative revolution of the 1990s.” This sub-group, more than four
million strong, belies “the stereotypical image of the hedonistic, rebellious boomer.”

Members “tend to be younger boomers who, for a long time, watched silently and helplessly as their version of the Canadian dream disappeared.” They include those infamous “angry white guys” who believe that Canadian society has changed “too much, too quickly, and for the worse.” And they found a champion in Stephen Harper (b. 1957), a darkside Boomer who won a parliamentary majority vote by uniting Disengaged Darwinists.

But wait. While in the United States, angry white guys contrived to elect a self-indulgent whacko as president, Canadian Boomers led the way in driving Harper and his cronies from the corridors of power. Sociologically speaking, the Autonomous Rebels and Connected Enthusiasts made common cause long enough to elect Trudeau the Son as prime minister. Justin smokes weed, practices yoga, and marches for Gay Pride. We’ve spirited the Sixties into the 21st Century. Our work here is done.
Veronica Strong-Boag is professor emerita with the University of British Columbia’s Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality and Social Justice and the Department of Educational Studies. Among numerous other honours, she was awarded the Canadian Historical Association’s John A. Macdonald Prize for her 1988 book *The New Day Recalled: Lives of Girls and Women in English Canada 1919-1939*. A Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, Strong-Boag is a former president of the Canadian Historical Association and the founding director of UBC’s Centre for Women’s and Gender Studies. In 2012, the Royal Society of Canada presented her with the J.B. Tyrrell Historical Medal “for outstanding work in the history of Canada”.

Well before the “Confederation” we officially celebrate, Canada had diverse histories and views of these histories. For many residents of the 2017 state, a 150th anniversary is insulting or meaningless, recognition of no more than a limited and highly compromised national/imperial project. Refusal and resistance are nothing new. While often ignored and repressed, they are woven into Canada’s very fabric. The phrase, “She Named It Canada Because That’s What It Was Called,” the title of a 1971 feminist graphic herstory, invokes historic dissent. As continuing debates over official bilingualism and multilingualism, gender equal lyrics for “O Canada”, the terms Indian, Métis, Indigenous, Aboriginal and First Nation, and cultural appropriation similarly demonstrate, words signal power. While economic redistribution necessarily underlies any democratic project, linguistic respect, including acceptance of the right to say “no” always matters. As the cultural critic Raymond Williams explained in his 1976 work *Keywords: a Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, updated in 2016 by *New Words for Radicals: The Contested Vocabulary of Late-Capitalist Struggle*, language constitutes a frontline in demands for justice and fair play.

1 Editors Kelly Fritsch, Clare O’Connor, and A.K. Thompson.
Progress toward participatory parity and meaningful democracy\(^2\) requires an enriched vocabulary.

As the *Oxford English Dictionary* declaration of “post-truth” as its 2016 word of the year and the prospect of “alternate-fact” for 2017 demonstrates, lies haunt the evolution of English (and for that matter other languages, too). Despite the denunciation of “newspeak” in George Orwell’s dystopia *1984*, “oldspeak” has too often been little more than subterfuge, ultimately undermining communication and solidarity and upholding the tyranny of the powerful. Certainly policy and public commentary on Canada have abounded with evidence of linguistic dishonesty and dispossession. As Mohawk-English writer and performer E. Pauline Johnson made clear in her 1893 short story, “A Red Girl’s Reasoning,” contemptuous terms such as “squaw” have repeatedly squandered possibilities for fairer marital, multicultural and national unions.\(^3\) Whether defended as academic freedom, as with recent apoplexy about non-gendered pronouns from a University of Toronto psychology professor, as common sense, as with an Alberta judge’s dismissal of a sexual assault victim as inadequately defending herself, as the prerogative of creative genius in *The Walrus*, or as mere locker-room banter in one future U.S. president’s talk of grabbing pussy,\(^4\) linguistic disrespect underpins and legitimizes cultural and physical violence and attempts to erase memory of injustice and enforce consent.

Although today’s heightened bigotry and boorishness give ample cause, despair when we look toward the future is unjustified. On the horizon, indeed in our very midst, stands a richer vocabulary and the promise of mutual respect, offering what Anne of Green Gables might have termed “scope for the imagination.” Its construction began long ago, but feminism has led in generating contemporary Canada and the world’s extraordinary reconsideration not only of material oppression but also of our associated linguistic impoverishment. Global feminist theorists such as Adrienne Rich, Audre Lorde and Judith Butler have routinely highlighted linguistic injuries.\(^5\) In Canada, sociologist Margrit Eichler’s

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Today, the much contested entry of words such as queer, lesbian, two-spirited, transsexual, classism, racism, sexism and homophobia, to name only a handful, into common parlance promises liberation from some of the worst shackles of English’s linguistic past. So too does unprecedented recognition that demeaning appellations — from squaw to fag, spaz, nigger, jewboy, cunt, and many more — with their enshrinement of oppression, threaten democracy and a shared life. These hard-won shifts have incalculably emboldened our individual and collective abilities to imagine and resist injustice.

Even as today’s enhancement of English — alongside new-found appreciation of other tongues, including, very significantly for this settler space, Indigenous languages — questions oppressive relations, equally important is the closely associated right of refusal by historically disadvantaged communities. This claim, without which equality is ultimately meaningless, is captured in feminist “no means no” drives against sexual abuse and demands by Indigenous communities and Quebecers that they can choose independence of the 1867 project. This is just what scholar Audra Simpson proposes in her important discussion of “nested sovereignty” in Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States. The possibility of constructing different outcomes than those set out by patriarchs in general and by the 1867 Founding Fathers of Confederation in particular can terrify, especially those of us who reap benefits from the status quo, but it offers Canadians extraordinary opportunities for overdue thinking, more “scope for the imagination”, about how to share the planet.

Even as she inventories hard truths — “there is no we” — the Ontario capital’s former poet laureate and GG winner, Dionne Brand, has glimpsed that better world. Her description of Toronto in the 2005 novel What We All Long For might well stand in for Canada of a New Day, to borrow a phrase from suffragist Nellie L. McClung:

“It’s like this with this city — you can stand on a simple corner and get taken away in all directions. Depending on the weather, it can be easy or hard. If it’s pleasant, and the pleasant is so relative, then the other languages making their way to your ears, plus the language of the air itself, which can be cold and humid or wet and hot, this all sums up into a kind of new vocabulary. No mat-
ter who you are, no matter how certain you are of it, you can’t help but feel the thrill of being someone else.

In 2017, the same politics of possibility informs important creative initiatives, such as the “Remember/Resist/Redraw: A Radical History Project” by the Graphic History Collective, the #LOVEISLOVE ISLOVE photography campaign against homophobia and transphobia by Adam Zivo and the Canadian Centre for Gender and Sexual Diversity, the May 2017 discussion on “Restorying Islam and Judaism in Canada” at the University of Ottawa, and the “Shame and Prejudice” exhibit that started out at the University of Toronto in January 2017 by Cree artist Ken Monkman. All send Canadians back to the national drafting board.

In short, when I survey Canada, my vision takes hope, admittedly sometimes fragile, from our collective capacity to embrace language that extends the idea and the practice of equality and fair dealing. Although that heightened prospect does not justify a passing grade for Canada 150+, it does permit an assessment familiar from our student days: potential in plenty but much more effort required. In the dark days of Trump and Brexit, not to mention a host of global conflicts and catastrophes, that vision should inspire all who live in the land she called Canada. We can do so much better — and we will need to if humanity and the planet are to survive.
Amidst Canada’s centennial celebrations in 1967, another, less conspicuous celebration was taking place. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick passed their first human rights laws. Except for Ontario’s precedent-setting Human Rights Code in 1961, these were the first such statutes in Canadian history. Within ten years every other jurisdiction had passed similar laws. It was a genuine revolution in Canadian law. The Supreme Court of Canada would later declare that these statutes were quasi-constitutional and among the most fundamental laws in the country. By the twenty-first century, Canada had produced one of the most sophisticated human rights legal systems in the world.

The transformation of Canada’s rights culture over the past fifty years is astounding. One of the most difficult lessons to teach about human rights is that people have not always framed their grievances in the language of rights. When rebels sought to overthrow British rule in 1837-8, they framed demands for free speech and responsible government as ‘British liberties’ rather than universal rights. In 1923, when the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association mobilized a campaign against segregated schools, they argued that “segregation is contrary to all British Ideals of Justice [and] Fair Play.” Such a limited conception of rights – premised on citizenship rather than humanity – partly explains how even ardent defenders of liberty at the time could deny women the vote or equal treatment for minorities.

One of the great misconceptions of Canadian history is that the horrors of the Holocaust inspired Canadians to embrace universal human rights principles. In fact, the federal government was opposed to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Discrimination remained a fact of life for many Canadians for decades after the war. The real trans-
formation began around the time of the centennial. Governments began passing sophisticated human rights laws while revising other statutes to better protect individual freedoms. The federal government also embraced human rights as a component of foreign policy. By the 1970s, Canada was imposing sanctions on human rights violators abroad, funding international human rights organizations and acceding to numerous treaties. Meanwhile, social movements dedicated to human rights proliferated across the country. There was an unprecedented level of mobilization and activism in the late 1960s. Finally, many political elites and social movements began advocating for a constitutional bill of rights, which culminated in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982.

The most significant development, however, was far subtler. By 1967, human rights had become the common vernacular for framing grievances. A search of the term ‘human rights’ in two of the country’s largest newspapers – the Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail – show very little use of the term for most of their history. Beginning in the 1960s, however, there was a dramatic shift as it became increasingly common to frame social problems as human rights violations.

The pervasiveness of ‘rights talk’ has since become manifest in almost every aspect of Canadian life. The original anti-discrimination laws only applied to race, religion and ethnicity. Fifty years later, these laws ban discrimination on more than a dozen grounds, from sexual orientation to family status. At the same time, laws that have existed for over a century have been struck down because they violate the principle of human rights. In the past few years alone, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled against solicitation laws, recognized a right to collective bargaining and struck down prohibitions on assisted suicide. Rights-talk has also transformed politics. During the Parliamentary hearings around a proposed federal bill of rights in 1947 and 1950, most Parliamentarians and community organizations only asked for recognition of speech, association, assembly, press, religion, equal treatment and due process. In 1980-1, however, during the hearings over the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, people demanded constitutional recognition of rights to language, learning, health care, education, minimum wage, self-determination, rest and leisure, meaningful work, abortion, day care, mobility, family reunification, cultural retention and much more. More recently, during the cross-country hearings in 2009 for the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, people framed an even broader range of issues as human rights violations: Aboriginal peoples’ loss of language, culture and beliefs systems; poverty and violence against women; bullying on school yards; ecological devastation; underemployment; social exclusion; and more.

What is significant is not that people were demanding redress for these and other social problems. People have been mobilizing around poverty for generations. Rather, for the first time in history, it was now common for people to frame these problems as violations of fundamental human rights.

The transformation of Canadians’ rights culture is evident today in everything from opinion polls to positions adopted by advocacy groups. 70% of respondents to a 1960 poll overwhelmingly agreed that married women should not be given equal opportunity with men for jobs. A 1968 poll asked
FIGURE 1: THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 1850 TO 2009, NUMBER OF HITS FOR THE TERM HUMAN RIGHTS

FIGURE 2: THE TORONTO STAR, 1850 TO 2009, NUMBER OF HITS FOR THE TERM HUMAN RIGHTS
whether homosexual behaviour (conducted in private) should be criminalized: 41% answered yes, and 42% said no. In a poll conducted in 1982, however, 69% agreed that discrimination against racial minorities should be prohibited and 77% supported a ban on sex discrimination. A 1999 poll found that a vast majority of people in Québec and Atlantic Canada (over 87%), and 75% in Ontario, supported the inclusion of sexual orientation in human rights legislation. Today, organizations as diverse as Greenpeace, B’Nai Brith, the Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty, the Elizabeth Fry Society and the Council of Canadians with Disabilities argue that access to medical treatment, housing, homelessness, exploitation of sex workers, clean water, self-determination, peace, security, child care, collective bargaining or labour mobility are human rights.

As late as the 1960s, Canadians framed social problems such as poverty or police misconduct as violations of British liberties or Christian values. In 2017, however, Canadians are more likely to believe that these social problems violate the principle of universal human rights. For many, this is cause for celebration. Framing child poverty on Aboriginal peoples’ reserves, as the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society has successful done before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, is one strategy for pressuring recalcitrant governments to act on pressing social issues.

Others, however, fear that human rights commissions will become forums for creating social policy. Moreover, there are implications to framing a broader range of grievances as human rights. Human rights is a discourse of absolutes: they are non-negotiable principles. Framing grievances as human rights places them above the pragmatic considerations of policy-making. It frames the issue in stark terms and, thus, limits any option for compromise. But resources, such as money for education or health, are not unlimited. Policy-making requires compromise. Framing issues such as funding for students with disabilities or poverty on Aboriginal people’s reserves as a human right sets the stage for a deadlocked conflict between social actors that have come to understand their grievances as non-negotiable rights. It also provides a justification for governments to deny resources to those in need by insisting that they are fulfilling the human rights of others. And there are unintended consequences to encouraging people to frame any and all grievances as human rights. An Ontario judge ruled in 2014 that Aboriginal peoples had a “constitutionally protected right to pursue their traditional medicine.” The judge permitted a mother to remove her 11-year-old Aboriginal daughter with leukemia from chemotherapy and place her in a holistic healing centre in Florida.

For most Canadians, the centennial celebrations and Expo ’67 symbolized a coming of age for the country and asserting its place on the world stage. The transformation of Canada’s rights culture at this time was equally symbolic of a new engagement with the world. For the first time in history, most Canadians used the global language of human rights to frame their grievances rather than the more parochial notion of British liberties. These post-1967 developments constituted an astonishing change for a country that, until then, had no human rights movement, no human rights laws, no concern for human rights abuses abroad and opposed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
generation arising from the centennial celebrations and Expo ’67 would redefine Canada as a world leader in promoting human rights abroad. It was, to be sure, a flawed revolution that failed many people. Child poverty remains rampant, women routinely face discrimination, and Aboriginal peoples rank last in almost every study of social equality. Still, it was a genuine revolution that affected almost every aspect of Canadians’ lives.
There was a palpable sense of Canada’s coming of age on the world stage during the country’s centennial celebrations in 1967. Expo 67 greeted the world and the world saw Canada in a new way. With a new flag devoid of the Union Jack, foreigners increasingly saw Canada as discarding vestiges of its British colonial past. Expo host Montréal was Canada’s lively bicultural metropolis. The dispositional pre-requisites of British Canadians’ Britishness were evaporating as Britain’s power internationally continued to ebb. Nevertheless, those of British ethnic origins continued to sit atop the country’s political, economic, and social pecking orders.¹

Also pivotal in 1967 was the introduction of a liberalized immigration policy, giving people from all over the world equal opportunity for admission. Immigrants were no longer identified by their ethnic origins but by their education, occupational skills, and language. This opened the door to Canada for many professional and skilled Asians as well as others from many lands and cultures.

During the centennial celebrations, a Royal Commission acknowledged and promoted bilingualism and biculturalism. Simultaneously, the children and grandchildren of the flood of early twentieth century European immigrants were unwinding their lingering Old World identities; acculturating, intermarrying, and assimilating largely into the English-speaking group in a post-Holocaust world increasingly taken with individual rights. The concept of Canada as an "equal partnership" of two founding peoples, English and French, pervaded federal government thinking.

Others who had settled in the country over the century chafed at their secondary status. J. B. Rudnyckyj, a Galician-born immigrant folklorist and member of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, promoted the recognition of the needs and contributions of other ethnic groups to Canada’s cultural enrichment beyond those speaking the “two colonial languages.” This soon led to a multicultural policy in 1971, the world’s first. It represented a form of “liberal multiculturalism,” the belief that the recognition and accommodation of ethnic diversity strengthens democratic institutions and diminishes ethnic hierarchies while expanding human rights and freedoms.


The new constitution entrenched official bilingualism and directed the judiciary to interpret newly enshrined individual and group rights in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the country’s multicultural heritage. The Reform Party, which sprang up in 1987 and became the second largest party in Parliament in 1997, derided the B&B Commission’s conception of Canada “as unfair to the vast majority of unilingual Canadians.” It also vowed to eliminate funding for multiculturalism programs and abolish the Department of Multiculturalism, created in 1984, that administered them. Other critics castigated multiculturalism as a wrong-headed policy that divided Canadians. They contended multiculturalism encouraged groups to highlight rather than downplay their “tribalisms,” putting Canada at risk of ethnic balkanization.

Many Quebeckers felt the multiculturalism policy as an imposition by English Canada that reduced the status of biculturalism and weakened Québec’s ability to shield its distinctive character. In their view, the underlying assumption of multiculturalism is that there are no primary cultures, just multiple cultures of equal worth and status. Quebeckers posited “interculturalism” as an alternative; this would take the centrality of Québec’s francophone culture for granted and seek to integrate other minorities into that common public culture. This model combines multiculturalism’s sensitivity to diversity with a secularist sensitivity to universal rights. Interculturalism is not so much a matter of difference in policy as of narrative and identity; it is

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5 For example, NEIL BISSONDATH, Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada (Toronto: Penguin 1994), and REGINALD W. BIBBY, Mosaic Madness: The Poverty and Potential of Life in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1990).
about the ongoing association of a French-speaking people in a historically stable community.7

The 1996 census underscored the new reality of Canada’s multicultural society. For the first time, only a minority of the immigrant population was born in Britain and other European countries.8 In 1970, the top two immigrant source countries had been the United Kingdom and the United States. Only three of the top ten immigrant sources – the West Indies, India, and China – were non-traditional. By 2010, seven of the top ten source countries were non-traditional, led by the Philippines. Canadian governments also began to view multiculturalism as an economic resource, leveraging the knowledge and experience of immigrants to attract foreign investment and expand trade with immigrants’ countries of origin.

As Canadian society became more secular, poly-ethnic, and religiously diverse, foreign cultural practices have emerged as a political issue. In the 2015 federal election, the government party campaigned against “barbaric cultural practices” (as if “honour killings” and female genital mutilation were common practices among some immigrant groups) and against women wearing a niqab at citizenship ceremonies.9 However, attitudes about the contributions of immigrants “bringing in new ideas and cultures” are more positive than in other western states; decreasing numbers of Canadians say there are “too many” immigrants.10 In this sesquicentennial year, another federal government has put its imprimatur on the traits of diversity and inclusiveness by putting in place a Cabinet Committee on Diversity and Inclusion, charged with improving the economic status of immigrants, promoting diversity, multiculturalism and linguistic duality, and improving relations with Indigenous peoples.11

The title of the responsible department, “Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship,” contrasts the title of the Department of Immigration and Colonization which existed from 1917 to 1936, subsequent to the decades when colonization had occurred, in large part at the expense of Indigenous peoples and when policy and public opinion were not favourable to refugees and non-European minorities.

In 1967, the Department of Indian Affairs managed the lives of most Indigenous peoples. Created in 1876, it undermined Indigenous languages and cultures in pursuit of an imaginary model of homogeneous civilizational integrity. Today, in 2017, a Department of Indigenous Services operates to close the socioeconomic gaps between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians, and another Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations works to make “foundational changes to... laws, policies and operational practices based on the recognition of rights” of Indigenous peoples and to advance

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10 Jack Jedwab, “Receiving and Giving: How Does the Canadian Public Feel about Immigration and Integration?” In John Biles, Meyer Burstein, and James Frideres, eds., Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-first Century (Kingston: Queen’s University School of Policy Studies, 2008), pp. 214 and 222.
their self-determination and self-government.\textsuperscript{12}

The intervening decades between 1967 and 2017 witnessed Anglophone and commercial flight from Montréal and larger numbers of visible minority groups arriving as immigrants; they represented almost 80% of immigrants between 2006 and 2011 and are now over 20% of the population, transforming Toronto and Vancouver; these groups will soon be the majority in these cities. The diverse immigrants of recent decades have reconfigured the meaning of national identity for established Canadians. However, the presence of the French and the Indigenous peoples makes Canada a multinational as well as a polyethnic state.

The vertical mosaic that was Canada in 1967 has not been upended, but the appearance of two refugees from China and Haiti as Governors-General, a First Nations Minister of Justice, a turbaned Sikh as Minister of Defence, and an Ismaili mayor of Calgary attests to the greater openness of the political elite to non-British, non-French, and Indigenous Canadians. The construction and reconstruction of Canadian society has meant that national identity has always been provisional, continuing to evolve, becoming significantly different from the images of the charter groups of French and British.

Jean-Philippe Warren is a professor of sociology at Concordia University in Montréal, and he holds degrees from Université Laval, the University of Montréal and the École Normale Supérieure, in Paris. The history of social sciences, social movements, indigenous peoples, and the Catholic Church are all of particular interest to him. He has written studies on Québec sociologist Fernand Dumont, painter Paul-Émile Borduas, and Honoré Beaugrand.

In a now classic article published in 1936, Robert K. Merton laid the foundation for a sociological study of the unintended consequences of social action.¹ The difficulty of such a study, however, was to trace with a minimum of assurance the thread that linked causes to their effects in time; human actions are indeed rarely sufficiently univocal to be explained by a simple action-reaction game. But Merton’s article aimed precisely at underlining how unpredictable the social trajectories of individuals and groups are, because the intentions of the actors do not always meet their objectives through the meanders of social determinisms.

It is tempting to see the Canadian experience as a particularly striking illustration of Merton’s theory. Canada has become what it is, among other things because the will of its leaders not only was unrealized, but actually took the opposite direction. In other words, Canada is a fine illustration of the proverb that suggests we should be wary of what we want. The perverse effects and unintended events that pepper its history are remarkable in their having been recycled into contemporary national rhetoric and now an integral part of the great Canadian narrative. We celebrate in 2017 a Canada that should never have been!

In this too brief article I chose to focus on four examples: the Conquest of 1760, the Act of Union of 1840, Bill 101 of 1977 and the persistence of an ethnic nationalist current after the 1995 referendum. In each case, as we shall see, what the event or action in question was supposed to provoke turned out to be short-lived, and what it meant to prevent actually happened. This analytical effort, I should

like to emphasize at the outset, should not serve to feed the reactionary ideology which denounces the perverse effects, the futility and the dangers of projects seeking to transform the social order,\(^2\) to allow us to better understand how history, far from being a rectilinear and perfectly planned march, follows unpredictable curves and bumps.

**FOUR BETRAYALS OF HISTORY**

The Conquest of 1760 was to end once and for all the "French and Indians wars" and to ensure the constitution of a hegemonic area for the British Empire of North America outside Mexico. The problem is that the elimination of the French threat, far from giving the Empire a firmer control over the continent, fostered the desire for independence of the thirteen American colonies which had hitherto depended on England for their protection. Americans began to complain of the taxes levied to reimburse the considerable expenses incurred by the Seven Years' War. Barely sixteen years later, the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America was adopted by the delegates meeting in Philadelphia.

The Act of Union of 1840 adopted one of the principal recommendations of Lord Durham, who had suggested uniting the two "English" and "French" groups in the same political entity in order to facilitate and accelerate the assimilation of the latter. The demographic imbalance, however, was to the advantage of French-speaking Canadians and it was therefore decided that each of the two former colonies, Lower Canada and Upper Canada, would receive an equal number of seats in the United Canada House of Representatives. The explosive population growth of Upper Canada almost immediately reversed the balance of power, and it was therefore the French-speaking Canadians who were ultimately protected by the new political structure. Twenty-five years later, during the constitutional discussions leading up to the BNAA, George Brown could not be more surprised at the impetus the Act of Union gave to the political dynamics of the colony:

> The scene presented by this chamber at this moment, I venture to affirm, has few parallels in history. [...] here sit to-day the descendants of the victors and the vanquished in the fight of 1759, with all the differences of language, religion, civil law and social habit, nearly as distinctly marked as they were a century ago. Here we sit to-day seeking amicably to find a remedy for constitutional evils and injustice complained of—by the vanquished? No, but complained of by the conquerors! Here sit the representatives of the British population claiming justice—only justice; and here sit the representatives of the French population, discussing in the French tongue whether we shall have it.

The Act of Union was supposed to crush French-speaking Canadians; it gave them instead the advantage of an incredible power relationship.

For its creators, Bill 101 was not only meant to give its French character back to Québec, and Montréal in particular, but also to give pride back to the people of Québec. In the eyes of the Minister of Cultural and Psychiatric Development, Camille Laurin, it was meant to allow for a collective psychotherapy session. "Time has come," Laurin used to say, "to stop thinking of our future in terms of timid sur-

vival and to regain the sense of our true greatness: that of participating fully in one of the great linguistic and cultural expressions of this vast world of which, from Québec, we are the citizens.”3 It was therefore a preliminary step in the long struggle for liberation undertaken by Québec Francophones and was to inject a necessary dose of self-confidence to achieve Québec independence. The French-language Charter, according to Laurin, reversed “the course of our history” and made the Québec people “feel at last fully at home”. “In a Québec now and forever French,” he continued, “it makes sense to foresee more recoveries, other appropriations, and other leaps forward,” among which, of course, was the “sovereignty policy”. Yet it must be concluded that Bill 101 rather blunted the linguistic fears of Francophones and facilitated their acceptance of a federal legislative framework that did not prevent them from flourishing in their language. This is why Stéphane Dion was able to talk about Bill 101 as “a great Canadian law”.

After the 1995 referendum, Québec Francophone nationalists continued to instill a certain amount of ethnicity into sovereignty. Against the multicultural policies of the federal government, no more or less assimilated to a war machine set in motion to destroy Québec nationalism by extirpating its memory roots, we sought to place Québec’s future on a horizon of collective meaning that would go beyond legal frameworks. Jacques Beauchemin was one of the main voices who supported the need for a people not to break the thread that connects it to what he did not hesitate to call a “destiny.” “What is diminishing,” he wrote, “is a representation of the political community in which the status of the Franco-Quebecer majority has asserted itself without detour.”4 The irony of the story is that these positions helped solidify the support for multiculturalism, seen by many as a response to the identity tensions of conservative nationalists. “What happened in Canada in the 1990s is best described as a conditionally inclusive form of socioethnic leveraging leading to pluralist group formation/formation of a multicultural national identity. By framing all French Canadians as Québécois nationalists, and by portraying this nationalism as outdated and ethnically oppressive, in dominant (media) discourses the image of ‘Québec’ is used as an undesirable contrast to a modern, cosmopolitan Canada where individuals of all ethnic and religious backgrounds can trade their talents for membership in the multicultural nation.”5 While the ideology of multiculturalism was declining everywhere else (Germany, United States, United Kingdom), the presence of strong ethnic nationalism in Québec paradoxically guaranteed a high level of popularity for multiculturalism in Canada.

CONCLUSION

I could give many more examples of unexpected consequences in Canadian history. The point to be made here is that Canada as we know it and celebrate it in 2017 is not only the result of enlightened and finely calculated decisions. Its development

3 CAMILLE LAURIN, quoted in Graham Fraser, Le Parti québécois, Montréal, Libre Expression, 1984, p. 124-125. Translation.
4 JACQUES BEAUCHEMIN, La souveraineté en héritage, Montréal, Boréal, 2015, p. 38. Translation.
has undergone a multitude of unforeseen detours, the scope of which it would be wrong to underestimate. What one would like to celebrate as the fulfillment of its founders’ dreams is in fact partly the result of chance and luck, as it is true that what was achieved has sometimes little to do with what was originally imagined. With a play on words, we could say that Canada is a country... unexpected!
50 YEARS OF CANADIAN CULTURE:
THE ROOTS OF OUR MODEL AND THE BIG, NEW THREAT

VICTOR RABINOVITCH

Victor Rabinovitch was for 11 years the CEO of the Canadian Museum of Civilization (now the Canadian Museum of History) and the Canadian War Museum. Previously, he was the senior official responsible for cultural policy and programs in the Department of Canadian Heritage. He is a Distinguished Fellow at the Queen’s University School for Policy Studies.

THE BEGINNINGS

Looking back over 50 years, we can see that much has changed in Canada’s cultural landscape. It is tempting to call these changes “revolutionary” because of their immense impacts on national identity, creative expression, and communications. If that is too grand a word, let us settle for “transformative”. In the 1960s, our country had limited capacity to create large-scale cultural products such as feature films, recorded music, books and professional theatre. There were essentially no policies or programs to promote a Canadian presence in the modern world of cultural industries or the performing arts. Canada was not entirely a cultural desert though it often felt like one, especially outside the main metropolitan cities.

But this feeling was deceptive. Political and social factors that would propel a ‘Canadian cultural revolution’ had in fact been gathering strength; they would have tremendous influence over the next few decades. Several important initiatives began in the period after the Second World War, notably the modern cultural vision set out in the 1951 Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences. The Massey Commission (named after its Chairman, Vincent Massey) led to the founding of Canada’s National Library (in 1953) and to the Canada Council (in 1957) to support the creative arts, the social sciences and humanities.

By the time we reached Centennial Year, 1967, a handful of energetic cultural institutions had already taken root. The decade-old Canada Council was already the authority for national arts funding. The Stratford Festival had just celebrated its 14th birthday. The Manitoba Theatre Centre was now nine years old. In Montréal, two companies born
in the 1950s, the Théâtre du Rideau Vert and the Théâtre du Nouveau Monde, had brought stability to French-language theatre, creating demand for the newly-formed National Theatre School. Three ballet companies were operating (in Winnipeg, Toronto and Montréal). A small number of authors in both English and French were achieving wide recognition. The National Film Board, Canada’s only significant film producer, had evolved from wartime propaganda into the genres of animation, documentaries and some feature films.

CBC and Radio-Canada were omnipresent in 1967. They were the only options for live-to-air and filmed broadcasting. The new technology of television already dominated culture and entertainment. Performers and writers for the small screen were household names: people such as Juliette, Norman DePoe and Patrick Watson or, on the French-language side, René Lévesque, Denise Pelletier and Roger Lemelin.

Private television in Canada was still in its infancy. In 1967, the CTV network shared only a minimum of news coverage and programming, mainly American, among its member stations. The French-language TVA network was just an informal arrangement between three stations in Québec. Private radio, particularly in English, was dominated by American recorded music presented by Canadian DJs and supported by local advertising: it was a lucrative business.

The period around 1967 stands out for its optimism. Canada had made an outsized contribution to victory in the Second World War, emerging with a strong ‘can-do’ spirit. Together with massive economic and demographic changes, our political system became both more activist and nationalist, which was reflected in a raft of new social policies. The Canada Pension Plan, Old Age Security, Medicare, and the Maple Leaf flag injected a progressive spirit into the symbols of nationhood. Cultural initiatives were part of this, with the creation of a national broadcasting regulator (the CRTC), a national film development agency (Telefilm), and the adoption of tax measures to protect advertising revenues in newspapers, magazines and broadcasting.

Across the country, there was a huge menu of Centennial Year projects, topped by the tremendous success of Montréal’s Expo 67. In cultural terms, Expo was far more than an entertainment spectacle. A new face for Canadian identity was forged by the quality of the Canadian-themed exhibitions, the brilliance of the National Film Board’s immersive “Labyrinth” experience, the Bell Canada 360-degree tour across the land, plus many provincial exhibitions. Centennial projects vastly expanded Canada’s capacity for cultural performance. The results were breathtaking, and 50 years later they still remain the cornerstones of cities across the country: Ottawa’s National Arts Centre, the Provincial Museum in Edmonton (now the R.A.M.), the Vancouver Museum, arts centres in London, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Charlottetown and St. John’s, plus many local libraries and the Grand Théâtre in Québec City (which opened in 1972).

But the 1967 celebrations soon collided with simmering conflicts between French and English Canada. The detailed work of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, set up in 1963, confirmed that there was systemic discrimination against French speakers and the French language. The ‘B and B Commission’ recommendations
eventually reshaped how English Canada viewed French language communities and linguistic rights. It also led to a profound shift in our perception of ethnicity and identity. This was captured in the words of Prime Minister P-E Trudeau in October 1971, who described how Canada would officially promote “a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.”

The disputes that took centre stage after 1967 defined the country for the next thirty years – literally an entire generation. While we often focus on their constitutional and economic dimensions, these conflicts had two cultural questions at their core. First, how could the French fact of Canada – its language, history and culture – best be preserved and expanded? Second, how could the identity of other peoples of Canada, with their own voices and spaces, best be protected and promoted?

Politics and the arts are closely related, a basic truth which explains and justifies the use of state power to protect national symbols, linguistic rights, and cultural voices. But just as politics can be used to promote the arts, it can also cast a shadow over them. The tense dynamic between Ottawa and Québec challenged artists and the wider public. It still does. Any contemporary political leader who does not understand this dynamic will soon enough discover that it is the ‘third rail’ of Canadian public life (as Stephen Harper learned in Québec during the 2008 election campaign).

A HOME-GROWN MODEL

Against this occasionally tense backdrop, a unique Canadian cultural model took shape over the years. I describe this as an ‘affirmative cultural model’ that uses state power and private creativity to promote expression, production and distribution. The state power is seen in a combination of careful incentives, promotional policies and regulatory restrictions, tying together federal measures and complementary (sometimes competing) provincial initiatives.

The interventionist tools deployed in this affirmative model have become more sophisticated over time. They include: stable funding for the Canada Council, focused on individual artists or arts groups; capital financing for presentation venues; funding for national arts training schools; Canadian content regulations (quotas) for radio and television; broadcast licensing requirements to balance different genres of content; distribution and ownership rules plus funding and tax credits for films, books, magazines and recorded music; and, support for museum projects.

Many of these cultural activities are directly administered by government departments, or by Crown agencies that act as regulators, creators and distributors of content and services. These include: the CBC, the CRTC, Canada Council for the Arts, Commissioner of Official Languages, Copyright Board, Telefilm, the National Film Board, the national museums, and Library and Archives. Provinces have similar cultural agencies.

Six main elements define the affirmative model for culture. These are:

1. Promotion of Canadian content choices through measures that encourage artists, writers, performers and producers;
2. Respect for freedom of expression and cultural choice (including foreign choices);

3. Access to Canadian choices to ensure the presence of Canadian cultural content in the distribution system;

4. Use of a wide range of tools to assist Canadian content, such as direct funding, regulations and licensing, and tax concessions;

5. Promotion of partnerships between different levels of government, and between private, public, international and not-for-profit interests;

6. Preservation of cultural heritage through designated institutions, legislation and tax measures.

Arts and culture constitute a large ecosystem, having a continuum of activities, beginning with individual creativity and continuing through production, distribution and marketing to consumption, memory, and retrieval. Interventions through public and private initiatives take place at many points along this continuum. The overarching goal is the promotion and protection of “Canadian Voices, Canadian Choices” (in the words of a 1988 government document). This is neither ‘protectionist’ nor ‘restrictive’, as Canada remains exceptionally open to foreign cultural products.

How far have we come since the 1960s? Simple comparisons over 50 years are not possible because detailed, consistent data about culture only began to be collected in the 1990s. However, we do have a good overview of more recent years, and the numbers are impressive. Here are some highlights reported by Statistics Canada (“Measuring Economic Impacts of Culture – 2014”):

- There were 703,900 people employed in cultural occupations in 2010 (or 4% of jobs in the economy).

- The direct GDP contribution of cultural industries was $53.2 billion (or 3.4% of total GDP).

- In comparative terms, the contribution of arts and cultural industries to GDP is more than double the total combined contribution from agriculture, fishing, forestry and hunting.

Today, federal programs, together with municipal and provincial programs, aim at a full range of cultural sectors. Programs for official languages and multicultural events, together with newer initiatives focused on Indigenous expressions, expand the scope for cultural promotion. Some highlights from 2014-15 (reported by the Department of Canadian Heritage) provide a sample of what is happening:

- In book publishing, Canadian-owned firms published approximately 80% of all Canadian-authored books, and accounted for about 60% of total domestic sales. The book fund run by the federal department supported 6,439 Canadian titles.

- In music recording, Canadian-owned companies released 87% of Canadian recordings. However, multinational companies generated most industry revenues (about 73%).

- Federal support in other cultural areas reached 1,115 not-for-profit performing arts compan-
ies (such as orchestras, theatres and dance groups), as well as 600 performing arts festivals in more than 250 communities. In the museum sector, which largely falls under provincial jurisdiction, there are now 2,500 not-for-profit heritage institutions, with about 50 of these being large-scale while the others are smaller and local.

THE NEW THREAT

In comparison with what was produced some 50 years ago, this is a time of plenty. There has been a blossoming of Canadian content in virtually every sector of cultural production (with the notable exception of daily newspapers, which have been shutting down to a worrying degree, though that is a global problem). The strengths of different regions are notable, as are the recent efforts to promote Indigenous cultural expressions. International recognition of Canadian artistry has also expanded greatly.

But this is also a time of great threats, as Canada faces new challenges from the American cultural colossus and from the digital disruption of production and distribution models. If cultural activists from the 1960s were transported into our era, they would know nothing about the Internet and digital processes but they would easily recognize the Californian business model of treating Canada as a regional market for American distributors, with no interest in Canadian voices and no sensitivity to our smaller economies of scale or our French culture. It was the invention of a Canadian cultural model beginning in the 1960s, supported by successive Liberal and Conservative governments, which enabled cultural industries and arts expression to emerge and flourish here.

Today’s rapid rise of digital distribution systems owned by American Internet giants is, by far, the greatest threat to Canadian cultural expression. The operation of Netflix, Amazon, Facebook and similar cultural platforms, whether in ‘streaming’ or ‘aggregating’ content, risks repeating what happened to Canada when the Hollywood studios took control of production and distribution in the young film industry. The federal government’s response to the Internet threat (first identified in 1996 by the Information Highway Advisory Committee) has been marked by denial and confusion. Both the CRTC and political ministers have repeatedly refused to use the well-developed tools of the Canadian cultural model, under the premise that the online world is a ‘neutral’ platform and not technically subject to democratic governance.

Yet cyberspace is, at the end of a day, a space like any other. Just as the Canadian government, starting in the 1960s, took a more proactive approach to ensuring that there would be Canadian voices in books, television and music, so too can it make a mark online. There are available options for positive interventions in the Internet world through legal and financial measures to promote and sustain local creativity. The European Union has started to blaze a trail in this regard, setting,... for example, quotas for European content on Netflix and Amazon. Once, it was Canada that led in devising sensible solutions for defending cultural diversity, and the world came to study our model. Now, it is our turn to learn from others, if we wish to protect cultural sovereignty and national expression.
HAS THE COUNTRY REALLY CHANGED ALL THAT MUCH IN THE PAST 50 YEARS?

JACK BUMSTED

Jack Bumsted, a retired University of Manitoba historian, is a prolific author with numerous award-winning titles, including his 2008 biography Lord Selkirk: A Life, winner of the J.W. Dafoe Book Prize for excellence in Canadian non-fiction writing. Bumsted had previously won the prize for his 1988 book Land, Settlement, and Politics on Eighteenth-Century Prince Edward Island. Bumsted was born in the U.S. and emigrated to Canada in the 1960s. He and his family operate the Whodunit Mystery Bookstore in Winnipeg.

Writing this essay required me to reflect on the 50 years that I have been living in Canada, 1967-2017. What surprised me most, when I thought about it, was how little Canada has really changed culturally during that period.

This reaction may seem to be surprising given the changes that have occurred, particularly in the ways that we communicate with one another. However, in the larger picture, which as a historian, should be the way that I approach the topic, not nearly as much is different now than it was then. Although they may be powered by electricity rather than leaded gasoline, the cars we drive today are conceptually the same as the ones that we drove to and from Expo half a century ago. We may no longer care whether it is rude or not for a woman to smoke while driving or walking (as a question asked in a 1967 Gallup Poll) but we have not yet created a Canada where people of any gender or identification can live without bias or restriction.

What I am most struck by in the period under review is the tremendous amount of immigration that has occurred, much of it from areas that hitherto were minimally represented, if at all, within Canada’s borders. Increased immigration, whatever its circumstances, whether from Asia, the islands of the Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, and central and southern America, has filled Canada with an abundance of new cultures and languages. However, the day-to-day lives of Canadians have not been changed nearly as dramatically by these new populations as some might have expected. There have been, and likely always will be, ethnic enclaves, pocket communities, and spaces that facilitate access to “foreign” traditions within our towns and cities. Chinese restaurants and laundries populated nearly every town in the Canadian West long before a Tim Hortons was planted in those
HAS THE COUNTRY REALLY CHANGED ALL THAT MUCH IN THE PAST 50 YEARS? - JACK BUMSTED

places; just as there were always delicatessens specializing in various Eastern European meats and groceries, and Catholic services offered in Spanish or Italian in our various cities. While there are, as a whole, an increased number of ethnically focused eateries, traditional garment makers, and non-Christian spaces of worship across Canada, this can be explained by the overall increase in Canada’s population since 1967 rather than a significant change to Canada’s cultural diversity.

With the possible exception of our food culture, in fact, there is an argument to be made that Canada has been more influential on these groups than they have been on Canada. That notable cultural touchstone, “Hockey Night in Canada” (HNIC) being broadcast in Punjabi as it has been on and off since 2008, is just one example of this. While it is certainly not the only example of an immigrant culture taking a serious interest in a stereotypically unifying cultural activity (of which there may be none more stereotypical than hockey), it nonetheless is notable. Conversely, the introduction of these communities and their interests in other sports, whether it be soccer, team handball, cricket or kabbadi, have not been felt on a cultural level in Canada as a whole. With the exception of a handful of female soccer players, Canada has not produced a world-class player in a sport that would be considered to be one brought to this country from outside its dominant traditions. And while HNIC is not the cultural touchstone today that it was in 1967, the difficult to pinpoint “Canadian” culture has nevertheless proven to be robust enough not just to survive introduction of outside forces, but to be the foundation upon which those groups can build shared interests within our communities.

It is also notable that we have become increasingly aware of the United States and their politics, especially in the more recent past. More importantly, it has become clearer that while in previous ages, the culture and success of the U.S.A has been quite enticing to Canadians, this is seemingly no longer the case. It is now clear that the fruit which the U.S. offers so readily has a bitter and poisonous underpinning of racism, violence and unfettered consumption. While these dangers are not exclusively American — or, in fact, totally absent from Canada — apart from such influences, it is a very real change in Canadian culture to reject them. The shift away from our largest outside influencer is important, especially as it has not been paralleled by a corresponding growth in other cultural influences.

Interestingly, and more importantly, the one area of the country in which there has been a significant change has been in Indigenous relations. This is a largely internal shift in approach, however, rather than one that has been brought about by increased cultural diversity from outside. The most important shift, which has come in terms of the attitudes of the two “core” ethnic groups — Western European and the Indigenous — is significant because the majority of Canadians still do not realize how much impact Indigenous people have had on our history, but also how significant their efforts have been in the cultural changes which have gone on in this past half century. For example, the way that Canadians have been forced to examine the historical impacts of the characters and events of our past is perhaps the biggest change in Canada culturally. We, as Canadians, no longer view John A. Macdonald, Louis Riel, Nellie McClung, and many other figures through the same Anglo-centric lens as we did less than a generation ago. Instead, we are
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seeing these people, the actions that they took, and the events in which they were major players, from a new perspective.

It is also notable that, as a government, Canada has finally attempted to start to reconcile some of the longstanding problems that have been created in the past. It has often been easier, however, for Canada as an entity to apologize for the negative actions that it took upon outsiders than to confront those much more ingrained in our past. Canada has since 1967 made apologies for the internment of Japanese people during World War II, for the denial of access to Canada for the people on the Komagata Maru in 1914, and the St. Louis in 1939. These apologies to “outsiders” such as the Japanese, Sikhs and European Jews do not internally change us. Apologies to Indigenous people on the other hand have been so difficult because they came close to striking at the foundations of our society. It is not that any of these apologies to outsiders were insincere, it is just that they did not significantly alter the day-to-day life in Canada. Once we as Canadians began to come to terms with the actions that were taken against Canada’s Indigenous people, we were changed. Official apologies for Residential Schools (June 11, 2008) and the Sixties Scoop (Manitoba government, June 17, 2015) have been more challenging for many Canadians to accept, as it has led to a shift in the relationship between Indigenous Canadians and “white” Canadians.

50 years ago, the only way people of similar interest could communicate was to congregate, through public messaging that would have unknown impacts, or through one-to-one interaction using technology like the telephone. Now, we can communicate, plan and express ourselves — for good or for ill — instantly, in a wide range of public or private formats. It is, as a result, just as easy to find someone who shares our fears and prejudices and reinforces them as it is to find someone who will help us fight prejudice, or change our opinions. Unfortunately, if we are not careful, as it proves easier and easier to communicate, we may find ourselves so insulated in our opinions that in future years we may be unable to continue the positive steps we have taken in the last 50.

The pace of the dissemination of information in Canada has led the country to believe that it has changed a great deal. Turning on the screens in our homes or, increasingly, in our pockets allows us to instantly find the perspectives that agree and disagree with our own. This gives us the feeling that Canada is changing faster than we can process, but we are most likely simply matching the pace of the rest of the world.

However, this speeding of the dissemination of information has not really resulted in any real change or any greater cultural acceptance. The dramatic changes in the ways in which we communicate and disseminate information through the Internet and social media have provided Canadians of all perspectives an opportunity to not just voice their opinions, but to make it easier to find similar voices.
Jack Jedwab is the President and CEO of the Association for Canadian Studies and the Canadian Institute for Identities and Migration. Holding a PhD in Canadian History from Concordia University, he taught at Université du Québec à Montréal and McGill University. He taught courses on the history of immigration in Québec, on ethnic minorities in Québec, on official language minorities in Canada and on sport in Canada. He also wrote essays for books, journals and newspapers across the country, in addition to being the author of various publications and government reports on issues of immigration, multiculturalism, human rights and official languages.

On 24 July 1967, during a state visit to Expo ’67, France’s President General Charles de Gaulle proclaimed: “Vive le Québec libre (long live a free Québec)” from the balcony of Montréal’s City Hall. In making this declaration he lent credibility to Québec’s burgeoning independence movement at a pivotal time in the unity of the country. The government of Canada viewed de Gaulle’s words as adding insult to injury as it occurred on the occasion of the President’s official visit to the country as it marked its 100th anniversary. It put a damper on the celebratory mood across much of Canada. Underlying the celebration was much concern amongst the political class of the fragile state of the relationship between English and French Canadians. Canada’s Prime Minister Lester Pearson tended to exercise great caution when speaking about Québec in the context of the festivities of the centenary and he generally limited his public remarks about Québec to the important contribution of the French population to the edification of Canada.

It is understandable that de Gaulle’s remarks were seen as damaging for those who hoped to make the centennial an opportunity to promote unity then so badly needed between English and French Canadians. Some fifty years later, there remains debate about whether de Gaulle’s remarks were a deliberate effort to bolster the independence movement or if he simply got carried away by the exuberant crowd that heard his words at City Hall. Either way, the speculation around what motivated de Gaulle has become a moot point. There has since been no convincing argument that has altered the generally accepted meaning and intent of the now famous pronouncement. Those Québec sovereignists old
enough to remember the event will inevitably embrace de Gaulle as a champion of the cause of Québec independence.

The reaction to de Gaulle’s remarks by the government of Canada was quite swift. His intervention was described as a hostile encroachment by the leader of the a foreign government in the domestic affairs of Canada. The federal Minister of Justice (and the country’s future Prime Minister) Pierre-Elliot Trudeau insisted that if a Canadian Prime Minister shouted publicly “Brittany to the Bretons” the reaction in France would have been no less severe. De Gaulle was unimpressed by Trudeau, saying some years later that “Nous n’avons aucune concession, ni même aucune amabilité, à faire à M. Trudeau, qui est l’adversaire de la chose française au Canada.” (“We have not one concession, nor even any courtesy, to extend to Mr Trudeau, who is the enemy of the French fact in Canada.”)

The response from René Lévesque was unsympathetic to de Gaulle. Prior to emerging as the iconic leader of Québec’s independence movement, Lévesque was a prominent Québec politician with the federalist Québec Liberal party. Lévesque was purportedly stunned by de Gaulle’s remarks and insisted that Quebecers did not need to be told what to do by France.¹

As reflected in much of the national media, the ensuing diplomatic uproar resulted in de Gaulle cutting short his visit to Canada. The day after his speech, de Gaulle visited Expo 67 and hosted a banquet at the French pavilion and then rather than continuing his scheduled visit to Ottawa to meet with Prime Minister Lester Pearson, he chose to return to France.

THE LATE SIXTIES IN CONTEXT

As noted above, the 1960s were marked by important strains in the relationship between Québec and the rest of Canada (specifically between French and English Canadians). When asked in a September 1967 Gallup poll, some 42% of Canadians felt that relations between English and French-speaking Canadians had worsened over the previous five years (while some 30% felt that relations had gotten better over that period). An earlier Gallup Poll (conducted in January 1967) revealed that the vast majority of English Canadians felt that Canada’s French population was well treated in both business and the civil service. (Canadian Gallup Poll, January 1967, #322). Yet during the late 1960s, the percentage of francophones in the public service of Canada was well below the share of francophones in the overall population of the country. Since that decade, the share of francophones in the federal civil service rose from about 20% in 1964 to nearly 30% by the beginning of the 21st century which is well ahead of the share of francophones in the Canadian population. Francophone representation in management positions in the federal public service has increased from 10.4% in 1964 to 18% in 1978 and to 30% in 2007.²

In that same decade, earnings amongst French Canadians were considerably less than they were for English Canadians. The economic condition of


Québec’s French population improved dramatically by the 1990s and by 2016 Statistics Canada data on income revealed that in Québec, annual median revenue was higher for the province’s mother tongue francophones than it was for Anglophones. Still during the 1990s, there remained sufficient resentment on the part of French Quebecers for historic inequities and a widely held sentiment that English Canadians refused to acknowledge the unique position that the French language occupied in Canada (as reflected for many Quebecers by the failed efforts at recognizing Québec’s difference in the Constitution). The sense of grievance felt by many Québec francophones enabled Québec’s independence movement to galvanize sufficient support to make for the narrowest of outcomes in the 1995 Québec referendum on sovereignty.

QUÉBEC AND CANADA: FIFTY YEARS LATER

Public interest in the 100th and 150th anniversaries of the country was roughly similar amongst Canadians. Polls conducted in 2017 reveal that there was considerably less enthusiasm among Québec francophones for the 150th anniversary commemorations than there was for other Canadians. Fewer than one in ten Québec francophones reported that they were very interested in the 150th anniversary and another one in three said they were fairly interested. When asked about participation in the 150th anniversary events, the intention to do so was even lower amongst Québec francophones.

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOW INTERESTED WOULD YOU SAY YOU, YOURSELF, ARE IN CANADA’S 150TH ANNIVERSARY / CENTENNIAL YEAR</th>
<th>2017 LÉGER</th>
<th>1967 GALLU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY INTERESTED</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAIRLY INTERESTED</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOT INTERESTED</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN’T SAY</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DO YOU THINK THAT TODAY THE FEELINGS BETWEEN ENGLISH-SPEAKING AND FRENCH-SPEAKING CANADIANS ARE BETTER OR WORSE THAN THEY WERE SAY FIVE YEARS AGO?</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BETTER</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORSE</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON’T KNOW/SAME</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Canadian Gallup Poll, September 1967, #325 and Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies
As regards relations between English- and French-speaking Canadians the 2017 survey suggests a much improved perception over the sentiment in 1967. In effect, more Canadians regard the relationship as better than they do worse, which is in marked contrast with the results on a similar question in 1967. The results lend little support to anyone who might wish to engage in nostalgia around an era where relations between French and English Canadians were more stable. Indeed, as regards the francophones surveyed in 2017, some 50% believe the relationship is better, while less than one in five think it’s worse.

Some fifty years and two failed referendums later, the Québec independence movement is stagnant. Its current leadership appear unable to persuade enough Quebecers of the need to for a breakup from Canada. This isn’t necessarily because of the quality of the individuals who are currently at the head of the movement as much as it’s about the changing economic and political condition of francophones in Québec and elsewhere in Canada. As revealed in the table below, there is a perception that Quebecers’ desire for separation from Canada is quite low, with fewer than one in ten Canadians who describe such sentiment as very strong (a marked difference by contrast with the results in 1967). Another one in three Canadians feel that the desire for separation is fairly strong. Still, the results amongst Quebeckers give the impression that there is even less enthusiasm for a breakup, with some 3% indicating that the feeling is very strong and another 20% that it is very strong.

### Table 3

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY STRONG</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAIRLY STRONG</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOT VERY STRONG</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN’T SAY</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: De Gaulle: the Aftermath

De Gaulle’s intervention contributed to a change in the way that sovereignists and for matter other Quebecers viewed the province’s relationship with France. The country became seen as a potential ally of Québec’s independence movement. For Robin Gendron, de Gaulle’s visit in 1967 was arguably the pivotal event in the France-Québec rapprochement of the 1960s. He describes de Gaulle’s speech as the “…symbolic culmination of France’s renewed interest in Québec and the national and cultural development of the French Canadian people after two centuries of relative neglect.”

Gendron adds that “…the current scholarly consensus surrounding France-Québec relations in the 1960s holds that de Gaulle, and through him the
French government and state, developed a firm belief in Québec's right to national independence in the early to-mid 1960s and were convinced that France was compelled to support it because of the ties of history, culture, and sympathy that bound France to Québec."

In the aftermath of the collapse of the French colonial empire, some observers contend that de Gaulle and France were transformed into champions of decolonization for the world’s remaining colonized peoples, especially for Quebercers. The idea that France had embraced such a mission is, according to Gendron, highly debatable if not manifestly incorrect. In point of fact, the only national aspirations that intrinsically mattered to de Gaulle and the French state were those of France itself, as can be demonstrated through even a cursory examination of the government’s attitude toward another emerging “nationalist” movement half-way around the world from Québec in one of France’s remaining colonial territories, the Pacific territory of New Caledonia.

It’s worth noting that in the years that followed his famous speech, de Gaulle gave neither additional support for an independent Québec nor did he encourage any of his political successors to do so. Hence no subsequent French President has extended such a ringing endorsement to the Québec sovereignty movement. In 2008, in the midst of the global financial crisis, French President Nicholas Sarkozy declared that “the world needs a strong, united Canada that can take a leadership role”. He described Canada as an ally of France and added that: “...if there is anyone who tells me that in today’s world, we need more division, we do not see the world in the same way.”

Judging by his initial feel-good interaction with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, it doesn’t appear that current French President Emmanuel Macron sees things very differently.

CONCLUSION

As noted, when de Gaulle made his declaration, francophones in Québec and elsewhere in Canada encountered considerable economic inequality and were severely underrepresented in the federal civil service. As pointed out above, that changed dramatically by the turn of the century. The ideas of the sixties that saw Québec independence as a form of decolonization are a very tough sell today as the historic grievances that traditionally defined the sovereignty movement no longer carry the same resonance for most Québec francophones and notably appear to connect less with the younger generation. Collectively, Québec francophones no longer face the kinds of barriers and inequities they did in the 1960s and for many the feelings of resentment towards other Canadians seem increasingly like a distant memory. The younger generation of Quebecers will undoubtedly have greater difficulty relating to de Gaulle and his message despite the reminder some may have gotten had they even heard about the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of his “Vive le Québec Libre” speech.